What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of Value

Value and reasons for action are often cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation often deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to some perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for some action just in case it indicates that something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, I attack the alleged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking the means to our ends is explicable in terms of our desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between value judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the connection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made from the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails motivation. But often we conversationally borrow external perspectives of desire, and subsequent judgements do not entail motivation. This analysis drives a critique of a common practice as a misuse of normative language. The "absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, analyze normative language in such a way as to justify the imposition of certain interests over others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent - in denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which is always indexed to some particular set of desires.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research

Revised 2006-06

Endogenous Formation of Competing Partnership with Moral Hazard

Published as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44, issue 1, pages 183-194.

Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).

International Support of Climate Change Policies in Developing Countries: Strategic, Moral and Fairness Aspects

33 p.

La ética y el riesgo moral de las entidades financieras

[ES] Actualmente nos econtramos sumergidos en una de las mayores crisis económicas conocidas hasta el momento, la cual ha dado lugar a diversos debates sobre las posibles causas de la misma. Entre ellas, últimamente, han tomado cierta relevancia términos como la ética bancaria y el riesgo moral, los cuales permiten establecer una concordancia entre las actitudes de la banca en los años previos al año 2007 y el estallido de la crisis económica. Es necesario, por tanto, el análisis de casos concretos como Bankia, CAM y BBVA para conocer con exactitud las buenas y malas gestiones desarrolladas por las entidades financieras de nuestro entorno en los citados años. Asimismo, conviene mostrar las consecuencias de aquellas actitudes, como la pérdida de la confianza por parte de la clientela, para determinar las medidas adoptadas con objeto de reconducir el sistema financiero español, lo cual permite evaluar su grado de efectividad.

Sobre el carácter y el objeto de la crítica moral en la sátira 2.5 de Horacio

El presente artículo es una ampliación y reelaboración de la comunicación presentada en el II Encuentro Interdisciplinar sobre Retórica, Texto y Comunicación (Cádiz, 7-10 de diciembre de 1994) titulada: "El valor del diálogo en la sátira de Horacio: el ejemplo de 2.5".

La ruptura de una economía moral y las deslegitimación de las deudas hipotecarias

In Spain, during the recent housing bubble, purchasing a home seemed the most advantageous strategy to access housing, and there was a wide social consensus about the unavoidability of mortgage indebtedness. However, such consensus has been challenged by the financial and real-estate crisis. The victims of home repossessions have been affected by the transgression of several principles, such as the fair compensation for effort and sacrifice, the prioritisation of basic needs over financial commitments, the possibility of a second chance for over-indebted people, or the State's responsibility to guarantee its citizens' livelihood. Such principles may be understood as part of a moral economy, and their transgression has resulted in the emergence of a social movement, the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH), that is questioning the legitimacy of mortgage debts. The article reflects on the extent to which the perception of over-indebtedness and evictions as unfair situations can have an effect on the reproduction of the political-economic system, insofar the latter is perceived as able or unable to repair injustice.

Mapping cosmopolis: moral topographies of the medieval city

Cosmopolis is a concept that has a long history in many cultures around the globe. It is a mirroring of the 'social' and 'natural' worlds, such that in one is seen the order and the structures of the other -- a mutual 'mapping'. In this paper I examine how the presence of cosmopolis -- a Christianised cosmopolis of the European Middle Ages -- was made evident in the representation and formation of cities at that time. I reveal a dualism between the social and spatial ordering of both city and cosmos which defined and reinforced social and spatial boundaries in urban landscapes, evident for example in the 11th and 12th centuries. Recently, Toulmin (1992) has taken the idea of cosmopolis to argue that it has been a persistent presence in Western - Enlightenment science, philosophy, and religion -- a 'hidden agenda of modernity'. I contend that, as an idea, cosmopolis has a much earlier circulation in European thinking, not least in the Middle Ages. Locating cosmopolis in the medieval and the modern periods then begs a question of what is it that really makes the two distinct and separate? All too often human geographers have emphasised discontinuities between the 'medieval' and 'modern' age, locating the 'rise of modernity' some time in the Enlightenment period. However, what 'mapping' cosmopolis reveals are continuities, binding time and space together, which when looked at begin to help query the modernity concept itself.