Tunisia. Supervising Tunisian Elections by civil society: How to improve it? Arab Citizenship Review No. 7. January 2015

Introduction. On October 26, 2014, Tunisia held its second democratic legislative elections. Participation among more than 5 million registered voters was at about 60%, a relatively good turnout for the country, compared to the 52% voters in 2011. Preliminary results for the 33 constituencies (27 within the country and 6 for expatriates) reveal that secular frontrunner Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia) won around 37% percent of votes while moderate Islamist party Ennahdha, winner of the 2011 elections and leader of Tunisia’s post-revolution government, received 27% of votes. Other parties with notable percentages are the Free Patriotic Union (French: UPL) with 4.4% and the leftist party, Popular Front, with 3.7%. Legislative were immediately followed by two round presidential elections the first one held on November 23, the second one after one month. Conversely to what was expected, people were more attracted by presidential elections even though president has notably less prerogatives than the parliament: representing the state, he is mainly responsible for determining the general state policies in the domains of defense, foreign relations and national security (article 76.) This paradox is ascribed to national imaginary more confident in a “Zaïm” (leader) rather than a collective institution such as a parliament. The turnout was at about 64% within the national 27 constituencies. Out of 70 candidates (including 5 female), 27 (with only one female) met the legal requirements to run for the presidency. The result confirms the legislative trend and Beji Caid Essebsi, leader of Nidaa, was proclaimed the third President of Tunisia. He gained 39.46% of the votes at the first round elections. Essebsi was followed by Moncef Marzouki who received an unexpected score (33.43%) at the first round, thanks to the support of Ennahdha audience and to an active and insistent campaign focused on the idea that revolution is threatened by old regime guard “come-back.” Rewarded for his long militant live, the extreme leftist Hamma Hammami in a new look gained 7,8% of the votes while the new comer Slim Riahi received 5,5% despite rumors circulating on his personal reputation. Notably, Kalthoum Kennou gained 0,55% (18.287 votes) but listed eleventh out of 27.

The Front National at the polls:transformational elections or the status quo reaffirmed?

There is a widespread sense that the Front National (FN) came of age in 2014 as a challenger for power in France. The municipal and European elections appeared to herald a transformation in the party's development and prospects, demonstrating its capacity to compete as a major player at subnational and supranational levels following strong performances at the national level in the presidential and legislative elections of 2012. This article takes a critical view of that assessment. It argues that the FN in 2014 made significant progress but that the apparent surge of support for the party in these elections belies fundamental weaknesses in the depth and range of its electoral capacities and in its prospects for transforming itself into a party of government. These weaknesses were again evident in the departmental elections of 2015, confirming that the FN has not succeeded in ending bipolarisation and imposing a genuinely tripartite structure on French politics. Far from being the 'first party of France' and 'at the gates of power', the FN is still consigned primarily to a role of spoiler, with its progression stalled by institutional obstacles, electoral limitations and a political containment which it remains powerless to overcome.

Política, eleições e corrupção económica…

Os partidos e candidatos que terão os melhores resultados nas próximas eleições legislativas a realizar em Portugal – que, com elevado grau de probabilidade, serão antecipadas – serão aqueles que melhor consigam convencer os votantes em geral de que a retribuição, prevenção e restauração dos crimes e ilícitos de corrupção, e da criminalidade económica e social em geral, terão um tratamento desta vez eficaz em concreto; Abstract: The parties and candidates who have the best results in the upcoming legislative elections in Portugal - which, with high probability, will be early - will be those who best can convince the general voting that the compensation, prevention and restoration of crimes and illegal corruption, and economic and social crime in general, receive treatment this time effective in concrete.

Definição de conjuntos de freguesias tipo para estimação eleitoral: eleições legislativas no período 1983 - 2005

Dissertação apresentada como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciência e Sistemas de Informação Geográfica

Rhetoric on the economy: have European parties changed their economic messages?

This study analyses the determinants of dispersion of economic issue mentions in European party manifestos. We examined three main economic domains (governmental control of the economy, free market capitalism and support for the welfare state) as consequences of globalization forces, economic conditions, partisanship and electoral turnout. Employing aggregate-level Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data from legislative elections in 15 European countries from 1970 to 2010, we confirm that parties hold a common view of the salience of economic control of the state as a consequence of globalization pressure and economic growth levels. Partisanship of the cabinets (regardless of the political orientation) counteracted issue salience concentration in the welfare domain. Government size favoured dispersion in the free market realm. Our results do not indicate clear homogenization of parties’ economic messages in elections over the last 40 years.

A elite política parlamentar portuguesa: caracterização, cristalização e circulação (2005-2011)

Dissertação de Mestrado em Ciência Política

Continuity of Government Planning Interim Study Committee, March 2007

The Legislative Council established the Continuity of Government Planning Interim Study Committee in 2006 and authorized the Committee to meet during the 2006 Legislative Interim. The Committee was given the following charge: Examine issues relating to the continued functioning of state government following a disaster, including gubernatorial succession, replacement of constitutional officers and department heads, legislative elections to fill vacancies, and continued funding of state government if the General Assembly is unable to meet and pass a budget.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.