Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

Coopetition as a lead generating mechanism: design, modelling and simulation

The aim of this research is to develop a tool that could allow to organize coopetitional relationships between organizations on the basis of two-sided Internet platform. The main result of current master thesis is a detailed description of the concept of the lead generating internet platform-based coopetition. With the tools of agent-based modelling and simulation, there were obtained results that could be used as a base for suggestion that the developed concept is able to cause a positive effect on some particular industries (e.g. web-design studios market) and potentially can bring some benefits and extra profitability for most companies that operate on this particular industry. Also on the basis of the results it can be assumed that the developed instrument is also able to increase the degree of transparency of the market to which it is applied.

Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the last 30-35 years (the U.K. Housing Act 1980 is a leading example). The main objective with this type of legislation is to transfer the ownership of the houses from the public authority to the tenants. To achieve this goal, selling prices of the public houses are typically heavily subsidized. The legislating body then faces a trade-off between achieving the goals of the legislation and allocating the houses efficiently. This paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable in a restricted preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public authority to the tenants. This rule is preferred to the current U.K. system by both the existing tenants and the public authority. Finally, a dynamic process for finding the outcome of the identified rule, in a finite number of steps, is provided.

On insurance markets with endogenous information acquisition: A robust mechanism design approach

Neste trabalho propomos a aplicação das noções de equilíbrio da recente literatura de desenho de mecanismo robusto com aquisição de informação endógena a um problema de divisão de risco entre dois agentes. Através deste exemplo somos capazes de motivar o uso desta noção de equilíbrio, assim como discutir os efeitos da introdu ção de uma restrição de participação que seja dependente da informação. A simplicidade do modelo nos permite caracterizar a possibilidade de implementar a alocação Pareto efiente em termos do custo de aquisição da informação. Além disso, mostramos que a precisão da informação pode ter um efeito negativo sobre a implementação da alocação efi ciente. Ao final, sao dados dois exemplos específicos de situações nas quais este modelo se aplica.

Convexity in multidimensional mechanism design

The present article initiates a systematic study of the behavior of a strictly increasing, C2 , utility function u(a), seen as a function of agents' types, a, when the set of types, A, is a compact, convex subset of iRm . When A is a m-dimensional rectangle it shows that there is a diffeomorphism of A such that the function U = u o H is strictly increasing, C2 , and strictly convexo Moreover, when A is a strictly convex leveI set of a nowhere singular function, there exists a change of coordinates H such that B = H-1(A) is a strictly convex set and U = u o H : B ~ iR is a strictly convex function, as long as a characteristic number of u is smaller than a characteristic number of A. Therefore, a utility function can be assumed convex in agents' types without loss of generality in a wide variety of economic environments.

Exposing market mechanism design trade-offs via multi-objective evolutionary search

Market mechanisms are a means by which resources in contention can be allocated between contending parties, both in human economies and those populated by software agents. Designing such mechanisms has traditionally been carried out by hand, and more recently by automation. Assessing these mechanisms typically involves them being evaluated with respect to multiple conflicting objectives, which can often be nonlinear, noisy, and expensive to compute. For typical performance objectives, it is known that designed mechanisms often fall short on being optimal across all objectives simultaneously. However, in all previous automated approaches, either only a single objective is considered, or else the multiple performance objectives are combined into a single objective. In this paper we do not aggregate objectives, instead considering a direct, novel application of multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) to the problem of automated mechanism design. This allows the automatic discovery of trade-offs that such objectives impose on mechanisms. We pose the problem of mechanism design, specifically for the class of linear redistribution mechanisms, as a naturally existing multi-objective optimisation problem. We apply a modified version of NSGA-II in order to design mechanisms within this class, given economically relevant objectives such as welfare and fairness. This application of NSGA-II exposes tradeoffs between objectives, revealing relationships between them that were otherwise unknown for this mechanism class. The understanding of the trade-off gained from the application of MOEAs can thus help practitioners with an insightful application of discovered mechanisms in their respective real/artificial markets.

Essays on robust mechanism design

Chapter 1: Under the average common value function, we select almost uniquely the mechanism that gives the seller the largest portion of the true value in the worst situation among all the direct mechanisms that are feasible, ex-post implementable and individually rational. Chapter 2: Strategy-proof, budget balanced, anonymous, envy-free linear mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-negative valuations. The smallest efficiency loss is uniquely achieved by the following simple allocation rule: assigns one object to each of the p−1 agents with the highest valuation, a large probability to the agent with the pth highest valuation, and the remaining probability to the agent with the (p+1)th highest valuation. When “envy freeness” is replaced by the weaker condition “voluntary participation”, the optimal mechanism differs only when p is much less than n. Chapter 3: One group is to be selected among a set of agents. Agents have preferences over the size of the group if they are selected; and preferences over size as well as the “stand-outside” option are single-peaked. We take a mechanism design approach and search for group selection mechanisms that are efficient, strategy-proof and individually rational. Two classes of such mechanisms are presented. The proposing mechanism allows agents to either maintain or shrink the group size following a fixed priority, and is characterized by group strategy-proofness. The voting mechanism enlarges the group size in each voting round, and achieves at least half of the maximum group size compatible with individual rationality.

Information Design

There are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is by providing appropriate payoff incentives, which is the subject of mechanism design. The other is by choosing the information that agents observe, which we refer to as information design. We consider a model of symmetric information where a designer chooses and announces the information structure about a payoff relevant state. The interacting agents observe the signal realizations and take actions which affect the welfare of both the designer and the agents. We characterize the general finite approach to deriving the optimal information structure for the designer - the one that maximizes the designer's ex ante expected utility subject to agents playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium. We then apply the general approach to a symmetric two state, two agent, and two actions environment in a parameterized underlying game and fully characterize the optimal information structure: it is never strictly optimal for the designer to use conditionally independent private signals; the optimal information structure may be a public signal or may consist of correlated private signals. Finally, we examine how changes in the underlying game affect the designer's maximum payoff. This exercise provides a joint mechanism/information design perspective.

Cardan Gear Mechanism versus Slider-Crank Mechanism in Pumps and Engines

In machine design we always want to save space, save energy and produce as much power as possible. We can often reduce accelerations, inertial loads and energy consumption by changing construction. In this study the old cardan gear mechanism (hypocycloid mechanism) has been compared with the conventional slider-crank mechanism in air pumps and four-stroke engines. Comprehensive Newtonian dynamics has been derived for the both mechanisms. First the slidercrank and the cardan gear machines have been studied as lossless systems. Then the friction losses have been added to the calculations. The calculation results show that the cardan gear machines can be more efficient than the slider-crank machines. The smooth running, low mass inertia, high pressures and small frictional power losses make the cardan gear machines clearly better than the slider-crank machines. The dynamic tooth loads of the original cardan gear construction do not rise very high when the tooth clearances are kept tight. On the other hand the half-size crank length causes high bearing forces in the cardan gear machines. The friction losses of the cardan gear machines are generally quite small. The mechanical efficiencies are much higher in the cardan gear machines than in the slider-crank machines in normal use. Crankshaft torques and power needs are smaller in the cardan gear air pumps than in the equal slider-crank air pumps. The mean crankshaft torque and the mean output power are higher in the cardan gear four-stroke engines than in the slider-crank four-stroke engines in normal use. The cardan gear mechanism is at its best, when we want to build a pump or an engine with a long connecting rod (≈ 5⋅crank length) and a thin piston (≈ 1.5⋅crank length) rotating at high angular velocity and intermittently high angular acceleration. The cardan gear machines can be designed also as slide constructions without gears. Suitable applications of the cardan gear machines are three-cylinder half-radial engines for motorcycles, sixcylinder radial engines for airplanes and six-cylinder double half-radial engines for sport cars. The applied equations of Newtonian dynamics, comparative calculations, calculation results (tables, curves and surface plots) and recommendations presented in this study hold novelty value and are unpublished before. They have been made and written by the author first time in this study.

Investigation of the Design of a Bistable Micro-Chemical-Mechanical Device Utilizing Lateral Buckling

The Gracias Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University has developed microgrippers which utilize chemically-actuated joints to be used in micro-surgery. These grippers, however, take up to thirty minutes to close fully when activated biochemicals in the human body. This is very problematic and could limit the use of the devices in surgery. It is the goal of this research to develop a gripper that uses theGracias Laboratory's existing joints in conjunction with mechanical components to decrease the closing time. The purpose of including the mechanical components is to induce a state of instability at which time a small perturbation would cause the joint to close fully.The main concept of the research was to use the lateral buckling of a triangular gripper geometry and use a toggle mechanism to decrease the closure time of the device. This would create a snap-action device mimicking the quick closure of a Venus flytrap. All developed geometries were tested using finite element analysis to determine ifloading conditions produced the desired buckled shape. This research examines lateral buckling on the micro-scale and the possibility ofusing this phenomenon in a micro-gripper. Although a final geometry with the required deformed shaped was not found, this document contains suggestions for future geometries that may produce the correct deformed shape. It was determined through this work that in order to obtain the desired deformed shape, polymeric sections need to be added to the geometry. This simplifies the analysis and allows the triangular structure to buckle in the appropriate way due to the added joints. Future work for this project will be completed by undergraduate students at Bucknell University. Fabrication and testing of devices will be done at Johns Hopkins University in the Gracias Laboratory.

DESIGN, MODELING, AND FABRICATION OF MICROROBOT LEGS

This dissertation presents work done in the design, modeling, and fabrication of magnetically actuated microrobot legs. Novel fabrication processes for manufacturing multi-material compliant mechanisms have been used to fabricate effective legged robots at both the meso and micro scales, where the meso scale refers to the transition between macro and micro scales. This work discusses the development of a novel mesoscale manufacturing process, Laser Cut Elastomer Refill (LaCER), for prototyping millimeter-scale multi-material compliant mechanisms with elastomer hinges. Additionally discussed is an extension of previous work on the development of a microscale manufacturing process for fabricating micrometer-sale multi-material compliant mechanisms with elastomer hinges, with the added contribution of a method for incorporating magnetic materials for mechanism actuation using externally applied fields. As both of the fabrication processes outlined make significant use of highly compliant elastomer hinges, a fast, accurate modeling method for these hinges was desired for mechanism characterization and design. An analytical model was developed for this purpose, making use of the pseudo rigid-body (PRB) model and extending its utility to hinges with significant stretch component, such as those fabricated from elastomer materials. This model includes 3 springs with stiffnesses relating to material stiffness and hinge geometry, with additional correction factors for aspects particular to common multi-material hinge geometry. This model has been verified against a finite element analysis model (FEA), which in turn was matched to experimental data on mesoscale hinges manufactured using LaCER. These modeling methods have additionally been verified against experimental data from microscale hinges manufactured using the Si/elastomer/magnetics MEMS process. The development of several mechanisms is also discussed: including a mesoscale LaCER-fabricated hexapedal millirobot capable of walking at 2.4 body lengths per second; prototyped mesoscale LaCER-fabricated underactuated legs with asymmetrical features for improved performance; 1 centimeter cubed LaCER-fabricated magnetically-actuated hexapods which use the best-performing underactuated leg design to locomote at up to 10.6 body lengths per second; five microfabricated magnetically actuated single-hinge mechanisms; a 14-hinge, 11-link microfabricated gripper mechanism; a microfabricated robot leg mechansim demonstrated clearing a step height of 100 micrometers; and a 4 mm x 4 mm x 5 mm, 25 mg microfabricated magnetically-actuated hexapod, demonstrated walking at up to 2.25 body lengths per second.

Multi-agent management system for electric vehicle charging

This paper proposes an implementation, based on a multi-agent system, of a management system for automated negotiation of electricity allocation for charging electric vehicles (EVs) and simulates its performance. The widespread existence of charging infrastructures capable of autonomous operation is recognised as a major driver towards the mass adoption of EVs by mobility consumers. Eventually, conflicting requirements from both power grid and EV owners require automated middleman aggregator agents to intermediate all operations, for example, bidding and negotiation, between these parts. Multi-agent systems are designed to provide distributed, modular, coordinated and collaborative management systems; therefore, they seem suitable to address the management of such complex charging infrastructures. Our solution consists in the implementation of virtual agents to be integrated into the management software of a charging infrastructure. We start by modelling the multi-agent architecture using a federated, hierarchical layers setup and as well as the agents' behaviours and interactions. Each of these layers comprises several components, for example, data bases, decision-making and auction mechanisms. The implementation of multi-agent platform and auctions rules, and of models for battery dynamics, is also addressed. Four scenarios were predefined to assess the management system performance under real usage conditions, considering different types of profiles for EVs owners', different infrastructure configurations and usage and different loads on the utility grid (where real data from the concession holder of the Portuguese electricity transmission grid is used). Simulations carried with the four scenarios validate the performance of the modelled system while complying with all the requirements. Although all of these have been performed for one charging station alone, a multi-agent design may in the future be used for the higher level problem of distributing energy among charging stations. Copyright (c) 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.