Functional and neural mechanisms of intertemporal choice

People are daily faced with intertemporal choice, i.e., choices differing in the timing of their consequences, frequently preferring smaller-sooner rewards over larger-delayed ones, reflecting temporal discounting of the value of future outcomes. This dissertation addresses two main goals. New evidence about the neural bases of intertemporal choice is provided. Following the disruption of either the medial orbitofrontal cortex or the insula, the willingness to wait for larger-delayed outcomes is affected in odd directions, suggesting the causal involvement of these areas in regulating the value computation of rewards available with different timings. These findings were also supported by a reported imaging study. Moreover, this dissertation provides new evidence about how temporal discounting can be modulated at a behavioral level through different manipulations, e.g., allowing individuals to think about the distant time, pairing rewards with aversive events, or changing their perceived spatial position. A relationship between intertemporal choice, moral judgements and aging is also discussed. All these findings link together to support a unitary neural model of temporal discounting according to which signals coming from several cortical (i.e., medial orbitofrontal cortex, insula) and subcortical regions (i.e., amygdala, ventral striatum) are integrated to represent the subjective value of both earlier and later rewards, under the top-down regulation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The present findings also support the idea that the process of outcome evaluation is strictly related to the ability to pre-experience and envision future events through self-projection, the anticipation of visceral feelings associated with receiving rewards, and the psychological distance from rewards. Furthermore, taking into account the emotions and the state of arousal at the time of decision seems necessary to understand impulsivity associated with preferring smaller-sooner goods in place of larger-later goods.

Lateral prefrontal cortex and self-control in intertemporal choice.

Disruption of function of left, but not right, lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) with low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) increased choices of immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. rTMS did not change choices involving only delayed rewards or valuation judgments of immediate and delayed rewards, providing causal evidence for a neural lateral-prefrontal cortex-based self-control mechanism in intertemporal choice.

Freedom of choice and bounded rationality: a brief appraisal of behavioral economists' plea for light paternalism

Behavioral economics has addressed interesting positive and normative questions underlying the standard rational choice theory. More recently, it suggests that, in a real world of boundedly rational agents, economists could help people to improve the quality of their choices without any harm to autonomy and freedom of choice. This paper aims to scrutinize available arguments for and against current proposals of light paternalistic interventions mainly in the domain of intertemporal choice. It argues that incorporating the notion of bounded rationality in economic analysis and empirical findings of cognitive biases and self-control problems cannot make an indisputable case for paternalism.

Ranking Sets of Objects

We provide a survey of the literature on ranking sets of objects. The interpretations of those set rankings include those employed in the theory of choice under complete uncertainty, rankings of opportunity sets, set rankings that appear in matching theory, and the structure of assembly preferences. The survey is prepared for the Handbook of Utility Theory, vol. 2, edited by Salvador Barberà, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers. The chapter number is provisional.

What Is a Commody? Two Axiomatic Anwers

We identify conditions under which preferences over sets of consumption opportunities can be reduced to preferences over bundles of \"commodities\". We distinguish ordinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to monotone transformations, from cardinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to positive linear transformations only.

Altruism, Intergenerational Transfers of Time and Bequests

This paper uses a standard two-period overlapping generation model to examine the behavior of an economy where both intergenerational transfers of time and bequests are available. While bequests have been examined extensively, time transfers have received little or no attention in the literature. Assuming a log-linear utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production function, we derive an explicit solution for the dynamics and show that altruistic intergenerational time transfers can take place in presence of a binding non-negativity constraint on bequests. We also show that with either type of transfers capital is an increasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. However, while with time transfers the labor supply of the young increases with the degree of altruism, with bequests it may decrease

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

La faiblesse de volonté : conceptions classiques et dynamiques

La présente thèse expose, analyse et critique les positions classiques et modernes à l’égard de la nature et des causes de la faiblesse de volonté. L’identification du problème par Platon et Aristote a donné lieu à l’explicitation de principes et propositions portant sur la rationalité pratique en général et la motivation en particulier. Une discussion de ces principes et propositions est faite dans la mesure où ils ont conservé une certaine pertinence pour les théories modernes. Ce qui est devenu la conception standard de la stricte akrasie ainsi que son caractère prétendument paradoxal sont mis de l’avant. Nous argumentons qu’une position sceptique à l’égard de la stricte akrasie ne peut pas reposer sur une version ou une autre de la théorie des préférences révélées et montrons qu’une description du processus décisionnel est nécessaire pour attribuer une préférence synthétique ou un meilleur jugement. Nous abordons le débat philosophique qui oppose une conception internaliste du lien entre le meilleur jugement et la décision à une conception externaliste, et soutenons, sur la base de résultats expérimentaux en psychologie cognitive et en neuroscience, que cette dernière conception est plus robuste, bien qu’imparfaite. Ces résultats ne vont pas toutefois à l’encontre de l’hypothèse que les agents sont des maximisateurs dans la satisfaction de leur préférence, laquelle hypothèse continue de justifier une forme de scepticisme à l’égard de la stricte akrasie. Nous exposons, par contre, des arguments solides à l’encontre de cette hypothèse et montrons pourquoi la maximisation n’est pas nécessairement requise pour le choix rationnel et que nous devons, par conséquent, réviser la conception standard de la stricte akrasie. Nous discutons de l’influente théorie de Richard Holton sur la faiblesse de volonté non strictement akratique. Bien que compatible avec une conception non maximisante, sa théorie réduit trop les épisodes de faiblesse de volonté à des cas d’irrésolution. Nous exposons finalement la théorie du choix intertemporel. Cette théorie est plus puissante parce qu’elle décrit et explique, à partir d’un même schème conceptuel, autant la stricte akrasie que l’akrasie tout court. Ce schème concerne les propriétés des distributions temporelles des conséquences des décisions akratiques et les attitudes prospectives qui motivent les agents à les prendre. La structure de ces distributions, couplée à la dévaluation à l’égard du futur, permet également d’expliquer de manière simple et élégante pourquoi la faiblesse de volonté est irrationnelle. Nous discutons de l’hypothèse qu’une préférence temporelle pure est à la source d’une telle dévaluation et mentionnons quelques éléments critiques et hypothèses concurrentes plus conformes à une approche cognitiviste du problème.

Individual Decision-Making and Inflation Persistence

The traditional task of a central bank is to preserve price stability and, in doing so, not to impair the real economy more than necessary. To meet this challenge, it is of great relevance whether inflation is only driven by inflation expectations and the current output gap or whether it is, in addition, influenced by past inflation. In the former case, as described by the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the central bank can immediately and simultaneously achieve price stability and equilibrium output, the so-called ‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard and Galí 2007). In the latter case, the achievement of price stability is costly in terms of output and will be pursued over several periods. Similarly, it is important to distinguish this latter case, which describes ‘intrinsic’ inflation persistence, from that of ‘extrinsic’ inflation persistence, where the sluggishness of inflation is not a ‘structural’ feature of the economy but merely ‘inherited’ from the sluggishness of the other driving forces, inflation expectations and output. ‘Extrinsic’ inflation persistence is usually considered to be the less challenging case, as policy-makers are supposed to fight against the persistence in the driving forces, especially to reduce the stickiness of inflation expectations by a credible monetary policy, in order to reestablish the ‘divine coincidence’. The scope of this dissertation is to contribute to the vast literature and ongoing discussion on inflation persistence: Chapter 1 describes the policy consequences of inflation persistence and summarizes the empirical and theoretical literature. Chapter 2 compares two models of staggered price setting, one with a fixed two-period duration and the other with a stochastic duration of prices. I show that in an economy with a timeless optimizing central bank the model with the two-period alternating price-setting (for most parameter values) leads to more persistent inflation than the model with stochastic price duration. This result amends earlier work by Kiley (2002) who found that the model with stochastic price duration generates more persistent inflation in response to an exogenous monetary shock. Chapter 3 extends the two-period alternating price-setting model to the case of 3- and 4-period price durations. This results in a more complex Phillips curve with a negative impact of past inflation on current inflation. As simulations show, this multi-period Phillips curve generates a too low degree of autocorrelation and too early turnings points of inflation and is outperformed by a simple Hybrid Phillips curve. Chapter 4 starts from the critique of Driscoll and Holden (2003) on the relative real-wage model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). While taking the critique seriously that Fuhrer and Moore’s model will collapse to a much simpler one without intrinsic inflation persistence if one takes their arguments literally, I extend the model by a term for inequality aversion. This model extension is not only in line with experimental evidence but results in a Hybrid Phillips curve with inflation persistence that is observably equivalent to that presented by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). In chapter 5, I present a model that especially allows to study the relationship between fairness attitudes and time preference (impatience). In the model, two individuals take decisions in two subsequent periods. In period 1, both individuals are endowed with resources and are able to donate a share of their resources to the other individual. In period 2, the two individuals might join in a common production after having bargained on the split of its output. The size of the production output depends on the relative share of resources at the end of period 1 as the human capital of the individuals, which is built by means of their resources, cannot fully be substituted one against each other. Therefore, it might be rational for a well-endowed individual in period 1 to act in a seemingly ‘fair’ manner and to donate own resources to its poorer counterpart. This decision also depends on the individuals’ impatience which is induced by the small but positive probability that production is not possible in period 2. As a general result, the individuals in the model economy are more likely to behave in a ‘fair’ manner, i.e., to donate resources to the other individual, the lower their own impatience and the higher the productivity of the other individual. As the (seemingly) ‘fair’ behavior is modelled as an endogenous outcome and as it is related to the aspect of time preference, the presented framework might help to further integrate behavioral economics and macroeconomics.

A kvázi- és általánosított hiperbolikus diszkontálás hosszú távon (Quasi- and Generalized Hyperbolic Discounting in Long Term)

Az intertemporális döntések fontos szerepet játszanak a közgazdasági modellezésben, és azt írják le, hogy milyen átváltást alkalmazunk két különböző időpont között. A közgazdasági modellezésben az exponenciális diszkontálás a legelterjedtebb, annak ellenére, hogy az empirikus vizsgálatok alapján gyenge a magyarázó ereje. A gazdaságpszichológiában elterjedt általánosított hiperbolikus diszkontálás viszont nagyon nehezen alkalmazható közgazdasági modellezési célra. Így tudott gyorsan elterjedni a kvázi-hiperbolikus diszkontálási modell, amelyik úgy ragadja meg a főbb pszichológiai jelenségeket, hogy kezelhető marad a modellezés során. A cikkben azt állítjuk, hogy hibás az a megközelítés, hogy hosszú távú döntések esetén, főleg sorozatok esetén helyettesíthető a két hiperbolikus diszkontálás egymással. Így a hosszú távú kérdéseknél érdemes felülvizsgálni a kvázi-hiperbolikus diszkontálással kapott eredményeket, ha azok az általánosított hiperbolikus diszkontálási modellel való helyettesíthetőséget feltételezték. ____ Intertemporal choice is one of the crucial questions in economic modeling and it describes decisions which require trade-offs among outcomes occurring in different points in time. In economic modeling the exponential discounting is the most well known, however it has weak validity in empirical studies. Although according to psychologists generalized hyperbolic discounting has the strongest descriptive validity it is very complex and hard to use in economic models. In response to this challenge quasi-hyperbolic discounting was proposed. It has the most important properties of generalized hyperbolic discounting while tractability remains in analytical modeling. Therefore it is common to substitute generalized hyperbolic discounting with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. This paper argues that the substitution of these two models leads to different conclusions in long term decisions especially in the case of series; hence all the models that use quasi-hyperbolic discounting for long term decisions should be revised if they states that generalized hyperbolic discounting model would have the same conclusion.

Multi-Profile Intertemporal Social Choice

We provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s axioms and they can be described by their corresponding collections of decisive coalitions. We review contributions that explore whether this possibility in the infinite-population context allows for a richer class of social welfare functions in an intergenerational model. Different notions of stationarity formulated for individual and for social preferences are examined. Journal of Economic Literature Classification No.: D71.

Intertemporal Social Evaluation

Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.

On choice of technique in the Robinson-Solow-Srinivasan model

We report results on the optimal \choice of technique" in a model originally formulated by Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (henceforth, the RSS model) and further discussed by Okishio and Stiglitz. By viewing this vintage-capital model without discounting as a speci c instance of the general theory of intertemporal resource allocation associated with Brock, Gale and McKenzie, we resolve longstanding conjectures in the form of theorems on the existence and price support of optimal paths, and of conditions suÆcient for the optimality of a policy rst identi ed by Stiglitz. We dispose of the necessity of these conditions in surprisingly simple examples of economies in which (i) an optimal path is periodic, (ii) a path following Stiglitz' policy is bad, and (iii) there is optimal investment in di erent vintages at di erent times. (129 words)

Why Some People Discount More than Others: Baseline Activation in the Dorsal PFC Mediates the Link between COMT Genotype and Impatient Choice

Individuals differ widely in how steeply they discount future rewards. The sources of these stable individual differences in delay discounting (DD) are largely unknown. One candidate is the COMT Val158Met polymorphism, known to modulate prefrontal dopamine levels and affect DD. To identify possible neural mechanisms by which this polymorphism may contribute to stable individual DD differences, we measured 73 participants' neural baseline activation using resting electroencephalogram (EEG). Such neural baseline activation measures are highly heritable and stable over time, thus an ideal endophenotype candidate to explain how genes may influence behavior via individual differences in neural function. After EEG-recording, participants made a series of incentive-compatible intertemporal choices to determine the steepness of their DD. We found that COMT significantly affected DD and that this effect was mediated by baseline activation level in the left dorsal prefrontal cortex (DPFC): (i) COMT had a significant effect on DD such that the number of Val alleles was positively correlated with steeper DD (higher numbers of Val alleles means greater COMT activity and thus lower dopamine levels). (ii) A whole-brain search identified a cluster in left DPFC where baseline activation was correlated with DD; lower activation was associated with steeper DD. (iii) COMT had a significant effect on the baseline activation level in this left DPFC cluster such that a higher number of Val alleles was associated with lower baseline activation. (iv) The effect of COMT on DD was explained by the mediating effect of neural baseline activation in the left DPFC cluster. Our study thus establishes baseline activation level in left DPFC as salient neural signature in the form of an endophenotype that mediates the link between COMT and DD.