Are There Classical Business Cycles?

The aim of this paper is to test formally the classical business cycle hypothesis, using data from industrialized countries for the time period since 1960. The hypothesis is characterized by the view that the cyclical structure in GDP is concentrated in the investment series: fixed investment has typically a long cycle, while the cycle in inventory investment is shorter. To check the robustness of our results, we subject the data for 15 OECD countries to a variety of detrending techniques. While the hypothesis is not confirmed uniformly for all countries, there is a considerably high number for which the data display the predicted pattern. None of the countries shows a pattern which can be interpreted as a clear rejection of the classical hypothesis.

Are these classical business cycles?

The aim of this paper is to test formally the classical business cyclehypothesis, using data from industrialized countries for the timeperiod since 1960. The hypothesis is characterized by the view that the cyclical structure in GDP is concentrated in the investment series: fixed investment has typically a long cycle, while the cycle in inventory investment is shorter. To check the robustness of our results, we subject the data for 15 OECD countries to a variety of detrending techniques. While the hypothesis is not confirmed uniformly for all countries, there is a considerably high number for which the data display the predicted pattern. None of the countries shows a pattern which can be interpreted as a clear rejection of the classical hypothesis.

A model of dynamic liquidity contracts

I study long-term financial contracts between lenders and borrowers in the absence of perfect enforceability and when both parties are credit constrained. Borrowers repeatedly have projects to undertake and need external financing. Lenders can commit to contractual agreements whereas borrowers can renege any period. I show that equilibrium contracts feature interesting dynamics: the economy exhibits efficient investment cycles; absence of perfect enforcement and shortage of capital skew the cycles toward states of liquidity drought; credit is rationed if either the lender has too little capital or if the borrower has too little collateral. This paper's technical contribution is its demonstration of the existence and characterization of financial contracts that are solutions to a non-convex dynamic programming problem.

Investment and Business cycles /

Includes index.

The determinants of international equity investment: Do they differ between institutional and noninstitutional investors?

In this paper we investigate whether the determinants of international equity investment differ between investors with different degrees of sophistication. For this purpose, we analyse and compare the determinants of international equity investment of institutional and noninstitutional investors from 20 OECD countries (US not included) in the period 2001-2009. The results show that there are significant differences in the determinants of international equity investment between institutional and noninstitutional investors. In particular, noninstitutional investors tend to exhibit a more pronounced preference for equities of geographical nearby, contiguous and more transparent countries than institutional investors. The preference for more developed equity markets and the contrarian behaviour are also significantly more pronounced for noninstitutional than for institutional investors. These results support the argument that international equity investment of less sophisticated investors is more affected by information costs and familiarity than that of more sophisticated investors. Moreover, business cycles exert an influence on international equity investment decisions of both institutional and noninstitutional investors.

The determinants of international equity and bond investment

The purpose of this research is fourfold. First, to investigate whether the determinants of international equity investment differ between investors with different degrees of information, experience and sophistication. For this purpose, the determinants of international equity investment of institutional and noninstitutional investors from 20 OECD countries, in the period 2001-2009, were analysed and compared. The results show that there are significant differences in the determinants of international equity investment between institutional and noninstitutional investors. Particularly, noninstitutional investors exhibit a more pronounced preference for equities of geographical nearby, contiguous and more transparent countries than institutional investors, suggesting that the effect of information costs and familiarity on international equity investment is stronger for less informed, experienced and sophisticated investors. Moreover, the preference for more developed equity markets and the contrarian behaviour are more severe for noninstitutional investors. Hence, the heterogeneity of institutional and noninstitutional investors in international equity investment is not negligible and therefore should be taken into account. Second, to investigate whether the determinants of international bond investment differ between investors with different degrees of information, experience and sophistication. For this purpose, the determinants of international bond investment of institutional and noninstitutional investors from 20 OECD countries, in the period 2001-2009, were analysed and compared. The results show that there are few significant differences in the determinants of international bond investment between institutional and noninstitutional investors. Particularly, the preference for bonds of more transparent countries and the return chasing behaviour are more pronounced for noninstitutional investors, whereas the preference for bonds with lower risk diversification potential is more pronounced for institutional investors. Hence, not only the results for international bond investment do not allow to support (or reject) the argument that information costs and familiarity are more important for less informed, experienced and sophisticated investors, but also they are contrary to the idea that financial variables, namely return and risk diversification, are more important for more informed, experienced and sophisticated investors. Third, to investigate whether the determinants of international equity investment differ from the determinants of international bond investment. For this purpose, the determinants of both international equity and bond investment of institutional and noninstitutional investors from 20 OECD countries, in the period 2001-2009, were analysed and compared. The results show that, although the effect of information costs on international equity investment tends to be stronger than on international bond investment, the differences between assets are not usually statistically significant, especially when the influence of financial variables is taken into account. Hence, it is not possible to conclude that international equity investment is much more information intensive than international bond investment, as suggested by Gehrig (1993) and Portes, Rey and Oh (2001), among others. Fourth, to investigate whether the flight to quality phenomenon is also observable in international investment and whether the flight to quality phenomenon is more pronounced for more sophisticated than for less sophisticated investors. For this purpose, a two-factor and three-factor ANOVA models, respectively, were applied to the international equity and bond investment of institutional and noninstitutional investors from 20 OECD countries in the period 2001-2009. The results suggest that the flight to quality phenomenon is also observable in international investment, as a change from business cycle of expansion to recession causes investors to significantly decrease the average weight invested in more risky assets (equities) and increase the average weight invested in less risky assets (bonds). The results also show that the variation on the average weight assigned to each type of asset, due to changes in business cycles, is significantly stronger for institutional investors than for noninstitutional investors, thereby suggesting that the flight to quality phenomenon is more pronounced for more sophisticated than for less sophisticated investors.

Liquidity, business cycles and monetary policy: A simulation

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Booms, Recessions and Financial Turmoil: A Fresh Look at Investment Decisions under Cyclical Uncertainty

The paper studies the interaction between cyclical uncertainty and investment in a stochastic real option framework where demand shifts stochastically between three different states, each with different rates of drift and volatility. In our setting the shifts are governed by a three-state Markov switching model with constant transition probabilities. The magnitude of the link between cyclical uncertainty and investment is quantified using simulations of the model. The chief implication of the model is that recessions and financial turmoil are important catalysts for waiting. In other words, our model shows that macroeconomic risk acts as an important deterrent to investments.

Self-Fulfilling Price Cycles

This paper presents a model of a self-fulfilling price cycle in an asset market. Price oscillates deterministically even though the underlying environment is stationary. The mechanism that we uncover is driven by endogenous variation in the investment horizons of the different market participants, informed and uninformed. On even days, the price is high; on odd days it is low. On even days, informed traders are willing to jettison their good assets, knowing that they can buy them back the next day, when the price is low. The anticipated drop in price more than offsets any potential loss in dividend. Because of these asset sales, the informed build up their cash holdings. Understanding that the market is flooded with good assets, the uninformed traders are willing to pay a high price. But their investment horizon is longer than that of the informed traders: their intention is to hold the assets they purchase, not to resell. On odd days, the price is low because the uninformed recognise that the informed are using their cash holdings to cherry-pick good assets from the market. Now the uninformed, like the informed, are investing short-term. Rather than buy-and-hold as they do with assets purchased on even days, on odd days the uninformed are buying to sell. Notice that, at the root of the model, there lies a credit constraint. Although the informed are flush with cash on odd days, they are not deep pockets. On each cherry that they pick out of the market, they earn a high return: buying cheap, selling dear. However they don't have enough cash to strip the market of cherries and thereby bid the price up.

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Credit Constraints, Firms' Precautionary Investment, and the Business Cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' precautionary investment behavior in response to the anticipation of future financing constraints. Firms increase their demand for liquid and safe investments in order to alleviate future borrowing constraints and decrease the probability of having to forego future profitable investment opportunities. This results in an increase in the share of short-term projects that produces a temporary increase in output, at the expense of lower long-run investment and future output. I show in a calibrated model that this behavior is at the source of a novel and powerful channel of shock transmission of productivity shocks that produces short-run dampening and long-run propagation. Furthermore, it can account for the observed business cycle patterns of the aggregate and firm-level composition of investment.

International business cycles, financial markets and household production

This paper investigates the properties of an international real business cycle model with household production. We show that a model with disturbances to both market and household technologies reproduces the main regularities of the data and improves existing models in matching international consumption, investment and output correlations without irrealistic assumptions on the structure of international financial markets. Sensitivity analysis shows the robustness of the results to alternative specifications of the stochastic processes for the disturbances and to variations of unmeasured parameters within a reasonable range.

Endogenous credit cycles

I develop an overlapping-generations framework in which changes in lending standards generateendogenous cycles. In my economy, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about thequality of their projects need to borrow funds. Intermediaries screen entrepreneurs both throughthe amount of investment undertaken and through the level of entrepreneurial net worth.I show that endogenous regime switches in financial contracts from pooling to separatingand vice-versa may generate fluctuations even in the absence of exogenous shocks. Whenthe economy is in the pooling (separating) regime, lending standards seem lax ( tight ) andinvestment is high (low). Differently from the existing literature, my model does not requireentrepreneurial net worth to be counter cyclycal or inconsequential for determining aggregateinvestment.

Credit constraints, firms' precautionary investment and the business cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' investment composition choices in the presence of credit constraints. Following a negative andpersistent aggregate productivity shock, firms shift into short-term investments because they produce more pledgeable output and because they help alleviate futureborrowing constraints. This produces a short-run dampening of the effects of theshock, at the expense of lower long-term investment and future output, relativeto an economy with no credit market imperfections. The effects are exacerbatedby a steepening of the term structure of interest rates that further encourages ashift towards short-term investments in the short-run. Small temporary shocks tothe severity of financing frictions generate large and long-lasting effects on outputthrough their impact on the composition of investment. A positive financial shockproduces much stronger effects than an identical negative shock, while the responsesto positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity are roughly symmetric.Finally, the paper introduces a novel explanation for the countercyclicality of financing constraints of firms.

Irreversible investment in stochastically cyclical markets

This paper presents a new framework for studying irreversible (dis)investment whena market follows a random number of random-length cycles (such as a high-tech productmarket). It is assumed that a firm facing such market evolution is always unsure aboutwhether the current cycle is the last one, although it can update its beliefs about theprobability of facing a permanent decline by observing that no further growth phasearrives. We show that the existence of regime shifts in fluctuating markets suffices for anoption value of waiting to (dis)invest to arise, and we provide a marginal interpretationof the optimal (dis)investment policies, absent in the real options literature. Thepaper also shows that, despite the stochastic process of the underlying variable has acontinuous sample path, the discreteness in the regime changes implies that the samplepath of the firm s value experiences jumps whenever the regime switches all of a sudden,irrespective of whether the firm is active or not.