Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player who wins the battlefields with highest total value. We focus on the case where there is one large and several small battlefields, such that a player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. We compute the mixed strategy equilibrium for these games and compare this with choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share of the resources of the players, and that most of the time resources should be spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. We find support for the main qualitative features of the equilibrium. In particular, strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, and the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share in the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is stronger.

The Greek Debt Crisis and Southern Europe: Majoritarian Pitfalls?

Although widely debated in broader socioeconomic terms, the Eurozone crisis has not received adequate scholarly attention with regards to the impact of alternative political systems. This article revisits the debate on majoritarian and consensus democracies drawing on recent evidence from the Eurozone debacle. Greece is particularly interesting both with regards to its potential ‘global spillover effects’ and choice of political system. Despite facing comparable challenges as Portugal and Spain, the country has become polarized socially and politically, seeing a record number of MP defections, electoral volatility and the rise of the militant extreme right. The article explains why Greece, the country that relied most extensively on majoritarian institutions, entered the global financial crisis in the most vulnerable position while subsequently faced insurmountable political and institutional obstacles in its management. The article points to the paradox of majoritarianism: in times of economic stress, the first ‘casualties’ are its strongest elements – centrist parties (bi-partisanship) and cabinet stability.

The democratic credentials of statutory bills of rights (and those of a self-styled majoritarian democrat)

This article has two aims. First, it seeks to demonstrate that the democratic credentials of statutory rights instruments are stronger than bills of rights sceptics such as Professors James Allan and Jeremy Waldron realise. It does so by examining the process by which statutory bills of rights are enacted and then provides an account as to why they are adopted that differs from the one offered by Allan and Waldron. This is done to suggest that the reason why a statutory rights instrument is adopted and the process itself has considerable democratic significance. And second, it seeks to assess the democratic credentials of Professor Allan's own critique of statutory bills of rights. The analysis undertaken in this regard reveals that in important respects Allan is anything but the majoritarian democrat that he routinely claims to be.

Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

We consider collective decision problems given by a profile of single-peaked preferences defined over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each such rule is described by a fixed priority ordering among interest groups. We show that any priority rule which treats agents symmetrically — anonymity — respects some form of coherence across collective decision problems — reinforcement — and only depends on peak information — peakonly — is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule defines priorities based on the relative size of the interest groups and specific weights attached to locations. We give an explicit account of the richness of this class of rules.

Environmental Policy in Majoritarian Systems

This paper sheds new light on the determination of environmental policies in majoritarian federal electoral systems such as the U.S., and derives implications for the environmental federalism debate on whether the national or local government should have authority over environmental policies. In majoritarian systems, where the legislature consists of geographically distinct electoral districts, the majority party (at either the national or the state level) favors its own home districts; depending on the location of polluting industries and the associated pollution damages, the majority party may therefore impose sub-optimally high or low pollution taxes due to a majority bias. We show that majority bias can influence the social-welfare ranking of alternative government policies and, in some cases, may actually bring distortionary policies closer to the first-best solution.

For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems

We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favors industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. tariff data from 1993, and House campaign contribution data from two electoral cycles. We find evidence of a protectionist bias due to majoritarian system politics that is comparable in magnitude to the payoff from being an organized industry.

Is Scotland a Westminster-style Majoritarian Democracy or a Scandinavian-style Consensus Democracy? A Comparison of Scotland, the UK and Sweden

Peer reviewed

Is Scotland a Westminster-style Majoritarian Democracy or a Scandinavian-style Consensus Democracy? A Comparison of Scotland, the UK and Sweden

Peer reviewed

Is Scotland a Westminster-style Majoritarian Democracy or a Scandinavian-style Consensus Democracy? A Comparison of Scotland, the UK and Sweden

Peer reviewed

A continuous time model for election timing

We consider a continuous time model for election timing in a Majoritarian Parliamentary System where the government maintains a constitutional right to call an early election. Our model is based on the two-party-preferred data that measure the popularity of the government and the opposition over time. We describe the poll process by a Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE) and use a martingale approach to derive a Partial Differential Equation (PDE) for the government’s expected remaining life in office. A comparison is made between a three-year and a four-year maximum term and we also provide the exercise boundary for calling an election. Impacts on changes in parameters in the SDE, the probability of winning the election and maximum terms on the call exercise boundaries are discussed and analysed. An application of our model to the Australian Federal Election for House of Representatives is also given.

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights : A comparative analysis of the conceptual relationship between democracy and rights in contemporary political theories

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.

Democratic Values Transmission

This study addresses the issue of intergenerational transmission of democratic values embedded in social choice rules. We focus on a few rules which have been the focus of social choice theory: plurality, plurality with a runoff, majoritarian compromise, social compromise and Borda rule. We confront subjects with preferences profiles of a hypothetical electorate over a set of four alternatives. Different rules produce different outcomes and subjects decide which alternative should be chosen for the society whose preference profile is shown. We elicit each subject's preferences over rules and his/her parents' and check whether there is any relationship; 186 students and their parents attended the sessions at Istanbul Bilgi University. Overall, we find support for the hypothesis of parental transmission of democratic values and gender differences in the transmitted rule.

Punitiveness and Political Culture: Notes from Some Small Countries

Green’s (2007, 2008, 2009) recent comparative work on child-on-child homicides in England and Norway has drawn attention to political-cultural explanations to account for differences in levels of state punitiveness. His work finds support for the distinction made by Arend Lijphart (1999) between consensus and majoritarian democracy, through his argument that English majoritarian political culture created powerful incentives to exploit the homicide of James Bulger in ways that were not present in Norway. Drawing on comparative research in Ireland, Scotland and New Zealand, this article joins with Green in enlisting political culture as an important explanatory variable yet challenges the usefulness of Lijphart’s typology in explaining penal difference.

Increasingly ‘Irrational’ Party Systems: Evidence that There Are Increasingly More Than Two at the District level

Recent work has noted an increase in the number of parties at the national level in both proportional and majoritarian electoral systems. While the conventional wisdom maintains that the incentives provided by the electoral system will prevent the number of parties at the district level from exceeding two in majoritarian systems, the evidence presented here demonstrates otherwise. I argue that this has occurred because the number of cleavages articulated by parties has increased as several third parties have begun articulating cleavages that are not well represented by the two larger parties.