How important is the intensive margin of labor adjustment?

Using new quarterly data for hours worked in OECD countries, Ohanian and Raffo (2011) argue that in many OECD countries, particularly in Europe, hours per worker are quantitatively important as an intensive margin of labor adjustment, possibly because labor market frictions are higher than in the US. I argue that this conclusion is not supported by the data. Using the same data on hours worked, I find evidence that labor market frictions are higher in Europe than in the US, like Ohanian and Raffo, but also that these frictions seem to affect the intensive margin at least as much as the extensive margin of labor adjustment.

Parametric pension reform and the intensive margin of labor supply, evidence from Colombia

We analyze the effect of a parametric reform of the fully-funded pension regime in Colombia on the intensive margin of the labor supply. We take advantage of a threshold defined by law in order to identify the causal effect using a regression discontinuity design. We find that a pension system that increases retirement age and the minimum weeks during which workers must contribute to claim pension benefits causes an increase of around 2 hours on the number of weekly worked hours; this corresponds to 4% of the average number of weekly worked hours or around 14% of a standard deviation of weekly worked hours. The effect is robust to different specifications, polynomial orders and sample sizes.

Labor adjustment dynamics: An application of system GMM

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The Labor Market Effects of Technology Shocks

We analyze the labor market effects of neutral and investment-specific technology shocks along the intensive margin (hours worked) and the extensive margin (unemployment). We characterize the dynamic response of unemployment in terms of the job separation and the job finding rate. Labor market adjustments occur along the extensive margin in response to neutral shocks, along the intensive margin in response to investment specific shocks. The job separation rate accounts for a major portion of the impact response of unemployment. Neutral shocks prompt a contemporaneous increase in unemployment because of a sharp rise in the separation rate. This is prolonged by a persistent fall in the job finding rate. Investment specific shocks rise employment and hours worked. Neutral shocks explain a substantial portion of the volatility of unemployment and output; investment specific shocks mainly explain hours worked volatility. This suggests that neutral progress is consistent with Schumpeterian creative destruction, while investment-specific progress operates as in a neoclassical growth model.

Organizational capital and employment fluctuations

In this paper I present a model in which production requires two types of labor inputs: regular productive tasks and organizational capital, which is accumulated by workers performing organizational tasks. By allocating more workers from organizational to productive tasks, firms can temporarily increase production without hiring. The availability of this intensive margin of labor adjustment, in combination with adjustment costs along the extensive margin (search frictions, firing costs, training costs), makes it optimal to delay employment adjustments. Simulations indicate that this mechanism is quantitatively important even if only a small fraction of workers perform organizational tasks, and explains why the hiring rate is persistent and why employment is slow to recover after the end of a recession.

Schumpeterian technology shocks

We analyze the labor market effects of neutral and investment-specific technologyshocks along the intensive margin (hours worked) and the extensive margin(unemployment). We characterize the dynamic response of unemploymentin terms of the job separation and the job finding rate. Labor market adjustmentsoccur along the extensive margin in response to neutral shocks, along theintensive margin in response to investment specific shocks. The job separationrate accounts for a major portion of the impact response of unemployment. Neutralshocks prompt a contemporaneous increase in unemployment because of asharp rise in the separation rate. This is prolonged by a persistent fall in thejob finding rate. Investment specific shocks rise employment and hours worked.Neutral shocks explain a substantial portion of the volatility of unemploymentand output; investment specific shocks mainly explain hours worked volatility.This suggests that neutral progress is consistent with Schumpeterian creative destruction,while investment-specific progress operates as in a neoclassical growthmodel.

Endogenous labor market participation and the business cycle

Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show analytically how variations in the participation rate are driven by the cross-sectional density of home productivity near the participation threshold, andhow this density translates into an extensive-margin labor supply elasticity. A calibration of the model to macro data not only matches employment and participation variabilities but also generates strongly countercyclical unemployment rates. With some wage rigidity the model also matches unemployment variations well. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity implied by our calibration is consistent with microeconometric evidence for the US.

Explaining movements in the labor share

In this paper we study the evolution of the labor share in the OECD since 1970. We show it is essentially related to the capital-output ratio; that this relationship is shifted by factors like the price of imported materials or the skill mix; and that discrepancies between the marginal product of labor and the real wage (due to, e.g., product market power, union bargaining, and labor adjustment costs) cause departures from it. We provide estimates of the model with panel data on 14 industries and 14 countries for 1973-93 and use them to compute the evolution of the wage gap in Germany and the US.

Before the United States Railroad Labor Board; exhibit ...

[1] The development of collection bargaining on a national basis.--[2] Industrial relations on railroads prior to 1917.--[3] The sanction of the eight-hour day.--[4] Seniority rules of the national agreement.--[5] The recognition of human standards in industry.--[6] Human standards and railroad policy.--[7] Railroad boards of labor adjustment.--[8] Punitive overtime.--[9] Rules prior to national agreement.--[10] Occupation hazard of railway shopmen.--[11] The work of the railway carmen.--[12] The unity of the American railway system.--[13-16] Inadequacies of railway management, part I-IV.--[17] Specific cases cited by Mr. Whiter, and employees' rebuttal.--[18] Standardization.--[19] The problem of piece work.

Essays on Macroeconomic Trends and Cycles

This dissertation describes two studies on macroeconomic trends and cycles. The first chapter studies the impact of Information Technology (IT) on the U.S. labor market. Over the past 30 years, employment and income shares of routine-intensive occupations have declined significantly relative to nonroutine occupations, and the overall U.S. labor income share has declined relative to capital. Furthermore, the decline of routine employment has been largely concentrated during recessions and ensuing recoveries. I build a model of unbalanced growth to assess the role of computerization and IT in driving these labor market trends and cycles. I augment a neoclassical growth model with exogenous IT progress as a form of Routine-Biased Technological Change (RBTC). I show analytically that RBTC causes the overall labor income share to follow a U-shaped time path, as the monotonic decline of routine labor share is increasingly offset by the monotonic rise of nonroutine labor share and the elasticity of substitution between the overall labor and capital declines under IT progress. Quantitatively, the model explains nearly all the divergence between routine and nonroutine labor in the period 1986-2014, as well as the mild decline of the overall labor share between 1986 and the early 2000s. However, the model with IT progress alone cannot explain the accelerated decline of labor income share after the early 2000s, suggesting that other factors, such as globalization, may have played a larger role in this period. Lastly, when nonconvex labor adjustment costs are present, the model generates a stepwise decline in routine labor hours, qualitatively consistent with the data. The timing of these trend adjustments can be significantly affected by aggregate productivity shocks and concentrated in recessions. The second chapter studies the implications of loss aversion on the business cycle dynamics of aggregate consumption and labor hours. Loss aversion refers to the fact that people are distinctively more sensitive to losses than to gains. Loss averse agents are very risk averse around the reference point and exhibit asymmetric responses to positive and negative income shocks. In an otherwise standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, I study loss aversion in both consumption alone and consumption-and-leisure together. My results indicate that how loss aversion affects business cycle dynamics depends critically on the nature of the reference point. If, for example, the reference point is status quo, loss aversion dramatically lowers the effective inter-temporal rate of substitution and induces excessive consumption smoothing. In contrast, if the reference point is fixed at a constant level, loss aversion generates a flat region in the decision rules and asymmetric impulse responses to technology shocks. Under a reasonable parametrization, loss aversion has the potential to generate asymmetric business cycles with deeper and more prolonged recessions.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Judicial presence and rent extraction

We estimate the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments.We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors.Our unique dataset at the level of individual inspections allows us to separately examine extensiveand intensive margins of rent extraction. The identification strategy is based on an institutionalrule of state judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned tothe most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research designexploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identicalpopulation size from other districts in the same state, where they are not the most populous. IVestimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularitiesrelated to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. In contrast, we findno effect on the intensive margin of rent extraction. Finally, our estimates suggest that judicialpresence reduces rent extraction only for first-term mayors.

Adoption of financial technologies: Implications for money demand and monetary policy

In this paper we argue that inventory models are probably not usefulmodels of household money demand because the majority of households does nothold any interest bearing assets. The relevant decision for most people is notthe fraction of assets to be held in interest bearing form, but whether to holdany of such assets at all. The implications of this realization are interesting and important. We find that(a) the elasticity of money demand is very small when the interest rate is small,(b) the probability that a household holds any amount of interest bearing assetsis positively related to the level of financial assets, and (c) the cost ofadopting financial technologies is positively related to age and negatively relatedto the level of education. Unlike the traditional methods of money demand estimation, our methodology allowsfor the estimation of the interest--elasticity at low values of the nominalinterest rate. The finding that the elasticity is very small for interest ratesbelow 5 percent suggests that the welfare costs of inflation are small. At interest rates of 6 percent, the elasticity is close to 0.5. We find thatroughly one half of this elasticity can be attributed to the Baumol--Tobin orintensive margin and half of it can be attributed to the new adopters or extensivemargin. The intensive margin is less important at lower interest rates and moreimportant at higher interest rates.

Job creation under liquidity constraints: The Spanish case

This paper shows that liquidity constraints restrict jobcreation even when labor markets are flexible. In a dynamicmodel of labor demand, I show that in an environment of imperfect capital and imperfect labor markets, firms usetemporary contracts to relax financial constraints. Evidence for the predictions of the model is presented using Spanish data from the CBBE (Central de Balances del Banco de España - Balance Sheet data from the Bank of Spain). It is shown that firms substitute temporary laborfor permanent one and use less debt as their financial position improves. In particular, it is rejected that Spanish firms operate in an environment of free capital markets and of no labor adjustment costs. The labor reform of 1984, which created temporary contracts, implied to some extent a relaxation of liquidity constraints.Accordingly, firms used these contracts more extensivelyand used less debt; however, as capital markets continueto be imperfect, permanent job creation continues to beslow. Consequently, relaxation of liquidity constraints should also be part of a job creation strategy.

Will EMU increase eurosclerosis?

In this paper we study the relationship between labor market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labor institutions (labor adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigitidy) and social preferences regarding inflation, employment, and real wages. We also calibrate our model tocompute how the change in social welfare brought about by giving up monetary policy as a result of joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) depends on institutions and preferences. We then use the calibrated model to analyze how EMU affects the incentives for labor market reform, both for reformsthat increase the economy's adjustment potential and for those that affect the long-run unemployment rate.