Om lärarskapets moraliska dimension : ett perspektiv och en studie av lärarstuderandes nätbaserade seminariesamtal

In this dissertation, an educational perspective called the moral dimension of teaching is developed. The work includes a theoretically informed discussion from a pragmatist point of view in which the concept of pedagogical rhythm is introduced. The concept captures the need for teachers to regularly shift their intentions and occasionally act in contradictory ways as a consequence of the moral which emerges from interaction in pedagogical situations. Using this perspective, criteria are developed for the characteristics of discussions of the work of teachers, which are desirable in order for students in pre-service teacher education to have opportunities to develop their teachership. Secondly, the educational perspective as it is conceptualised serves as a theoretical framework for a study of discussions taking place in net-based seminars among students in teacher education. The study consists of 14 recorded seminars in which discussions of the work of teachers are analysed in terms of content and direction for reflection. The result of the analysis is a construction of four different focal points for processes of making judgements: existential, performative, critical and professional. Mainly the performative, and to some extent the critical, focal points appear to be supported by the net-based environment, although potential for the professional focal point is found when available tools in net-based settings are used in deliberate ways. Finally, based on these four focal points, possible future predispositions among student teachers are deliberated. Student teachers’ future opportunities to develop a moral and epistemological authority are discussed, as well as teachers’ general opportunities to exercise professional responsibility. The conclusion emphasises that a perspective such as the one developed in the dissertation is important, as it creates an understanding for the need to educate student teachers to exercise a form of responsibility that goes beyond being accountable to society.

Nazis by Kraut: A playful application of moral self-licensing

Doing something moral gives one a license to do something immoral. This form of moral compen-sation is called “moral self-licensing”. Interestingly, the moral behavior can take place in another domain than the subsequent immoral behavior. For example, buying eco-friendly products gives one a license to steal. This article is based on the idea that a healthy diet has a moral dimension. As a consequence, consuming a healthy product should give one a license for immoral behavior. This research supports this hypothesis on a playful study. This study shows that drinking sauerkraut juice contributes to a stronger support of Nazi-esque right wing ideology than drinking either nothing or a less-healthy beverage (Nestea).

La dimensión moral en el marxismo : la justicia distributiva en Marx y en los marxistas analíticos

El artículo aborda la dimensión moral en el marxismo desde el enunciado del concepto de justicia distributiva. La existencia explícita o implícita de una dimensión moral en el marxismo ha sido discutida en la bibliografía, sobre todo a partir del análisis de los propios textos de Marx. El artículo afirma la existencia de una noción transhistórica y absoluta de justicia en Marx y en el grupo de los marxistas analíticos, aunque en éstos últimos con distintas variantes.

Matrizes clínicas e ética em Freud

O presente estudo hipotetiza que as diferentes matrizes clínicas que Freud encontrava em sua prática, e que lhe possibilitavam acréscimos teóricos, direcionaram seus distintos olhares sobre a cultura, fazendo-o privilegiar alguns elementos éticos em detrimento de outros. Desse modo, indicaremos: (1) como a histeria gerou a questão do conflito entre sexualidade e moral na civilização; (2) como a neurose obsessiva possibilitou a entrada dos temas da agressividade e do ódio como entraves contra os quais a cultura se esforça por lutar, assim como a presença marcante no psiquismo da consciência moral e do sentimento de culpa; (3) por fim, como as ditas afecções narcísicas trouxeram a Freud o papel do egoísmo e da destrutividade como inimigos da cultura. Nesse percurso nos aproximaremos das questões ligadas à problematização ética na "psicologia" freudiana e, a partir daí, do destaque que terá a dimensão moral na concepção freudiana do sujeito.

Another Kind of Knowledge: Aristotle's Phronêsis from an Epistemological Point of View

In my thesis, I defend the idea that Aristotle's notion of phronêsis (practical wisdom) is best understood as a kind of practical knowledge. I interpret phronêsis as the knowledge we display when we make the correct decision to act. In a particular situation that demands a specific response, we have practical knowledge of what to do when we make the best decision possible. This interpretation of phronêsis involves that it is possible to evaluate our decisions epistemically, that is, to evaluate whether we really know what to do or not. Aristotle provides a tool for the evaluation of our decisions, which is a definite kind of argument and which the tradition has called the 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism stands as the explanation of our decisions or actions. We invoke it when we want to explain or justify why we act as we do. My claim is that the components of the practical syllogism enable one to evaluate not only the moral character of our actions, but also the epistemic strength of our decisions. Correspondingly, a decision is morally right, i.e. virtuous, if the agent considers the right moral principle to apply, and if he is aware of the relevant circumstances of the situation (moral evaluation). Moreover, a decision displays practical knowledge if the agent meets three conditions (epistemic evaluation): he must desire the moral principle for its own sake; he must have experience in spotting the relevant circumstances of the situation; and he must be able to closely connect these circumstances with the moral principle. This interpretation of phronêsis differs from other more traditional interpretations in the emphasis it puts on phronêsis as knowledge. Other interpretations focus more on the moral dimension on phronêsis, without taking its epistemic value seriously. By contrast, I raise seriously the question of what it takes to genuinely know what one should do in a particular situation. -- Dans ma thèse, je défends l'idée que la notion aristotélicienne de phronêsis (sagesse pratique) doit être interprétée comme connaissance pratique. Je comprends la phronêsis comme étant la connaissance que nous avons lorsque nous prenons une bonne décision. Dans une situation particulière qui demande une réponse précise, nous avons une connaissance pratique lorsque nous prenons la meilleure décision possible. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis implique qu'il est possible d'évaluer nos décisions de manière épistémique, c'est-à-dire, d'évaluer si nous savons vraiment ce qu'il faut faire ou non. Ma position est qu'Aristote fournit un outil pour évaluer épistémiquement nos décisions, qui consiste en un certain type d'argument et que la tradition a appelé le 'syllogisme pratique'. Le syllogisme pratique correspond à l'explication de nos décisions ou de nos actions. Nous invoquons un syllogisme pratique lorsque nous voulons expliquer ou justifier pourquoi nous agissons comme nous le faisons. Les éléments du syllogisme pratique permettent d'évaluer non seulement le caractère moral de nos actions, mais aussi la force épistémique de nos décisions. Par conséquent, une décision est moralement correcte, i.e. vertueuse, si l'agent considère le bon principe moral, et s'il est attentif aux circonstances pertinentes de la situation (évaluation morale). En outre, une décision inclut la connaissance pratique si l'agent remplit trois conditions (évaluation épistémique) : il doit désirer le principe moral pour lui-même, il doit avoir de l'expérience pour déceler les circonstances pertinentes, et il doit pouvoir lier intimement ces circonstances avec le principe moral. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis diffère d'autres interprétations plus traditionnelles par l'emphase mise sur la phronêsis en tant que connaissance. D'autres interprétations se concentrent plus sur la dimension morale de la phronêsis, sans se préoccuper sérieusement de sa valeur épistémique. Au contraire, je pose sérieusement la question des conditions nécessaires pour réellement savoir ce qu'il faut faire dans une situation donnée.

Priority setting in healthcare: from arbitrariness to societal values

This paper develops an account of the normative basis of priority setting in health care as combining the values which a given society holds for the common good of its members, with the universal provided by a principle of common humanity. We discuss national differences in health basket in Europe and argue that health care decision-making in complex social and moral frameworks is best thought of as anchored in such a principle by drawing on the philosophy of need. We show that health care needs are ethically ‘thick’ needs whose psychological and social construction can best be understood in terms of David Wiggins's notion of vital need: a person's need is vital when failure to meet it leads to their harm and suffering. The moral dimension of priority setting which operates across different societies’ health care systems is located in the demands both of and on any society to avoid harm to its members.

Testemunho, juízo político e história

A partir de um comentário sobre as propriedades características do gênero testemunhal, descrevem-se as respectivas situações ideológicas que presidiram à recepção de depoimentos sobre os campos de concentração nazistas e comunistas quando da sua publicação no Ocidente. Ao sublinhar a dimensão moral do testemunho e mostrar que os saberes dele advindos baseiam-se em práticas de reconhecimento, aponta-se, complementarmente, para situações em que o historiador vê-se por ele interpelado. Situações em que sua arte depende unicamente do ouvido que prestar ao apelo testemunhal. Nesse momento o testemunho não é mais fonte, pode tornar-se algo como um ultimato. Permutadas, assim, as posições, não fica o historiador exposto ao testemunho, carregando a inteira responsabilidade de sua audiência? Não deve o cultor de Clio a certos endereçamentos, por lacunares e subjetivos que sejam?

La conception néolibérale de la justice: les cas comparés de Friedrich A. von Hayek et de Walter Lippmann

Le néolibéralisme, un terme qui désigne couramment la raison d’état contemporaine, est largement associé à un désinvestissement de l’État pour la cause sociale ainsi qu’à un discours de légitimation des disparités socio-économiques. Il s’agit, pour plusieurs, d’une idéologie qui ne considère pas la justice comme un idéal collectif à poursuivre. Un retour sur certains penseurs à qui l’on attribue la formulation des idées néolibérales permet toutefois de constater que la justice fut, au sein de leurs travaux, l’un des thèmes majeurs. L’objectif général de ce mémoire est donc de présenter la conception de la justice chez deux penseurs du néolibéralisme : le journaliste américain Walter Lippmann et l’économiste autrichien Friedrich A. von Hayek. Cette perspective comparée me permettra d’identifier ce que je nomme la «conception néolibérale» de la justice, conception qui s’articule à partir d’une compréhension singulière du marché. Dans le premier chapitre, je présente le problème central de la conception néolibérale de la justice, en abordant la posture épistémologique privilégiée par Hayek et Lippmann. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je présente certaines modalités de cette conception et soulève ses principales apories. Je soutiens aussi qu’une rupture survient entre Hayek et Lippmann autour de la notion de «responsabilité». Finalement, je compare la conception néolibérale de la justice avec la conception libertarienne présentée par Nozick. C’est à partir des critères de justice respectifs de chaque théorie que j’avance la distinction, au troisième chapitre, entre les deux conceptions pourtant similaires. Contrairement à une analyse courante qui fait du néolibéralisme un projet amoral, je soutiens que la reconnaissance de la dimension morale du discours néolibéral ouvre une fenêtre à partir de laquelle il devient possible de critiquer le projet sur des bases éthiques. C’est en identifiant la notion de justice à l’oeuvre dans le discours néolibéral contemporain et en l’inscrivant dans la tradition morale présentée dans le cadre de ce mémoire que nous sommes mieux à même de comprendre l’idéologie du néolibéralisme.

Gaining Insight into Teaching: The Lived Experiences of Teachers of the Year

What qualities describe outstanding teachers? Many stakeholders in education argue that student achievement indicates teacher quality. Ten Teachers of the Year participated in this qualitative study, showing their lives as outstanding teachers personify four roles and two phenomena. Findings indicate the need to investigate the moral dimension of teaching.

Piękny czy dobry? Moralny wymiar upiększania ciała

The main purpose of the article is to point outsome relations between beauty and good in contemporary reality. The main question that arises here is as follows: is the relationship of beauty and moral good still relevant? The concept presented in the thesis refers to the ancient idea of kalokagathia. It stated that beauty is inseparable from moral good. As far as this ancient perspective is concerned, it can be treated as the background for contemporary considerations about the main issue of beauty and good. The article refers to the concept of aestheticization by Wolfgang Welsch. He defines aesthetics as the primary guiding value, where as experience and entertainment have become the guidelines for contemporary culture. Moreover, the thesis mentions the concept of the consumer society and new ethics of the relation to the body as it is described by Jean Budrillard. Then the narration of the article focuses on the following problem: in what sense can we talk nowadays about moral motivation for beauty treatments of body? One assumption leads to the case of looking after one’s body. Another point of view mentions the need of harmony which manifests itself in beautiful body. Eventually, the central question emerges whether contemporary practice of beautifying the body can be a part of the concept of the good life or not.

La conception néolibérale de la justice: les cas comparés de Friedrich A. von Hayek et de Walter Lippmann

Le néolibéralisme, un terme qui désigne couramment la raison d’état contemporaine, est largement associé à un désinvestissement de l’État pour la cause sociale ainsi qu’à un discours de légitimation des disparités socio-économiques. Il s’agit, pour plusieurs, d’une idéologie qui ne considère pas la justice comme un idéal collectif à poursuivre. Un retour sur certains penseurs à qui l’on attribue la formulation des idées néolibérales permet toutefois de constater que la justice fut, au sein de leurs travaux, l’un des thèmes majeurs. L’objectif général de ce mémoire est donc de présenter la conception de la justice chez deux penseurs du néolibéralisme : le journaliste américain Walter Lippmann et l’économiste autrichien Friedrich A. von Hayek. Cette perspective comparée me permettra d’identifier ce que je nomme la «conception néolibérale» de la justice, conception qui s’articule à partir d’une compréhension singulière du marché. Dans le premier chapitre, je présente le problème central de la conception néolibérale de la justice, en abordant la posture épistémologique privilégiée par Hayek et Lippmann. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je présente certaines modalités de cette conception et soulève ses principales apories. Je soutiens aussi qu’une rupture survient entre Hayek et Lippmann autour de la notion de «responsabilité». Finalement, je compare la conception néolibérale de la justice avec la conception libertarienne présentée par Nozick. C’est à partir des critères de justice respectifs de chaque théorie que j’avance la distinction, au troisième chapitre, entre les deux conceptions pourtant similaires. Contrairement à une analyse courante qui fait du néolibéralisme un projet amoral, je soutiens que la reconnaissance de la dimension morale du discours néolibéral ouvre une fenêtre à partir de laquelle il devient possible de critiquer le projet sur des bases éthiques. C’est en identifiant la notion de justice à l’oeuvre dans le discours néolibéral contemporain et en l’inscrivant dans la tradition morale présentée dans le cadre de ce mémoire que nous sommes mieux à même de comprendre l’idéologie du néolibéralisme.

Investing for impact. An exploration of impact investments in rural Ghana

This thesis offers an exploration of impact and social investments for agricultural development projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. It does so through the case of SustAgric-Africa (SAA), a social enterprise that aims to lift smallholder farmers out of poverty through the promotion of sustainable farming and operates with capital provided by a variety of investors who are committed to pairing financial returns with social and environmental outcomes. The thesis sets off to answer the following research questions: What is the moral dimension that emerges in finance with the establishment of environmental and social criteria? What kind of arrangements do social and impact investments give origin to? Is it possible to talk about a ‘spirit of the gift’ in such arrangements? What happens when abstract and globalizing ideas around ‘impact’ hit the ground? Drawing from the STS and Actor-Network Theory, I look at the formation engendered by social and impact investments in terms of a socio-technical arrangement, and look at the movements of “objects” between the main actors in terms of circuits. In these processes ideas about ‘value’ and ‘values’ articulate in complex ways in the interplay of gift, debt and credit in the relationships among the three main categories of involved actors: investors, SAA, and the farmers. In the case of SAA, I contend that the ways abstract and globalising ideas about ‘impact’ hit the ground produce uncertain results and contribute to the reproduction of inequalities and unequal wealth distribution and accumulation, deepening ongoing processes of financialization. However, my ethnography also reveals how actors depicted as beneficiaries of impact and social policies and resources, far from being passive recipients of policies and resources, actually question and appropriate them, potentially unsettling the whole arrangement and the moral and ethical claims underpinning it.

Aprendendo a viver com regras : a validação das teses piagetianas da gênese da moral nos contextos atuais

RESUMO: Esta dissertação teve como objetivo central replicar o estudo realizado por Piaget sobre aquisição do conceito de regras em crianças, a fim de procurarmos saber se passados 78 anos da obra “O Juízo Moral na Criança”, os dados que o mesmo encontrou sobre a aquisição do princípio da moral se mantêm em nossa atualidade. Para atingir esse objetivo realizamos uma breve revisão bibliográfica, abrangendo alguns autores, teóricos e pesquisadores que enfatizaram estudos sobre o princípio da ética e a fundamentação da moral, entre os quais constam: Platão, Aristóteles, Nietzsche, Kant, Durkheim. Baseamo-nos igualmente em alguns autores mais recentes como Vázquez, Lourenço, Cortina e Martinez, Biaggio, dentre outros. Ao analisarmos a origem psicológica do desenvolvimento moral da criança, buscamos suporte na teoria de Kolhberg e principalmente de Jean Piaget, autor principal para esta pesquisa. A pesquisa guiou-se por uma dimensão descritiva e qualitativa, centrada na observação direta e indireta, baseada no modelo clínico introduzido por Piaget. Os resultados da pesquisa demonstraram que os dados obtidos por Piaget há 78 anos, são compatíveis com os dias de hoje, pois as crianças apresentaram dados equivalentes em média com as idades estipuladas para a aquisição da moral heterônoma e da moral autônoma. Constatámos que a aquisição do princípio da reversibilidade leva as crianças a adquirirem capacidades cognitivas para uma moral autônoma. A concepção de regras transmitidas pelas crianças, emergiram em uma concepção de respeito a uma norma pré estabelecida, e que, gradualmente se transforma em consciência da importância das mesmas para o princípio da boa convivência. ABSTRACT: This dissertation aimed to replicate the study worked out by Piaget on acquisition of concept rules in children, in order to know if, 78 years passed from "The Moral Judgment in Child", data about acquisition of morality principle remain current. To achieve this goal we conducted a brief bibliographic review, covering some authors, theorists and researchers who emphasized studies on ethics principle and moral fundamentation, such as: Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, Kant, Durkheim. We were also based on some latest authors as Vázquez, Lourenço, Cortina and Martinez, Biaggio, and others. Considering the psychological origin of moral development of children, we sought support in Kolhberg´s theory and, especially, Jean Piaget, the main author for this search. The research was led by a descriptive and qualitative dimension, focused on direct and indirect observation, based on clinical model introduced by Piaget. The survey results showed that data obtained by Piaget 78 years ago are still compatible with the present day, because children have, on average, equivalent data through all ages stipulated for the acquisition of heteronomic and autonomous moral. We found that the acquisition of the reversibility principle leads children to acquire cognitive skills for an autonomous moral. The conception of rules provided by children, emerged to a conception of respect to a pre-established standard, that gradually becomes aware of its importance to the principle of coexistence.

The collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief in international law : the application of findings to the case of Turkey

Pertinent domestic and international developments involving issues related to tensions affecting religious or belief communities have been increasingly occupying the international law agenda. Those who generate and, thus, shape international law jurisprudence are in the process of seeking some of the answers to these questions. Thus the need for reconceptualization of the right to freedom of religion or belief continues as demands to the right to freedom of religion or belief challenge the boundaries of religious freedom in national and international law. This thesis aims to contribute to the process of “re-conceptualization” by exploring the notion of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief with a view to advance the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief. The case of Turkey provides a useful test case where both the domestic legislation can be assessed against international standards, while at the same time lessons can be drawn for the improvement of the standard of international review of the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief. The right to freedom of religion or belief, as enshrined in international human rights documents, is unique in its formulation in that it provides protection for the enjoyment of the rights “in community with others”.1 It cannot be realized in isolation; it crosses categories of human rights with aspects that are individual, aspects that can be effectively realized only in an organized community of individuals and aspects that belong to the field of economic, social and cultural rights such as those related to religious or moral education. This study centers on two primary questions; first, what is the scope and nature of protection afforded to the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief in international law, and, secondly, how does the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey compare and contrast to international standards? Section I explores and examines the notion of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief, and the scope of its protection in international law with particular reference to the right to acquire legal personality and autonomy religious/belief communities. In Section II, the case study on Turkey constitutes the applied part of the thesis; here, the protection of the collective dimension is assessed with a view to evaluate the compliance of Turkish legislation and practice with international norms as well as seeking to identify how the standard of international review of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief can be improved.