940 resultados para judicial independence
Resumo:
The role of Constitutional Courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial independence and impartiality. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court’s decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that the longer a judge serves on the Court the more ethno-national affiliation seems to influence her decision-making. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.
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The focus of study in this thesis is on the necessity and extent of judicial creativity in interpreting provisions in certain crucial areas in the Constitution of India. Judicial innovation was essential to adapt the constitutional provisions to modern changed context. Creativity of the Court has been mainly in the creation and introduction of certain new concepts not found in any specific provision of the Constitution which, but were essential for its meaningful interpretation.Independence of the judiciary, basic structure and certain elements of social justice cherished as ideal by the makers of the Constitution are some such concepts infused into the Constitution by the judiciary. The second aspect of creativity lies in the attempt of the Court to construe provisions in the Constitution with a view to upholding and maintaining the concepts so infused into the Constitution. Introduction of those concepts into the Constitution was necessary and is justified. all important features of the Constitution like democratic form of government, federal structure, judicial review, independence of judiciary and rule of law were thus included in the doctrine to prevent their alteration by amendments.As a result of such a construction, the nature of those directive principles itself has changed. They ceased to be mere directives for state action but became mandate for it. If left to legislative or executive will for their implementation, the directives would have remained enforceable as ordinary right.To conclude, notwithstanding the errors committed by the Supreme Court in construing the provisions in the above areas, they stand testimony to its creative and innovative response in interpreting the Constitution. If this trend is continued, it will be possible to achieve through the judicial process, maintenance of independence of the judiciary, avoidance of destruction of the Constitution through the process of amendment and realisation of social justice envisaged in the directive principles. It can be hoped that the Court would maintain its energetic and vibrant mind and rise up to the occasions and extend the same to other areas in future.
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This work examines independence in the Canadian justice system using an approach adapted from new legal realist scholarship called ‘dynamic realism’. This approach proposes that issues in law must be considered in relation to their recursive and simultaneous development with historic, social and political events. Such events describe ‘law in action’ and more holistically demonstrate principles like independence, rule of law and access to justice. My dynamic realist analysis of independence in the justice system employs a range methodological tools and approaches from the social sciences, including: historical and historiographical study; public administrative; policy and institutional analysis; an empirical component; as well as constitutional, statutory interpretation and jurisprudential analysis. In my view, principles like independence represent aspirational ideals in law which can be better understood by examining how they manifest in legal culture and in the legal system. This examination focuses on the principle and practice of independence for both lawyers and judges in the justice system, but highlights the independence of the Bar. It considers the inter-relation between lawyer independence and the ongoing refinement of judicial independence in Canadian law. It also considers both independence of the Bar and the Judiciary in the context of the administration of justice, and practically illustrates the interaction between these principles through a case study of a specific aspect of the court system. This work also focuses on recent developments in the principle of Bar independence and its relation to an emerging school of professionalism scholarship in Canada. The work concludes by describing the principle of independence as both conditional and dynamic, but rooted in a unitary concept for both lawyers and judges. In short, independence can be defined as impartiality, neutrality and autonomy of legal decision-makers in the justice system to apply, protect and improve the law for what has become its primary normative purpose: facilitating access to justice. While both independence of the Bar and the Judiciary are required to support access to independent courts, some recent developments suggest the practical interactions between independence and access need to be the subject of further research, to better account for both the principles and the practicalities of the Canadian justice system.
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This paper will give a ‘criminological perspective’ on mandatory sentencing. It will however largely avoid the issues of the effect of mandatory sentencing provisions on the judicial process and judicial independence, as this has already been covered by Sir Anthony Mason. It will also avoid the legal issues concerning the constitutional, human rights and international law aspects of mandatory sentencing which will be covered by later speakers. The aim will be to give a brief overview of research which evaluates the effects of mandatory sentencing provisions in terms of the available evidence of whether they meet their stated aims of deterrence, selective incapacitation and the reduction of crime rates. This will be done in two parts, first in relation to the more extensive experiment in mandatory sentencing in the USA which has provided some of the impetus and metaphors ("three strikes") for recent Australian developments; and second the recent mandatory sentencing provisions in Western Australia (WA) and the Northern Territory (NT). Evidence from both the US and WA (NT is hard to assess because of the lack of proper monitoring and criminal statistics) indicates that mandatory sentencing does not produce the effects of deterrence, selective incapacitation and crime reduction which are its stated justifications and does produce a range of damaging side effects in terms of distortion of the judicial process, wildly disproportionate sentencing, additional financial and social cost and deepening social exclusion of individuals and particular communities. So what is left are the less acknowledged underpinnings of mandatory sentencing in the form of the symbolic politics of law and order, the politics of social exclusion and a displacement of racial anxieties and hostilities onto the terrain of the legal. In fashioning this necessarily brief overview a number of sources have been heavily drawn upon, in particular the excellent work by Neil Morgan from UWA (Morgan, 1995;1999; 2000); Dianne Johnson and George Zdenkowski in their detailed report to the Senate Inquiry (2000); and a number of articles appearing in 1999 in an excellent special issue of the UNSW Law Journal, all of which are highly recommended for further reading.
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Canadian Judicial Council
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Since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, Canadians courts have become bolder in the law-making entreprise, and have recently resorted to unwritten constitutional principles in an unprecedented fashion. In 1997, in Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court of Canada found constitutional justification for the independence of provincially appointed judges in the underlying, unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution. In 1998, in Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Court went even further in articulating those principles, and held that they have a substantive content which imposes significant limitations on government action. The author considers what the courts' recourse to unwritten principles means for the administrative process. More specifically, he looks at two important areas of uncertainty relating to those principles: their ambiguous normative force and their interrelatedness. He goes on to question the legitimacy of judicial review based on unwritten constitutional principles, and to critize the courts'recourse to such principles in decisions applying the principle of judicial independence to the issue of the remuneration of judges.
Resumo:
Bien que la juridiction inhérente des cours superIeures constitue une notion souvent utilisée par les tribunaux au Canada, plusieurs facettes importantes de cette notion demeurent inconnues et incomprises. Le présent mémoire s'attarde à retracer l'origine et les fondements des pouvoirs inhérents afin d'en expliquer la constitutionnalisation dans l'ordre constitutionnel canadien contemporain. Pour ce faire, nous avons retracé l'essence des pouvoirs inhérents au moyen d'une démarche historique afin d'énoncer une théorie constitutionnelle cohérente des pouvoirs inhérents qui permettra de juger du bien-fondé de leurs nombreuses manifestations contemporaines. L'enchâssement de la juridiction inhérente dans la Constitution canadienne repose sur le statut, la nature et les caractéristiques uniques des cours supérieures. Plus particulièrement, le principe constitutionnel de l'indépendance judiciaire constitue le fondement contemporain de la constitutionnalisation de la juridiction inhérente. Cette constatation permet alors d'avancer l'idée selon laquelle les pouvoirs inhérents nécessaires au maintien de l'indépendance judiciaire des cours supérieures doivent être élevés au rang de normes constitutionnelles supralégislatives.
Resumo:
Le contexte culturel particulier à la Chine influe sur le choix du mode de résolution des différends commerciaux comportant un lien d'extranéité. Plusieurs mécanismes de préventions des litiges sont utilisés en Chine. La conciliation et médiation sont issues d'une tradition plus que millénaire en Chine, elles occupent donc un rôle important dans la résolution des différends commerciaux. La conciliation est ainsi presque toujours mise en branle antérieurement à un règlement des différends comportant des solutions contraignantes pour les parties soit un jugement ou une sentence arbitrale. L'analyse de la structure juridique chinoise nous permet de soulever les lacunes relatives à l'utilisation de ce véhicule dans la résolution d'un litige. Effectivement, l'indépendance judiciaire est défaillante ce qui a pour conséquences de préférer l'arbitrage aux tribunaux judiciaires. Malgré cette défaillance, certains investisseurs étrangers pourraient y recourir ce qui nécessite alors une connaissance minimale de ce système juridique. Le règlement des différends, en Chine, relatif à un élément d'extranéité s'effectue principalement par voie arbitrale. De ce fait, deux catégories d'arbitrage doivent alors être présentées ce qui permet d'écarter en Chine l'arbitrage ad hoc qui n'est pas expressément interdit, ni permis. Cette situation a permis à l'arbitrage institutionnel de se développer de façon considérable particulièrement par le biais de la CIETAC qui constitue ainsi l'institution de choix. Mais parallèlement à elle, il ne faut pas négliger les institutions arbitrales étrangères ayant sis sur le territoire chinois qui, de plus en plus, attirent les investisseurs étrangers, et leurs partenaires.
Resumo:
Dans sa thèse, l’auteure analyse la fonction du système judiciaire dans le système juridique selon une double perspective historique et sociologique. Cette approche possède un potentiel euristique important, car elle révèle que la place réservée à la production judiciaire du droit se modifie au gré de la conception que se fait la société de l’origine et de la légitimité du droit. Grâce à la méthodologie proposée par la théorie des systèmes, il est possible d’analyser le phénomène de la montée en puissance des juges dans sa dimension scientifique, en substituant une interprétation sociologique à celle, traditionnelle, formulée par la science politique. Grâce à une réappropriation de la justice par la science juridique, la production judiciaire du droit peut être étudiée dans une perspective systémique. Celle-ci démontre la situation névralgique occupée par la fonction de juger dans le système juridique. Par le biais d’un retour aux sources de la fonction de juger, l’auteur identifie les stratégies empruntées par les titulaires de cette fonction pour maintenir et légitimer leur position dans l’organisation du système juridique. La thèse démontre que le discours judiciaire de la Cour suprême du Canada sur la norme d’indépendance judiciaire homologue la théorie de la place centrale du système judiciaire dans le système juridique. La thèse conclut enfin que des conditions sociologiques sont nécessaires pour assurer l’indépendance judiciaire et garantir la primauté du droit. Ces conditions sont la différenciation sociale, une structure de programme juridique conditionnelle et la limitation de la responsabilité des juges pour l’impact de leurs décisions dans le système social.
Resumo:
El autor adopta sustenta la inconstitucionalidad de la Resolución del Congreso No. 25-181, del 8 de diciembre de 2004, por medio de la cual cesa a los magistrados que desempeñaban sus funciones en la Corte Suprema de Justicia hasta esa fecha, y, para fundamentar su criterio, reconstruye los hechos y el derecho desde 1997 hasta el año 2004, analiza detalladamente la Resolución No. 25181 y objeta sus débiles fundamentos jurídicos y fácticos, a más de ello, utiliza métodos y principios específicos de la interpretación constitucional. Se estudia además de la trasgresión constitucional, la violación de los derechos subjetivos de los magistrados de la Corte Suprema cesados de sus cargos en diciembre de 2004.
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Uma das principais modificações introduzidas pela Reforma do Judiciário (Emenda Constitucional 45/2004) foi a criação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ). Dentre suas competências constitucionais, a do controle dos deveres funcionais dos magistrados por meio dos Processos Administrativos Sancionadores foi bastante questionada, chegando a ser objeto de controle concentrado de constitucionalidade pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). A composição do Conselho foi também alvo de reiteradas críticas, pois considerável parte dos conselheiros (6 dos 15, representando 40% do total) é composta por membros não oriundos da magistratura – vindos do Ministério Público, da Advocacia, além dos Juristas indicados pelo Congresso Nacional -, os conselheiros não-juízes. O Poder Judiciário, historicamente hermético e corporativista, passava a ser controlado por um órgão novo, um Conselho de Justiça que não contava apenas com conselheiros juízes entre seus membros. O presente trabalho estudou o CNJ a partir desses dois pontos mais controversos, com enfoque no controle disciplinar exercido pelo órgão sobre a magistratura nacional. Conselhos de Justiça, em especial em sua feição disciplinar, devem lidar com e existente tensão entre controle (ou accountability) e independência judicial. Observamos a atuação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça em vista dessa constante tensão ao longo de sua historia: por meio de uma análise que percorreu um período que vai da instalação do CNJ, em 2005, até o final do ano de 2013. Identificamos, com isso, as estratégias de legitimação institucional utilizadas para o exercício da competência disciplinar, analisamos as normas jurídicas surgidas nesse período, bem como descrevemos qual o perfil dos atores que ocuparam as cadeiras do colegiado enquanto conselheiros. Como resultado dessa observação, importante destacar que o Conselho Nacional de Justiça jogou luz sobre um Poder historicamente fechado, mas que ainda apresenta problemas de transparência. A dificuldade de localizar dados sobre matérias mais sensíveis (processos administrativos sancionadores) e as ausências de envio de informações quando solicitadas foram marcantes na pesquisa. Sobre o comportamento do órgão, mobilizamos a variável do profissionalismo (com especial enfoque na origem de carreira) para interpretar esse processo. Esperávamos um Conselho com duas características: corporativista e pouco harmônico. As análises empíricas quantitativas, que compuseram um retrato de todos os Processos Administrativos Sancionadores julgados até o final de 2013 pelo CNJ, mostraram um cenário inverso: um colegiado não corporativista e coeso. Mesmo em vista dessas características globais, identificamos que existem importantes diferenças no comportamento decisório e, quando elas estão presentes, o elemento da carreira é influente.
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The Ph.D. dissertation analyses the reasons for which political actors (governments, legislatures and political parties) decide consciously to give away a source of power by increasing the political significance of the courts. It focuses on a single case of particular significance: the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 in the United Kingdom. This Act has deeply changed the governance and the organization of the English judicial system, has provided a much clearer separation of powers and a stronger independence of the judiciary from the executive and the legislative. What’s more, this strengthening of the judicial independence has been decided in a period in which the political role of the English judges was evidently increasing. I argue that the reform can be interpreted as a «paradigm shift» (Hall 1993), that has changed the way in which the judicial power is considered. The most diffused conceptions in the sub-system of the English judicial policies are shifted, and a new paradigm has become dominant. The new paradigm includes: (i) stronger separation of powers, (ii) collective (as well as individual) conception of the independence of the judiciary, (iii) reduction of the political accountability of the judges, (iv) formalization of the guarantees of judicial independence, (v) principle-driven (instead of pragmatic) approach to the reforms, and (vi) transformation of a non-codified constitution in a codified one. Judicialization through political decisions represent an important, but not fully explored, field of research. The literature, in particular, has focused on factors unable to explain the English case: the competitiveness of the party system (Ramseyer 1994), the political uncertainty at the time of constitutional design (Ginsburg 2003), the cultural divisions within the polity (Hirschl 2004), federal institutions and division of powers (Shapiro 2002). All these contributes link the decision to enhance the political relevance of the judges to some kind of diffusion of political power. In the contemporary England, characterized by a relative high concentration of power in the government, the reasons for such a reform should be located elsewhere. I argue that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 can be interpreted as a result of three different kinds of reasons: (i) the social and demographical transformations of the English judiciary, which have made inefficient most of the precedent mechanism of governance, (ii) the role played by the judges in the policy process and (iii) the cognitive and normative influences originated from the European context, as a consequence of the membership of the United Kingdom to the European Union and the Council of Europe. My thesis is that only a full analysis of all these three aspects can explain the decision to reform the judicial system and the content of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Only the cultural influences come from the European legal complex, above all, can explain the paradigm shift previously described.