Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Everything that rises must converge: a neo-Marxist analysis of Canadian business-government relations

The following thesis presents an analysis of business-government relations within a neo-Marxist framework. Specifically, the discussion encompasses how the business interest group. the Business Council on National Issues, maintains consensus and unity amongst its monopoly capital members. Furthermore. the study elaborates on the process through which the group's interests are acknowledged and legitimized by the state under the "public interest" f8fue. Most of the literature pertaining to business-government relations within the context of interactions between business interest groups and the state, and such specific branches of the state as the government and/or the civil service. emphasize a liberal-pluralist perspective. Essentially, these writings serve to reflect and legitimate the current slatus quo. Marxist discourses on the subject, while attempting to transcend the liberal-pluralist framework. nevertheless suffer from either economic determinism .. ie., stressing the state's accumulation function but not its legitimation function or historical specificity. A cogent and comprehensive neo-Marxist analysis of business-government relations must discuss both the accumulation and legitimation functions of the state. The process by which the concerns of a particular business interest group become part of the state's policy agenda and subsequently are formulated and implemented into policies which legitimate its dominance is also studied. This inquiry is significant given the liberal-pluralist assumptions of a neutral state and that all interest groups compete "on a level playing field". The author's neo-Marxist paradigm rejects both of these assumptions. Building on concepts from nea-Marxist instrumentalism. structuralism. state monopoly capitalism, and forms and functions of the state perspectives. the author proposes that policies which legitimize the interests of the monopoly capital fraction cannot. be discerned only from the state's activities. per StJ. Clearly, if the liberal-pluralist 3 contention of multiple and conflicting interest groups, including those within the capitalist class, is taken at face value, M interest group such as the Business Council on National Issues (BCND, must somehow maintain. internal consensus Md unity amongst its members. Internal consensus amongst its members ensures that the state can better acknowledge and articulate its concerns into policies that maintain hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital fraction under the "public interest" fllf.JJdq. The author contends that the BCNI focuses most of its interactions on the upper echelons of the civil service since it is this branch of the state which is most responsible for policy formulation and implementation. The author's paradigm is applied within the context of extensively analyzing newspaper coverage. BCN! publications, and other published sources, as well as a personal interview with an executive administrative member of the BeNI. The discussion focuses on how agreement and unity amongst the various interests of the monopoly capital fraction are maintained through the business organization, its policy scope, and finally its interactions with the state. The analysis suggests that while the civil service is an important player in expressing the interests of the BCNI's membership through policies which ostensibly also reflect the "public interest", it is not the only strategic target for the BCNI's interactions with the state. The author's research also highlights the importance of government officials at the Cabinet level and Cabinet Committees. Senior elected officials from the Federal government are also significant in avoiding intergovernmental or interprovincial conflict in implementing policies that legitimize hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital fraction over other fractions and classes.

Constituição e modelo de mercado : uso liberal e desuso neoliberal

Tese de doutoramento, Direito (Ciências Jurídico-Políticas), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Direito, 2016

The (Im)possibility of the Intellectual Worker Inside the Neoliberal University

The provocation and point of this paper is that universities of the North during the era of neoliberalism of have been sucked of their human life-giving capacities. What remains are closed doors and bare walls. Lest we give the impression of a hopelessly romantic view of the university (and embark upon a lament for some paradise lost), let us be clear from the outset: there is no such place – and there never has been. As will be outlined below, a consideration of the history of the university reveals it was born and has persistently drawn its life breath from oxygen formed in the tension ridden mix of an impulse to human freedom and accommodation to powers of church, state and capital. But, we contend, history is now the witness to the almost complete dissolution of that tension: to the exhaustion of emancipatory impulses in the service of indoctrination, regulation and accumulation. In the church-state-capital triad, it is the latter that has emerged hegemonic. Importantly, we argue, its dominance has emerged with the rise of what Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy describe as monopoly capital: the move from competitive (small entrepreneurial business) forms to monopolistic (large corporate business) regimes of accumulation (Baran & Sweezy 1966). A central feature of monopoly capitalism is its need for significant financial support of national states and the harnessing of public resources such as universities to feed accumulation. It is no surprise that neoliberalism, despite its neoclassical economic pronouncements, is a ‘big state’ advocate (Harvey 2005). Our argument is that neoliberalism, as the political workhorse of monopoly capitalism, has overseen a makeover of universities so they might behave like a monopoly capitalist corporation. Our time is the time of the near global domination of capital. The university has succumbed. In its colonisation – its capitalisation – the university has not only reinvented itself as a willing ally of capital but has also set about remaking itself in its image.

Who thinks what about capitalism? Class consciousness and attitudes to economic institutions

Attitudes to the fundamental economic institutions of capitalism, private ownership of productive property, markets as arenas for securing economic outcomes, and working class rights to associate and to strike, are key dimensions of class consciousness. This paper investigates how class location shapes these attitudes in combination with other factors like employment sector and trade union membership. Using data from the 1995 National Social Science Survey, the paper finds systematic class variation on attitudes to economic institutions that is consistent with respondents endorsing or rejecting class-specific strategies of interest realisation according to their own class circumstances. On some attitudes, class structural effects are additionally moderated by organisational norms associated with public sector employment and mediated by the impact of trade union membership.