A model of dynamic liquidity contracts

I study long-term financial contracts between lenders and borrowers in the absence of perfect enforceability and when both parties are credit constrained. Borrowers repeatedly have projects to undertake and need external financing. Lenders can commit to contractual agreements whereas borrowers can renege any period. I show that equilibrium contracts feature interesting dynamics: the economy exhibits efficient investment cycles; absence of perfect enforcement and shortage of capital skew the cycles toward states of liquidity drought; credit is rationed if either the lender has too little capital or if the borrower has too little collateral. This paper's technical contribution is its demonstration of the existence and characterization of financial contracts that are solutions to a non-convex dynamic programming problem.

Accounting for the economic risk, caused by variation in disease severity, in fungicide dose decisions: exemplified for Mycosphaerella graminicola on winter wheat

A method is presented to calculate economic optimum fungicide doses accounting for the risk-aversion of growers responding to variability in disease severity between crops. Simple dose-response and disease-yield loss functions are used to estimate net disease-related costs (fungicide cost, plus disease-induced yield loss) as a function of dose and untreated severity. With fairly general assumptions about the shapes of the probability distribution of disease severity and the other functions involved, we show that a choice of fungicide dose which minimises net costs on average across seasons results in occasional large net costs caused by inadequate control in high disease seasons. This may be unacceptable to a grower with limited capital. A risk-averse grower can choose to reduce the size and frequency of such losses by applying a higher dose as insurance. For example, a grower may decide to accept ‘high loss’ years one year in ten or one year in twenty (i.e. specifying a proportion of years in which disease severity and net costs will be above a specified level). Our analysis shows that taking into account disease severity variation and risk-aversion will usually increase the dose applied by an economically rational grower. The analysis is illustrated with data on septoria tritici leaf blotch of wheat caused by Mycosphaerella graminicola. Observations from untreated field plots at sites across England over three years were used to estimate the probability distribution of disease severities at mid-grain filling. In the absence of a fully reliable disease forecasting scheme, reducing the frequency of ‘high loss’ years requires substantially higher doses to be applied to all crops. Disease resistant cultivars reduce both the optimal dose at all levels of risk and the disease-related costs at all doses.

The need of subsidy for the implementation of photovoltaic solar energy as supporting of decentralized electrical power generation in Brazil

The growing demand for electrical power and the limited capital invested to provide this power is forcing countries like Brazil to search for new alternatives for electrical power generation. The purpose of this paper is to present a technical and economic study on a 15 kW solar plant installed in an isolated community, highlighting the importance of the need for financial subsidy from the government. It evaluates the importance of parameters such as the annual interest rate, specific investment, the marginal cost of expanding the electrical power supply and the government subsidy on amortization time of capital invested. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved.

Certificate for Two Shares of Capital Stock in The Henley Aquatic Association Limited

Certificate for 2 shares of capital stock in Henley Aquatic Association Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Oct. 15, 1921.

Certificate for Sixty Shares of Capital Stock in High Pressure Oil and Gas Syndicate, Limited

Certificate for 60 shares of capital stock in High Pressure Oil and Gas Syndicate, Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Nov. 1, 1922.

Certificate for Ten Shares of Accumulative Preference Capital Stock in Lincoln Manufacturing Company Limited

Certificate for 10 shares of accumulative preference capital stock in Lincoln Manufacturing Company Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, April 10, 1923.

Certificate for Twenty Shares of Accumulative Preference Capital Stock in Lincoln Manufacturing Company Limited

Certificate for 20 shares of accumulative preference capital stock in Lincoln Manufacturing Company Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, April 14, 1923.

Certificate for Ten Shares of Accumulative Preference Shares of Capital Stock in Lincoln Manufacturing Company Limited

Certificate for 10 shares of accumulative preference shares of capital stock in Lincoln Manufacturing Company Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, July 4, 1923.

Certificate for Eight Shares of Capital Stock in Insurance Investments Limited

Certificate for 8 shares of capital stock in Insurance Investments Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Aug. 12, 1929.

Certificate for Twenty Shares of Capital Stock in Skyway Limited

Certificate for 20 shares of capital stock in Skyways Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Sept. 2, 1929.

Certificate for Five and Four Fifths Shares of Capital Stock in Insurance Investments Limited

Certificate for 5 4/5 shares of capital stock in Insurance Investments Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Jan. 15, 1930.

Certificate for Fifty Shares of Capital Stock Skyways Limited

Certificate for 50 shares of capital stock Skyways Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Jan. 31, 1930.

Certificate for Twenty Shares of Capital Stock in The Tait Storage Battery Company, Limited

Certificate for 20 shares of capital stock in The Tait Storage Battery Company Limited to the estate of Hamilton K Woodruff, March 2, 1934.

Determinants of Capital Structure of Swedish limited companies : Testing Trade-off Theory Against Pecking Order Theory

Research question- This thesis investigates the determinants of capital structure of the Swedish companies. In order to do so, the two dominant theories of the corporate structure are studied and their assumptions are tested. Thus, the study researches which one of the two theories is more appealing for the Swedish market. Methodology-The study follows a purely quantitative study, by conducting an econometric analysis. The data are collected from a secondary source and more particularly the "Retriever" database, which contains financial data of the Swedish companies. Findings- The findings indicate that the determinants of the corporate structure for the Swedish market do not differ from other studies which have been conducted in other countries. However, there is a difference when it comes to tax and non-tax shields. The results suggest that in most cases the Pecking Order Theory appears to be more representative for the Swedish market, since most of the coefficient appear to be in favour of it. Moreover, the significance of the effect of the industry for the financial leverage is confirmed.

On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.