Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets

This paper examines how preference correlation and intercorrelation combine to influence the length of a decentralized matching market's path to stability. In simulated experiments, marriage markets with various preference specifications begin at an arbitrary matching of couples and proceed toward stability via the random mechanism proposed by Roth and Vande Vate (1990). The results of these experiments reveal that fundamental preference characteristics are critical in predicting how long the market will take to reach a stable matching. In particular, intercorrelation and correlation are shown to have an exponential impact on the number of blocking pairs that must be randomly satisfied before stability is attained. The magnitude of the impact is dramatically different, however, depending on whether preferences are positively or negatively intercorrelated.

Intermarriage in a Divided Society: Ireland a Century Ago

This paper explores the characteristics associated with marriages between Roman Catholics and members of other religious denominations in Ireland before the Great War. Using the entire digitized returns of the 1911 population census, we find that such marriages were relatively rare, occurring in less than one percent of total marriages. Some of this infrequency can be attributed to ethno-religious hostility-especially in the north of the country. However, we also show that the rarity of intermarriage reflects local marriage markets, as non-Roman Catholics living in communities with fewer coreligionists were more likely to intermarry. We examine the individual characteristics of partners in these marriages, looking at the religious denomination of their children, their decision to marry out, and their fertility behavior. Our findings illustrate how the frequency of intermarriage reflects historical levels of intolerance, but only after local marriage market conditions have been accounted for.

Market work and household production in Brazil

This thesis is composed of three papers in which the research questions are related to the double burden that accrues to Brazilian women. The first and second papers address this issue by looking at expenditure decisions about home production. The first paper examines whether the expenditure decisions about production goods, such as white appliances, relative to entertainment goods, such as TVs, are the outcome of a bargaining process between husbands and wives. The second paper looks at the demand for maid services and for production durable goods, examining the extent to which other household members substitute for maid services and durable goods in home production. The third paper addresses the effects of Brazilian women's double burden on their labor market participation by examining whether the occupational choice of Brazilian women is affected by their gender roles and whether entry into other occupations that are not identified as female occupations has become easier since the introduction of anti-discrimination laws in the labor market. The first paper combines two Brazilian data sets: a Brazilian household expenditure survey, Pesquisa de Orçamento Familiares (POF), and a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). The results of the first paper indicate that the decision about durable goods ownership is the outcome of a bargaining process between husband and wife. The test on the coefficients of the marriage market variable and the indicators of households in which only the wife and households in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions corroborate the expectations about wives' preferences for production goods. The same data sets as the first paper are used in the second paper. The finding of the second paper indicates that if the marriage market is favorable to women, that is if the ratio of women to men goes from 1.07 to 0.96, the increment in the household probability of owning at least one maid's substitute durable goods is equivalent to 24% the impact of moving a household up one income quintile. Moreover, the results indicate that daughters' time substitutes for wives' time and maid services in home production. Parents may want daughters trained in home production to be able to perform their future role as wives. However, this training comes at a cost to daughters' investment in formal education, narrowing their future career options. The data used in the third paper come from a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). Gender roles are responsible for women to choose female-dominated occupations, married women are 1.14 times more likely to work in female-dominated occupations and having a child six years and older increases on average by 12% the probability that women work in female-dominated occupations instead of genderintegrated occupations in 2001. However, it becomes easier for all types of women to enter into male-dominated and gender-integrated occupations in 2001 compared to 1981.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences

Authors of experimental, empirical, theoretical and computational studies of two-sided matching markets have recognized the importance of correlated preferences. We develop a general method for the study of the effect of correlation of preferences on the outcomes generated by two-sided matching mechanisms. We then illustrate our method by using it to quantify the effect of correlation of preferences on satisfaction with the men-propose Gale-Shapley matching for a simple one-to-one matching problem.

Marriage as women's old age insurance : evidence from migration and land inheritance practices in rural Tanzania

In a traditional system of exogamous and patrilocal marriage prevalent in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, when she marries, a rural woman typically leaves her kin to reside with her husband living outside her natal village. Since a village that allows a widow to inherit her late husband's land can provide her with old age security, single females living outside the village are more likely to marry into the village. Using a natural experimental setting, provided by the longitudinal household panel data drawn from rural Tanzania for the period from 1991 to 2004, during which several villages that initially banned a widow's land inheritance removed this discrimination, this study provides evidence in support of this view, whereby altering a customary land inheritance rules in a village in favor of widows increased the probability of males marrying in that village. This finding suggests that providing rural women with old age protection (e.g., insurance, livelihood protection) has remarkable spatial and temporal welfare effects by influencing their decision to marry.