Do charges to freight trucks and trains in the European Union reflect their social marginal costs? Application to the case of Spain

In the last few years, the European Union (EU) has become greatly concerned about the environmental costs of road transport in Europe as a result of the constant growth in the market share of trucks and the steady decline in the market share of railroads. In order to reverse this trend, the EU is promoting the implementation of additional charges for heavy goods vehicles (HGV) on the trunk roads of the EU countries. However, the EU policy is being criticised because it does not address the implementation of charges to internalise the external costs produced by automobiles and other transport modes such as railroad. In this paper, we first describe the evolution of the HGV charging policy in the EU, and then assess its practical implementation across different European countries. Second, and of greater significance, by using the case study of Spain, we evaluate to what extent the current fees on trucks and trains reflect their social marginal costs, and consequently lead to an allocative-efficient outcome. We found that for the average case in Spain the truck industry meets more of the marginal social cost produced by it than does the freight railroad industry. The reason for this lies in the large sums of money paid by truck companies in fuel taxes, and the subsidies that continue to be granted by the government to the railroads.

Do charges to freight trucks and trains in the European Union reflect their social marginal costs? Application to the case of Spain

In the last few years, the European Union (EU) has become greatly concerned about the environmental costs of road transport in Europe as a result of the constant growth in the market share of trucks and the steady decline in the market share of railroads. In order to reverse this trend, the EU is promoting the implementation of additional charges for heavy goods vehicles (HGV) on the trunk roads of the EU countries. However, the EU policy is being criticised because it does not address the implementation of charges to internalise the external costs produced by automobiles and other transport modes such as railroad. In this paper, we first describe the evolution of the HGV charging policy in the EU, and then assess its practical implementation across different European countries. Second, and of greater significance, by using the case study of Spain, we evaluate to what extent the current fees on trucks and trains reflect their social marginal costs, and consequently lead to an allocative-efficient outcome. We found that for the average case in Spain the truck industry meets more of the marginal social cost produced by it than does the freight railroad industry. The reason for this lies in the large sums of money paid by truck companies in fuel taxes, and the subsidies that continue to be granted by the government to the railroads.

Bayesian nash equilibrium in ''linear'' cournot models with private information about costs

Calculating explicit closed form solutions of Cournot models where firms have private information about their costs is, in general, very cumbersome. Most authors consider therefore linear demands and constant marginal costs. However, within this framework, the nonnegativity constraint on prices (and quantities) has been ignored or not properly dealt with and the correct calculation of all Bayesian Nash equilibria is more complicated than expected. Moreover, multiple symmetric and interior Bayesianf equilibria may exist for an open set of parameters. The reason for this is that linear demand is not really linear, since there is a kink at zero price: the general ''linear'' inverse demand function is P (Q) = max{a - bQ, 0} rather than P (Q) = a - bQ.

Accounting for management costs in sensitivity analyses of matrix population models

Traditional sensitivity and elasticity analyses of matrix population models have been used to p inform management decisions, but they ignore the economic costs of manipulating vital rates. For exam le, the growth rate of a population is often most sensitive to changes in adult survival rate, but this does not mean that increasing that rate is the best option for managing the population because it may be much more expensive than other options. To explore how managers should optimize their manipulation of vital rates, we incorporated the cost of changing those rates into matrix population models. We derived analytic expressions for locations in parameter space where managers should shift between management of fecundity and survival, for the balance between fecundity and survival management at those boundaries, and for the allocation of management resources to sustain that optimal balance. For simple matrices, the optimal budget allocation can often be expressed as simple functions of vital rates and the relative costs of changing them. We applied our method to management of the Helmeted Honeyeater (Lichenostomus melanops cassidix; an endangered Australian bird) and the koala (Phascolarctos cinereus) as examples. Our method showed that cost-efficient management of the Helmeted Honeyeater should focus on increasing fecundity via nest protection, whereas optimal koala management should focus on manipulating both fecundity and survival simultaneously, These findings are contrary to the cost-negligent recommendations of elasticity analysis, which would suggest focusing on managing survival in both cases. A further investigation of Helmeted Honeyeater management options, based on an individual-based model incorporating density dependence, spatial structure, and environmental stochasticity, confirmed that fecundity management was the most cost-effective strategy. Our results demonstrate that decisions that ignore economic factors will reduce management efficiency.

Estratégias de comercialização de energia elétrica em mercados liberalizados

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica Ramo de Energia

Power Producers Trading Electricity in Both Pool and Forward Markets

The electricity industry throughout the world, which has long been dominated by vertically integrated utilities, has experienced major changes. Deregulation, unbundling, wholesale and retail wheeling, and real-time pricing were abstract concepts a few years ago. Today market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. As power markets continue to evolve, there is a growing need for advanced modeling approaches. This article addresses the challenge of maximizing the profit (or return) of power producers through the optimization of their share of customers. Power producers have fixed production marginal costs and decide the quantity of energy to sell in both day-ahead markets and a set of target clients, by negotiating bilateral contracts involving a three-rate tariff. Producers sell energy by considering the prices of a reference week and five different types of clients with specific load profiles. They analyze several tariffs and determine the best share of customers, i.e., the share that maximizes profit. © 2014 IEEE.

Power producers trading electricity in both pool and forward markets

The electricity industry throughout the world, which has long been dominated by vertically integrated utilities, has experienced major changes. Deregulation, unbundling, wholesale and retail wheeling, and real-time pricing were abstract concepts a few years ago. Today market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. As power markets continue to evolve, there is a growing need for advanced modeling approaches. This article addresses the challenge of maximizing the profit (or return) of power producers through the optimization of their share of customers. Power producers have fixed production marginal costs and decide the quantity of energy to sell in both day-ahead markets and a set of target clients, by negotiating bilateral contracts involving a three-rate tariff. Producers sell energy by considering the prices of a reference week and five different types of clients with specific load profiles. They analyze several tariffs and determine the best share of customers, i.e., the share that maximizes profit. © 2014 IEEE.

Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty

We investigate the effects of trade with a foreign firm and privatization of the domestic pubUc firm on an incentive for the domestic firm to reduce costs by undertaking R&D investment, under demand uncertainty. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm, and the effects of demand uncertainty, on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Empreendedorismo internacional: plano de negócios de criação da GIBS

Dissertação apresentada ao Instituto Politécnico do Porto, Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto, para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Empreendedorismo e Internacionalização Orientador: Doutor Orlando Manuel Martins Marques de Lima Rua Coorientadora: Mestre Anabela Paula Alferes Ferreira Ribeiro

Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays

We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system and discrimination between on and off-net prices does not hold up once more than two mobile networks are considered. Indeed, if there are at least three competing networks and enough utility is obtained from receiving calls, only equilibria with finite call prices and receiving prices exist. Private negotiations over access charges then achieve the efficient outcome. Bill & keep (zero access charges) and free outgoing and incoming calls are efficient if and only marginal costs of calls are zero.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

A Retail benchmarking approach to eficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network covera.

Strategic investment and international outsourcing in unionised oligopoly

We critically consider the conventional belief that the attractiveness of international outsourcing lies in cheaper labour costs overseas and that it offers a means to ‘escape’ the power of unions. We develop an oligopoly model in which firms facing unionised domestic labour market choose between producing an intermediate in-house or outsourcing it to a non-unionised foreign supplier that makes a relationship specific investment in developing the intermediate. We show that outsourcing typically results in higher wages and does not always reduce marginal costs. Trade liberalisation favours outsourcing particularly for the relatively less efficient firms.

International Evidence on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve Using Aggregate and Disaggregate Data

We present a unique empirical analysis of the properties of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve using an international dataset of aggregate and disaggregate sectoral in ation. Our results from panel time-series estimation clearly indicate that sectoral heterogeneity has important consequences for aggregate in ation behaviour. Heterogeneity helps to explain the overestimation of in ation persistence and underestimation of the role of marginal costs in empirical investigations of the NKPC that use aggregate data. We nd that combining disaggregate information with heterogeneous-consistent estimation techniques helps to reconcile, to a large extent, the NKPC with the data.