Moral asymmetries in judgments of agency withstand ludicrous causal deviance

Americans have been shown to attribute greater intentionality to immoral than to amoral actions in cases of causal deviance, that is, cases where a goal is satisfied in a way that deviates from initially planned means (e.g., a gunman wants to hit a target and his hand slips, but the bullet ricochets off a rock into the target). However, past research has yet to assess whether this asymmetry persists in cases of extreme causal deviance. Here, we manipulated the level of mild to extreme causal deviance of an immoral versus amoral act. The asymmetry in attributions of intentionality was observed at all but the
most extreme level of causal deviance, and, as we hypothesized, was mediated by attributions of Blame/credit and judgments of action performance. These findings are discussed as they support a multiple-concepts interpretation of the asymmetry, wherein blame renders a naïve concept of intentional action (the outcome matches the intention) more salient than a composite concept (the outcome matches the intention and was brought about by planned means), and in terms of their implications for cross-cultural research on judgments of agency.

Out of time: The moral temporality of sex, crime and taboo

This paper discusses the relationship between law and morality. Morality does not necessarily coincide with the law, but it contributes to it. An act may be legal but nevertheless considered to be immoral in a particular society. For example, the use of pornography may be considered by many to be immoral. Nevertheless, the sale and distribution of non-violent, non-child related, sexually explicit material is legal (or regulated) in many jurisdictions. Many laws are informed by, and even created by, morality. This paper examines the historical influence of morality on the law and on society in general. It aims to develop a theoretical framework for examining legal moralism and the social construction of morality and crime as well as the relationship between sex, desire and taboo. Here, we refer to the moral temporality of sex and taboo, which examines the way in which moral judgments about sex and what is considered taboo change over time, and the kinds of justifications that are employed in support of changing moralities. It unpacks the way in which abstract and highly tenuous concepts such as ‘‘desire’’, ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘entertainment’’ may be ‘‘out of time’’ with morality, and how morality shapes laws over time, fabricating justifications from within socially constructed communities of practice. This theoretical framework maps the way in which these concepts have become temporally dominated by heteronormative structures such as the family, marriage, reproduction, and longevity. It is argued that the logic of these structures is inexorably tied to the heterosexual life-path, charting individual lives and relationships through explicit phases of childhood, adolescence and adulthood that, in the twenty-first century, delimit the boundaries of taboo surrounding sex more than any other time in history.

Moral expansiveness: Examining variability in the extension of the moral world

The nature of our moral judgments—and the extent to which we treat others with care—depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of moral consideration— our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians, and social scientists have noted that people’s moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This research explores variations in the size of individuals’ moral boundaries using the psychological construct of moral expansiveness and introduces the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), designed to capture this variation. Across 6 studies, we established the reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity, “moral” universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth), and other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity, connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to engage in prosocial intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, willingness to sacrifice one’s life to save others (ranging from human out-groups to animals and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Authority dependence and judgments of utilitarian harm

Three studies tested the conditions under which people judge utilitarian harm to be authority dependent (i.e., whether its right or wrongness depends on the ruling of an authority). In Study 1, participants judged the right or wrongness of physical abuse when used as an interrogation method anticipated to yield useful information for preventing future terrorist attacks. The ruling of the military authority towards the harm was manipulated (prohibited vs. prescribed) and found to significantly influence judgments of the right or wrongness of inflicting harm. Study 2 established a boundary condition with regards to the influence of authority, which was eliminated when the utility of the harm was definitely obtained rather than forecasted. Finally, Study 3 replicated the findings of Studies 1-2 in a completely different context—an expert committee’s ruling about the harming of chimpanzees for biomedical research. These results are discussed as they inform ongoing debates regarding the role of authority in moderating judgments of complex and simple harm. 2013 Elsevier B.V. © All rights reserved.

Moral emotions and the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing

Anger may be more responsive than disgust to mitigating circumstances in judgments of wrongdoing. We tested this hypothesis in two studies where we had participants envision circumstances that could serve to mitigate an otherwise wrongful act. In Study 1, participants provided moral judgments, and ratings of anger and disgust, to a number of transgressions involving either harm or bodily purity. They were then asked to imagine and report whether there might be any circumstances that would make it all right to perform the act. Across transgression type, and controlling for covariance between anger and disgust, levels of anger were found to negatively predict the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing, while disgust was unrelated. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings to less serious transgressions, using a continuous measure of mitigating circumstances, and demonstrated the impact of
anger independent of deontological commitments. These findings highlight the differential relationship that anger and disgust have with the ability to envision mitigating factors.

Religiosity, Political Orientation, and Consequentialist Moral Thinking

Three studies demonstrated that the moral judgments of religious individuals and political conservatives are highly insensitive to consequentialist (i.e., outcome-based) considerations. In Study 1, both religiosity and political conservatism predicted a resistance toward consequentialist thinking concerning a range of transgressive acts, independent of other relevant dispositional factors (e.g., disgust sensitivity). Study 2 ruled out differences in welfare sensitivity as an explanation for these findings. In Study 3, religiosity and political conservatism predicted a commitment to judging “harmless” taboo violations morally impermissible, rather than discretionary, despite the lack of negative consequences rising from the act. Furthermore, non-consequentialist thinking style was shown to mediate the relationship religiosity/conservatism had with impermissibility judgments, while intuitive thinking style did not. These data provide further evidence for the influence of religious and political commitments in motivating divergent moral judgments, while highlighting a new dispositional factor, non-consequentialist thinking style, as a mediator of these effects.

Los sentimientos morales en el problema de la responsabilidad moral

El trabajo es un análisis del lugar que ocupan los sentimientos morales en la formulación y justificación de juicios morales. Se analizan las motivaciones morales en un contexto de crímenes de lesa humanidad, tal como fue la dictadura militar argentina, por medio del caso del ex comandante de navío Francisco Scilingo. Se sostiene que la pertenencia a una comunidad moral es determinante para la formación de expectativas morales y que el incumplimiento de esas expectativas está directamente relacionado con el surgimiento de sentimientos morales. El trabajo busca extender la reflexión sobre el concepto de sentimientos morales al ámbito de la responsabilidad colectiva y por eso se pregunta si estos sentimientos tienen lugar en la atribución de responsabilidad a los perpetradores de crímenes de lesa humanidad.

Exclusão étnica, julgamento moral e emoções morais : estudo em adolescentes

Os pressupostos defendidos na declaração de Salamanca sobre a Educação Inclusiva não são fáceis de concretizar pois as pessoas, por causa de diferenças de sexo, etnia, aparência, etc, têm frequentemente condutas diferenciais. Um dos critérios sociais que mais provoca exclusão social são as diferenças étnicas, um fenómeno mais estudado pela psicologia social. Porém, a atitude de exclusão social pode estar relacionada com a competência moral dos indivíduos, uma relação que foi analisada neste estudo. Para isso recorremos ao suporte da psicologia moral que valoriza o papel das emoções na compreensão das condutas sociais, bem exemplificada nos estudos do vitimizador feliz (e.g., Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Lourenço, 1998). Nas perspectivas mais recentes da psicologia moral tem sido atribuída grande ênfase à necessidade de analisar cognições e emoções nas condutas morais (e.g., Malti & Latzko, 2010; Turiel & Killen, 2010). Apoiados no estudo de Malti, Killen & Gasser (2012) sobre a exclusão social analisámos os julgamentos e as emoções morais de adolescentes em três contextos, etnia africana, etnia cigana e género, numa amostra de 45 adolescentes, com idades entre os 13 e os 19 anos, através da aplicação de uma versão traduzida da Survey Instrument for Measuring Judgments about Emotions about Exclusion (Malti, Killen & Gasser, 2009). Os jovens avaliaram a exclusão étnica como mais incorreta que a exclusão por género mas não foram encontradas diferenças nos juízos e emoções expressas pelos portugueses e estrangeiros. As emoções de culpa, tristeza, vergonha, atribuídas ao excludente confirmam a avaliação negativa da atitude de exclusão. Porém, a emoção normal que revela indiferença expressa que alguns jovens avaliaram positivamente a exclusão. A intensidade emocional intermédia das emoções atribuídas mostra inconsistência com o juízo moral. Relativamente ao excluído existe consenso pois as emoções de tristeza e raiva foram as mais atribuídas. As justificações dos juízos e emoções atribuídos são de tipo diverso, ou seja, argumentos morais de justiça e igualdade, argumentos de inclusão por empatia e argumentos convencionais relativos à coesão intragrupal. A atitude de exclusão não é estritamente moral pois também é vista em função de benefícios para o funcionamento do grupo. A relação complexa entre juízos, emoções e justificações requisita mais investigação de modo a percebermos melhor os processos psicológicos que induzem a conduta social.

A formação de personalidades éticas: representações de si e moral

O artigo apresenta os estudos de uma investigação atual entre 75 adolescentes de 12 a 15 anos, estudantes de colégios particulares da cidade de Campinas, que tem como principal objetivo constatar a possível correspondência entre os julgamentos morais e as representações que os sujeitos têm de si mesmos. A partir de um questionário, os estudos destacam as representações desses sujeitos e respondem a um questionamento de que teriam um caráter ético ou não e se corresponderiam a seus julgamentos morais. Os resultados apontam para uma correspondência entre aqueles cujas representações de si são caracterizadas por conteúdos éticos e julgamentos mais evoluídos quanto à sensibilidade aos sentimentos dos personagens envolvidos nas situações descritas. Tais estudos validam a intenção deste artigo de discutir as correspondências entre ética (como o sujeito se vê) e moral (como julga as situações morais).

Psicologia do trânsito e competência moral: uma intervenção junto a alunos de um curso de especialização

Pós-graduação em Educação - FFC

A contação de histórias como recurso facilitador do desenvolvimento do juízo moral de crianças da educação infantil

Pós-graduação em Docência para a Educação Básica - FC

Teaching about trafficking : opportunities and challenges for critical engagement

When I was first invited to teach a women's studies course called Sex Trafficking in 2002, most of my students had never heard of the issue. Internet and literature searches for "trafficking" mostly turned up references to trafficking in drugs and weapons, not people. When I revised the course for a topical capstone in Criminology, Justice, and Policy Studies in 2006, all of my students had heard about human trafficking, and a handful had already studied it in other classes. The availability of books, films, scholarly articles, and advocacy pieces had all increased exponentially since I first became engaged in the field. This bounty provided a wealth of resources for teaching but also presented a greater challenge when it came to deciding which texts to include. It also added to the inevitable pedagogical angst over what to leave out. I came to know about trafficking by accident, when I was hired as a research assistant at The Protection Project (TPP) in 1999. In my time at TPP I authored a literature review on human trafficking. At that time, my comprehensive database of sources contained fewer than one hundred books and articles, a few UN documents, a handful of films, and some websites from nongovernmental organizations. My review of the literature inevitably reflected the ideological chasm between those who saw trafficking as primarily a labor, migration, and rights issue and those who saw it as primarily a sexual exploitation issue. On the policy end, these ideological orientations created bizarre bedfellows of individuals and organizations that otherwise would have been at odds. The ideological divide has not diminished in the intervening years, and it is important to be aware of and to negotiate this in designing a course on trafficking. As a feminist teacher, I was very aware of the divisions among feminists on the subject of trafficking, and was interested in communicating these differences to students who were not well versed in the varieties of feminist thought. I was also mindful of the difficulties my American students had in engaging with some of the course texts and issues the first time around. For some students, moral judgments about prostitutes were as far as they were able to go in engaging with the course. These students could not find a way in to think about the many issues involved in trafficking. How could I reach them? In this article, I share some of my texts and tactics with others who might find themselves in a position to teach about human trafficking. I include my case for why feminist teachers should teach trafficking, an overview of the debate that divides the field, my rationale for organizing the course the way that I did, issues to consider when designing a course on trafficking, and some suggested readings, films, and web resources.

A educação como campo de batalha e local de seleção

Este trabalho é o resultado das reflexões relativas às leituras que venho realizando desde a minha graduação. A partir do entendimento de que a educação escolar, ao contrário de alguns de seus pressupostos, serviria especialmente à ordem social capitalista; sendo uma das maneiras mais eficientes de domesticar o ser humano. Não se trata de afirmar que toda educação escolar será sempre domesticadora, mas, que grande parte do seu trabalho acaba por contribuir para a diminuição da capacidade criativa do indivíduo. Entendo que a imposição da busca pela verdade e a tentativa de igualar a todos os indivíduos são julgamentos morais. Esses julgamentos representariam a interpretação da vida a partir de um ser enfraquecido, ou seja, teriam como função a preservação do decadente. Esses valores morais acabam por diminuir, também, a energia dos indivíduos que poderiam expandir-se. A escola pode ser um local onde o estudante poderá ter experiências capazes de levá-lo ao crescimento, ou não. Concordamos com Nietzsche, ao entender que há uma oposição entre a vontade de moral e a vontade de potência. O ser vivo quer crescer, ou preservar-se. A criação de novas formas de viver, de desejar uma vida com outra intensidade depende, dos instintos. A moral impõe ao indivíduo uma constante vigilância e coerção contra a expressão desses instintos. A energia que poderia gerar novas formas de viver, agora será utilizada contra o próprio indivíduo, atormentando-o. A escola ainda é uma fonte de experiências. Resta-nos saber como utilizá-la em seus potenciais criadores