Information and anti-terrorist security of Poland. A critical analysis exemplified with the tasks and activity of the Internal Security Agency

The subject matter of the analysis conducted in the text is information and anti-terrorist security of Poland, which has been presented within the context of a clash between two spheres – the state and the private sphere. Furthermore, the issues of security have been supplemented with a description of the tasks and activity of the Internal Security Agency, as well as a synthetic appraisal of a terrorist threat to Poland. The main parts of this work are concerned with: (1) the state and the private sphere, (2) " terrorism " and terrorist offences, (3) the tasks and activity of the Internal Security Agency, (4) an appraisal of a terrorist threat to Poland. Given the necessity to elaborate the research problem, the text features the following research questions: (1) To what extent does referring to a threat to security influence a limitation on rights and freedoms in Poland (with regard to the clash between the state and the private sphere)?, (2) To what extent do the tasks and activity of the Internal Security Agency influence the effectiveness of anti-terrorist security in Poland?

Poland’s internal security as exemplified by the tasks and activities of the Internal Security Agency in the period 2007–2015

The text analyses Poland's internal security illustrated with the example of the tasks and activities of one of the Polish special services, the Internal Security Agency (pol. Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego – ABW). Although the Internal Security Agency was established as a counter-intelligence service, the scope of its tasks and activities places it among the criminal intelligence services, which is poorly effective in terms of the eradication of crime targeted at the state's internal security. The analysis of the issues of state security in the context of the ISA's activity has been elaborated in the present text with the following research questions: (1) To what extent does the statutory scope of the ISA's tasks lower the effectiveness of the actions aimed at combating crime threatening state security? (2) To what extent does the structural pathology inside the ISA lower the effectiveness of the actions aimed at combating crime threatening state security? The text features an extensive analysis of three major issues: (1) the ISA's statutory tasks (with particular consideration of de lege lata and de lege ferenda regulations), (2) the dysfunctional character of the ISA's activity in relation to the scope of its statutory tasks, and (3) the structural pathology resulting from the 'politicisation' of the Internal Security Agency.

EU Home Affairs Agencies and the Construction of EU Internal Security. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 53/December 2012

Regulatory agencies such as Europol, Frontex, Eurojust, CEPOL as well as bodies such as OLAF, have over the past decade become increasingly active within the institutional architecture constituting the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and are now placed at the forefront of implementing and developing the EU’s internal security model. A prominent feature of agency activity is the large-scale proliferation of ‘knowledge’ on security threats via the production of policy tools such as threat assessments, risk analyses, periodic and situation reports. These instruments now play a critical role in providing the evidence-base that supports EU policymaking, with agency-generated ‘knowledge’ feeding political priority setting and decision-making within the EU’s new Internal Security Strategy (ISS). This paper examines the nature and purpose of knowledge generated by EU Home Affairs agencies. It asks where does this knowledge originate? How does it measure against criteria of objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability and accuracy? And how is it processed in order to frame threats, justify actions and set priorities under the ISS?

Communist political propaganda and use of United States mails : hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

Includes tables.

Visa procedures of Department of State: the Struelens case. Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws to the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-seventh Congress, second session.

At head of title: 87th Cong., 2d sess. Committee print.

State Department security. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-seventh Congress.

Each part also has special subtitle.

The case of Steve Nelson from the records of the proposed antisubversion legislation, hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Eighty-sixth Congress, first session. Appendix to Part 1.

Mode of access: Internet.

Internal security of Air Force installations.

Cover title.

The problem of internal security in Great Britain, 1948-1953,

Mode of access: Internet.

Communist propaganda : Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, second session.

Hearings held June 22-Oct.14. 1954.

[Hearings, reports and prints of the House Committee on Internal Security]

Mode of access: Internet.

The governance of justice and internal security in Scotland:between the Scottish independence referendum and British decisions on the EU

This article examines how the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland could be affected by the outcome of the Scottish independence referendum in September 2014. The article argues that it is currently impossible to equate a specific result in the referendum with a given outcome for the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. This is because of the complexities of the current arrangements in that policy area and the existence of several changes that presently affect them and are outside the control of the government and of the people of Scotland. This article also identifies an important paradox. In the policy domain of justice and internal security, a ‘no’ vote could, in a specific set of circumstances, actually lead to more changes than a victory of the ‘yes’ camp.

Shifting borders of European Union internal security:technology, externalisation and accountability

This edited volume analyzes recent key developments in EU border management. In light of the refugee crises in the Mediterranean and the responses on the part of EU member states, this volume presents an in-depth reflection on European border practices and their political, social and economic consequences. Approaching borders as concepts in flux, the authors identify three main trends: the rise of security technologies such as the EUROSUR system, the continued externalization of EU security governance such as border mission training in third states, and the unfolding dynamics of accountability. The contributions show that internal security cooperation in Europe is far from consolidated, since both political oversight mechanisms and the definition of borders remain in flux. This edited volume makes a timely and interdisciplinary contribution to the ongoing academic and political debate on the future of open borders and legitimate security governance in Europe. It offers a valuable resource for scholars in the fields of international security and migration studies, as well as for practitioners dealing with border management mechanisms.

New challenges for the EU internal security strategy

In recent years, the EU and its member states have experienced a number of changes, as well as challenges, in the areas of politics, economics, security and law. As these areas are interconnected, changes and challenges to any of them have implications for the others, as well as implications for the populations and institutions of the EU or those coming into contact with its international power and influence. This edited collection focuses primarily on security and law, particularly the EU’s internal security strategy. The EU’s Internal Security Strategy, adopted by the Spanish presidency early in 2010, followed the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, building on previous developments within the EU in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) policy. The focus of the EU Internal Security Strategy is to prevent and combat “serious and organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, in strengthening the management of our external borders and in building resilience to natural and man-made disasters”. The Internal Security strategy intersects and overlaps with the European Union’s Counter-terrorism strategy, the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA, and the EU’s Security Strategy. The role of and interaction between these strategies, their supplementing documents, and their implications for crime, victims, the law, political relations, democracy and human rights, form the backdrop against which the chapters in this collection are written. Building on original research by its contributors, this collection comprises work by authors from a wide variety of academic and professional areas and perspectives, as well as different countries, on a variety of areas and issues related to or raised by the EU’s Internal Security Strategy, from intelligence-led policing to human trafficking and port security. This book examines, from a wide variety of disciplinary perspectives including law, geography, politics and practice, both this further refinement of existing internal provisions on cross-border crime, and the increasing external relations of the EU in the AFSJ.

Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, 6 November 2013

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this paper assesses the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of these practices, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the paper contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of the balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The paper argues that these programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be analysed from an EU law perspective via i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights and judicial oversight constitute key norms; ii) the risks posed to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners and iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The paper then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.