Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Harmful transgressions qua moral transgressions: A deflationary view

One important issue in moral psychology concerns the proper characterization of the folk understanding of the relationship between harmful transgressions and moral transgressions. Psychologist Elliot Turiel and associates have claimed with a broad range of supporting evidence that harmful transgressions are understood as transgressions that are authority independent and general in scope, which, according to them, characterizes these transgressions as moral transgressions. Recently, many researchers questioned the position advocated by the Turiel tradition with some new evidence. We entered this debate proposing an original, deflationary view in which perceptions of basic-rights violation and injustice are fundamental for the folk understanding of harmful transgressions as moral transgressions in Turiel’s sense. In this article, we elaborate and refine our deflationary view, while reviewing the debate, addressing various criticisms raised against our perspective, showing how our perspective explains the existent evidence, and suggesting new lines of inquiry.

Are there different moral domains? Evidence from Mongolia

In this paper we report a study conducted in Mongolia on the scope of morality, that is, the extent to which people moralize different social domains. Following Turiel’s moral-conventional task, we characterized moral transgressions (in contrast to conventional transgressions) in terms of two dimensions: authority independence
and generality of scope. Different moral domains are then defined by grouping such moral transgressions in terms of their content (following Haidt’s classification of morally relevant domains). There are four main results of the study. First, since all five Haidtian domains were moralized by the Mongolian participants, the study provides
evidence in favour of pluralism about moral domains. However, the study also suggests that the domain of harm can be reduced to the fairness domain. Furthermore, although the strong claim about reduction of all moral domains to the domain of fairness seems not to hold, a significant number of participants did indicate considerations of fairness across domains. Finally, a significant amount of participants moralized conventional transgressions a la Turiel, but it did not reach a statistical significance.

Adam Smith, Moral Motivation and Business Ethics

This paper shows how Adam Smith’s concept of moral motivation applies to business ethics and ethical consumption. Moral motivation for Smith is embedded in his moral psychology and his theory of virtue, particularly in terms of socialization and our social interactions and in his view that people always seek approval for their conduct, either though actual or ideal spectators. It follows that right conduct depends on the spectator’s awareness of one’s conduct. Thus concerning business ethics, transparency and accountability are essential, as opposed to anonymity which is detrimental. Applying Smith’s theory of motivation to consumption entails two further points: One, information concerning business conduct without consumers seeking it and acting accordingly will only have a limited effect. Two, people’s concern for the propriety of their action can and should include consumption, such that purchasing behavior becomes a moral issue rather than a mere economic one.

Educación moral y literatura infantil : estudio de la formación moral en la infancia a partir de algunas teorías de los sentimientos morales

Este trabajo realizado como requisito de grado del programa de Filosofía de la Universidad Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario, aborda el tema de la educación moral en la infancia a partir del análisis y discusión de algunas teorías de la moral. También hace un acercamiento a la literatura infantil en lo relativo a la función que se le puede atribuir como recurso o herramienta para la formación moral. De este modo, el trabajo se estructura siguiendo una argumentación que primero pretende esclarecer los conceptos que se vinculan con el tema de la educación moral como los son el de socialización, el de infancia, el de desarrollo, el mismo concepto de educación moral, y otros que permiten identificar y problematizar esta cuestión en relación con los niños y las particularidades de su comportamiento, sus procesos cognitivos y el modo en que se dan sus relaciones sociales. Por ello el trabajo recoge aportes de la sociología y de la psicología que complementan el tema, que es observado aquí, principalmente, desde la filosofía moral. Estos conceptos ayudan a estructurar el problema que se plantea relativo a la manera cómo se construye lo moral en la infancia. A partir de ellos se desarrolla el resto del texto, primero, con el análisis crítico que se hace en el capítulo dos a la teoría racionalista de la moral, la cual se pone en discusión con los planteamientos de algunas teorías de los sentimientos morales y del desarrollo emocional. Luego, en el capítulo tres se examina la teoría de las virtudes de Aristóteles, destacando la mayor capacidad que tiene de comprender comportamientos morales no racionales, como los de la infancia, que se relacionan con lo que desde la sociología se entiende como el entorno social en el que se desarrolla la moral individual. Finalmente, en el capítulo cuatro, se examina la literatura infantil como un recurso que sirve para la formación moral en los niños, debido a los procesos cognitivos y sociales, que esta literatura favorece. En este capítulo se retoman las cuestiones tratadas a lo largo del trabajo acerca de lo moral y la formación en la infancia para ponerlas en relación con ejemplos de la literatura infantil tomados de los Cuentos de los Hermanos Grimm que permiten identificar algunos elementos que vinculan la lectura de estos cuentos con los procesos de formación moral.

Exclusão étnica, julgamento moral e emoções morais : estudo em adolescentes

Os pressupostos defendidos na declaração de Salamanca sobre a Educação Inclusiva não são fáceis de concretizar pois as pessoas, por causa de diferenças de sexo, etnia, aparência, etc, têm frequentemente condutas diferenciais. Um dos critérios sociais que mais provoca exclusão social são as diferenças étnicas, um fenómeno mais estudado pela psicologia social. Porém, a atitude de exclusão social pode estar relacionada com a competência moral dos indivíduos, uma relação que foi analisada neste estudo. Para isso recorremos ao suporte da psicologia moral que valoriza o papel das emoções na compreensão das condutas sociais, bem exemplificada nos estudos do vitimizador feliz (e.g., Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Lourenço, 1998). Nas perspectivas mais recentes da psicologia moral tem sido atribuída grande ênfase à necessidade de analisar cognições e emoções nas condutas morais (e.g., Malti & Latzko, 2010; Turiel & Killen, 2010). Apoiados no estudo de Malti, Killen & Gasser (2012) sobre a exclusão social analisámos os julgamentos e as emoções morais de adolescentes em três contextos, etnia africana, etnia cigana e género, numa amostra de 45 adolescentes, com idades entre os 13 e os 19 anos, através da aplicação de uma versão traduzida da Survey Instrument for Measuring Judgments about Emotions about Exclusion (Malti, Killen & Gasser, 2009). Os jovens avaliaram a exclusão étnica como mais incorreta que a exclusão por género mas não foram encontradas diferenças nos juízos e emoções expressas pelos portugueses e estrangeiros. As emoções de culpa, tristeza, vergonha, atribuídas ao excludente confirmam a avaliação negativa da atitude de exclusão. Porém, a emoção normal que revela indiferença expressa que alguns jovens avaliaram positivamente a exclusão. A intensidade emocional intermédia das emoções atribuídas mostra inconsistência com o juízo moral. Relativamente ao excluído existe consenso pois as emoções de tristeza e raiva foram as mais atribuídas. As justificações dos juízos e emoções atribuídos são de tipo diverso, ou seja, argumentos morais de justiça e igualdade, argumentos de inclusão por empatia e argumentos convencionais relativos à coesão intragrupal. A atitude de exclusão não é estritamente moral pois também é vista em função de benefícios para o funcionamento do grupo. A relação complexa entre juízos, emoções e justificações requisita mais investigação de modo a percebermos melhor os processos psicológicos que induzem a conduta social.

Kierkegaard's mirrors: Interest, self, and moral vision

What is it to see the world, other people, and imagined situations not just as morally compelling, but as making personal demands of us? What is it to experience stories as speaking to us individually and directly? Kierkegaard's Mirrors explores Kierkegaard's unique and challenging answers to these questions. Beginning with the structural account of consciousness offered in Johannes Climacus, this book develops a new phenomenological interpretation of what Kierkegaard calls 'interest': a self-reflexive mode of thought, vision and imagination that plays a central role in moral experience. Tracing this concept across Kierkegaard's work takes us through topics such as consciousness, the ontology of selfhood, ethical imagination, admiration and imitation, seeing the other, metaphors of self-recognition and mirroring, our need for transcendent meaning, and the relationship between scholarship and subjective knowledge. 'Interest' equips us with a new understanding of Kierkegaard's highly original normative, teleological account of moral vision.

Desenvolvimento moral e preconceito: um estudo sobre os juízos de crianças do ensino fundamental de uma escola inclusiva

Pós-graduação em Educação - FFC

A ética do desperdício: a influência da compaixão no querer fazer moral de adolescentes

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Relações entre os estilos parentais e juízo moral de adolescentes

Pós-graduação em Psicologia - FCLAS

A dimensão moral do cuidar na educação infantil

Present research investigated how morality has been developed from kinder garten through care relationships established between the nursery assistants, caregivers calls, and children aged 0-2 years old in order to identify if there the action of caring expressions of generosity, considered one of the virtues that are the genesis of human morality, as well as to analyze the conceptions of these nursery assistants about care as a possibility for the moral development of children. The research was based on theoretical studies of Jean Piaget (1932), a pioneer in psychological research on the development of moral judgment in children, and others who own research in the field of moral psychology related to the educational context as well as the care relationship with morality in order to support the research. The results show that the understanding of care in early child hood education is still superficial and based on concepts related to welfare, including caring in a limited way, just as an action aimed at the physical integrity of children. Unable to note concerns and moral development of children, taking care as a support. We hope this research instigate reflections on the importance of care in day care and their contributions to the moral awakening the children they serve

Intelligent Automaticity in Moral Judgment and Decision-Making

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-05

The influence of fatalistic beliefs on risky road use behavior in developing countries

There is little discussion of fatalism in the road safety literature, and limited research. However, fatalism is a potential barrier to participation in health-promoting behaviours, particularly among the populations of developing countries and to some extent in developed countries. Many people still believe in divine discretion and magical powers as causes of road crashes in different parts of the world. Fatalistic beliefs and beliefs in mystical powers and superstition appear to influence perceptions of crash risk and consequently lead people to take risks and neglect safety measures. Fatalistic beliefs may cause individuals to be resigned to risks because they cannot do anything to reduce these risks.