Private Property, Public Use, and Just Compensation: The Economics of Eminent Domain

The eminent domain clause of the U.S. Constitution concerns the limits of the government's right to take private property for public use. The economic literature on this issue has examined (1) the proper scope of this power as embodied by the 'public use' requirement, (2) the appropriate definition, and implications, of 'just compensation,' and (3) the impact of eminent domain on land use incentives of owners whose land is subject to a taking risk. This essay reviews this literature and draws implications for our understanding of eminent domain law.

Climate adaptation and the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution: How do adaptation strategies impact regulatory takings claims?

As the impacts and potential of climate change are realized at the governance level, states are moving towards adaptation strategies that include greater regulatory restrictions on development within coastal zones. The purpose of this paper is to outline the impacts of existing and planned regulatory mechanisms on the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prevents the government taking of private property for public use without just compensation. A short history of regulatory takings is explained, and the potential legal issues surrounding mitigation and adaptation measures for coastal communities are discussed. The goal is to gain an understanding of the legal issues that must be resolved by governments to effectively deal with regulatory takings claims as coastal mitigation and adaptation plans are implemented. (PDF contains 3 pages)

Compensation or consideration for a statutory right of user?

Section 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) makes provision for an applicant to seek a statutory right of user over a neighbour’s property where such right of use is reasonably necessary in the interests of effective use in any reasonable manner of the dominant land. A key issue in an application under s 180 is compensation. Unfortunately, while s 180 expressly contemplates that an order for compensation will include provision for payment of compensation to the owner of servient land there are certain issues that are less clear. One of these is the basis for determination of the amount of compensation. In this regard, s 180(4)(a) provides that, in making an order for a statutory right of user, the court: (a) shall, except in special circumstances, include provision for payment by the applicant to such person or persons as may be specified in the order of such amount by way of compensation or consideration as in the circumstances appears to the court to be just The operation of this statutory provision was considered by de Jersey CJ (as he then was) in Peulen v Agius [2015] QSC 137.

Beyond managerial talent: ‘key group’ identification and differential compensation practices in multinational companies

With the maturation of strategic human resource management scholarship, there appears to be a greater call to move from monolithic workforce management to a more strategic and differentiated emphasis on employees with the greatest capacity to enhance competitive advantage. There has been little consideration in the literature as to whether organizations formally identify key groups of employees based on their impact on organizational learning and core competences. Using survey evidence from 260 multinational companies (MNCs), this paper explores the extent to which key groups of employees are formally recognized and whether they are subject to differential compensation practices. The results demonstrate that just in excess of half of these MNCs identify a key group. There was considerable differentiation in the compensation practices between these key groups, managers and the largest occupational group in the workforce. The results give rise to questions worthy of future investigation, namely whether the differentiated approaches used lead to improved performance outcomes.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

It is just not fair: the Endangered Species Act in the United States and Ontario

The United States and the Canadian province of Ontario have enacted endangered species laws that regulate private land. The rationale for this is that the vast majority of endangered species in the two countries rely on private lands for survival. However, from a landowner perspective the law is deemed unfair. This paper presents analysis from 141 interviews with landowners in three U.S. states and Ontario. In recognition of distributive justice claims, both the U.S. government and the Ontario government have enacted programs aimed at increasing financial incentives for participation and compliance with the law. However, the law is still perceived as unfair. The central argument of this paper is that future amendments and new policies for endangered species should confront two other forms of environmental justice: procedural justice and justice-as-recognition. Landowners in both countries expressed not only concerns about compensation, but also a deep desire to be included in the protection and recovery process, as well as to be recognized by government and society as good stewards of the land. The paper concludes by stating that future policy amendments need to address justice-as-recognition if endangered species conservation on private lands is to be considered fair by landowners.

Clipping noise compensation for OFDMA systems

This paper presents an efficient low-complexity clipping noise compensation scheme for PAR reduced orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) systems. Conventional clipping noise compensation schemes proposed for OFDM systems are decision directed schemes which use demodulated data symbols. Thus these schemes fail to deliver expected performance in OFDMA systems where multiple users share a single OFDM symbol and a specific user may only know his/her own modulation scheme. The proposed clipping noise estimation and compensation scheme does not require the knowledge of the demodulated symbols of the other users, making it very promising for OFDMA systems. It uses the equalized output and the reserved tones to reconstruct the signal by compensating the clipping noise. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can significantly improve the system performance.

Positive development

net sustainability. At best they reduce relative resource consumption. They still consume vast quantities of materials, energy, water and ecosystems during construction. Moreover, green buildings replace land and ecosystems with structures that, at the very best, only 'mimic' ecosystems<'). Mimicking nature is little compensation when we have lost a third of species that are integral parts of our life support system. Already, development has exceeded the Earth's ecological carrying capacity, so even 'restorative' design is not enough. Urban areas must be retrofitted to increase net bioregional carrying capacity - just to support existing or reduced population levels in cities. The eco-retrofitting of our built environment is therefore an essential precondition of achieving a sustainable society. But we need to eco-retrofit cities in ways that increase net sustainability, not just relative efficiency.

'We just make the pictures...?' How work is portrayed in children's feature length films

This article explores how adult paid work is portrayed in 'family' feature length films. The study extends previous critical media literature which has overwhelmingly focused on depictions of gender and violence, exploring the visual content of films that is relevant to adult employment. Forty-two G/PG films were analyzed for relevant themes. Consistent with the exploratory nature of the research, themes emerged inductively from the films' content. Results reveal six major themes: males are more visible in adult work roles than women; the division of labour remains gendered; work and home are not mutually exclusive domains; organizational authority and power is wielded in punitive ways; there are avenues to better employment prospects; and status/money is paramount. The findings of the study reflect a range of subject matters related to occupational characteristics and work-related communication and interactions which are typically viewed by children in contemporary society.