Legislative proposals to codify directors' liability for insolvent trading in Hong Kong : a 10-year journey

Hong Kong is a modern global city with a reputation for well-regulated financial markets, but for years, the government had been trying to enact laws on corporate rescue procedures with relatively little success. It is under the pretext of the Global Financial Crisis, the threat of a future economic meltdown gave the Hong Kong government the impetus to revisit this issue. This third attempt to codify statutory obligations on directors’ liability for insolvent trading has been criticised for either setting the standards too high or low for directors trading whilst insolvent. There is also some reservation given the beliefs and values of directors in Chinese family-owned and controlled companies. These companies would most likely trade out the difficult times. Nevertheless, this does not negate from the fact that the enactment of corporate rescue procedures in Hong Kong in 2010 is a momentous achievement for the Hong Kong government.

"Sexually transmitted debts":the scope of defences to directors' liability for insolvent trading

The recent demise of prominent Australian corporations, such as GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, One.Tel Ltd, HIH Insurance Ltd and Ansett Australia Ltd, have highlighted the relevance of, inter alia, the Australian insolvent trading provisions embodied in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (formerly Corporations Law). What may not be appreciated, however, is that insolvent trading is not only concerned with large public companies. Many of the insolvent trading cases that come before the courts involve small proprietary companies. Moreover, in many cases these are small “family” companies where there may only be one active director. This gives rise to a difficult issue as to the appropriateness of imposing liability for insolvent trading on a spouse who is, factually, merely a dormant director. This article explores the issue of spousal liability for insolvent trading, particularly focusing on the scope of the current defences to insolvent
trading under s 588H.

Director liability for uncommercial transactions : is s 588G(1A) impotent to provide liquidators the means to seek compensation for creditors?

In the 10 years since the addition of uncommercial transactions to the table of deemed “debts incurred” in s 588G(1A) of the Corporations Act, the sub-section has arguably achieved little. This article explains why this has been so, and what needs to be done to enable this aspect of Australia’s insolvent trading laws to operate effectively and as originally intended.

Bailing out the FEG : is the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (formerly GEERS) approaching its own fiscal cliff?

This article discusses what recent statistics and public reports reveal about the funding of GEERS (now the FEG) and its bottom line. The article examines (1) whether there has been a “blowout” in the scheme which guarantees the recovery of employee entitlements in liquidations and (2) what might be done to put the scheme on a firmer fiscal footing.

Regulating against corporate phoenix activity

This paper considers the adequacy and efficiency of existing legal and regulatory frameworks to deal with corporate phoenix activity. Phoenix activity, which is often triggered by a solvency crisis, is estimated to cost the Australian economy up to $3 billion each year. Despite the raft of piecemeal Australian legislation directed at this activity, phoenix activity does not appear to be abating. This paper considers regulatory approaches to detection and enforcement of the underlying law. This study reveals and explores a perception that the law is deficient, and the tension that exists between the adequacy of the law and the regulatory approach.

The conundrum of phoenix activity: Is further reform necessary?

Phoenix activity presents a conundrum for the law and its regulators. While there is economic cost associated with all phoenix activity, the underlying behaviour is not always illegal. A transaction with indicators of phoenix activity may be an entirely innocent and well-intentioned display of entrepreneurial spirit, albeit one that has ended in failure. Restructuring post business failure is not illegal per se. Recent reforms targeting phoenix activity fail to grapple with the vast range of behaviour that can be described as phoenix activity since they do not differentiate between legal and illegal activity. This article explores the importance of the distinction between legal and illegal phoenix activity, the extent to which the existing law captures a range of behaviour that can be described as illegal phoenix activity and the response of key regulators and governmental bodies to the absence of single law that attempts to define illegal phoenix activity.