Finding Quasi-Optimal Network Topologies for Information Transmission in Active Networks

This work clarifies the relation between network circuit (topology) and behaviour (information transmission and synchronization) in active networks, e.g. neural networks. As an application, we show how one can find network topologies that are able to transmit a large amount of information, possess a large number of communication channels, and are robust under large variations of the network coupling configuration. This theoretical approach is general and does not depend on the particular dynamic of the elements forming the network, since the network topology can be determined by finding a Laplacian matrix (the matrix that describes the connections and the coupling strengths among the elements) whose eigenvalues satisfy some special conditions. To illustrate our ideas and theoretical approaches, we use neural networks of electrically connected chaotic Hindmarsh-Rose neurons.

Optimal information transmission in organizations: Search and congestion

We propose a stylized model of a problem-solving organization whoseinternal communication structure is given by a fixed network. Problemsarrive randomly anywhere in this network and must find their way to theirrespective specialized solvers by relying on local information alone.The organization handles multiple problems simultaneously. For this reason,the process may be subject to congestion. We provide a characterization ofthe threshold of collapse of the network and of the stock of foatingproblems (or average delay) that prevails below that threshold. We buildupon this characterization to address a design problem: the determinationof what kind of network architecture optimizes performance for any givenproblem arrival rate. We conclude that, for low arrival rates, the optimalnetwork is very polarized (i.e. star-like or centralized ), whereas it islargely homogenous (or decentralized ) for high arrival rates. We also showthat, if an auxiliary assumption holds, the transition between these twoopposite structures is sharp and they are the only ones to ever qualify asoptimal.

ACTIVE NETWORKS THAT MAXIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION TRANSMISSION

This work clarifies the relationship between network circuit (topology) and behavior (information transmission and synchronization) in active networks, e. g. neural networks. As an application, we show how to determine a network topology that is optimal for information transmission. By optimal, we mean that the network is able to transmit a large amount of information, it possesses a large number of communication channels, and it is robust under large variations of the network coupling configuration. This theoretical approach is general and does not depend on the particular dynamic of the elements forming the network, since the network topology can be determined by finding a Laplacian matrix (the matrix that describes the connections and the coupling strengths among the elements) whose eigenvalues satisfy some special conditions. To illustrate our ideas and theoretical approaches, we use neural networks of electrically connected chaotic Hindmarsh-Rose neurons.

Linear and nonlinear pathways of spectral information transmission in the cochlear nucleus

At the level of the cochlear nucleus (CN), the auditory pathway divides into several parallel circuits, each of which provides a different representation of the acoustic signal. Here, the representation of the power spectrum of an acoustic signal is analyzed for two CN principal cells—chopper neurons of the ventral CN and type IV neurons of the dorsal CN. The analysis is based on a weighting function model that relates the discharge rate of a neuron to first- and second-order transformations of the power spectrum. In chopper neurons, the transformation of spectral level into rate is a linear (i.e., first-order) or nearly linear function. This transformation is a predominantly excitatory process involving multiple frequency components, centered in a narrow frequency range about best frequency, that usually are processed independently of each other. In contrast, type IV neurons encode spectral information linearly only near threshold. At higher stimulus levels, these neurons are strongly inhibited by spectral notches, a behavior that cannot be explained by level transformations of first- or second-order. Type IV weighting functions reveal complex excitatory and inhibitory interactions that involve frequency components spanning a wider range than that seen in choppers. These findings suggest that chopper and type IV neurons form parallel pathways of spectral information transmission that are governed by two different mechanisms. Although choppers use a predominantly linear mechanism to transmit tonotopic representations of spectra, type IV neurons use highly nonlinear processes to signal the presence of wide-band spectral features.

ORBIT: online reduced bandwidth information transmission.

"Supported in part by contract number U.S. AEC AT(11-1) 1469."

Problems in information transmission.

Photocopy.

Enhanced information transmission with signal dependent noise in an array of LIF neurons

Sensory cells usually transmit information to afferent neurons via chemical synapses, in which the level of noise is dependent on an applied stimulus. Taking into account such dependence, we model a sensory system as an array of LIF neurons with a common signal. We show that information transmission is enhanced by a nonzero level of noise. Moreover, we demonstrate a phenomenon similar to suprathreshold stochastic resonance with additive noise. We remark that many properties of information transmission found for the LIF neurons was predicted by us before with simple binary units [Phys. Rev. E 75, 021121 (2007)]. This confirmation of our predictions allows us to point out identical roots of the phenomena found in the simple threshold systems and more complex LIF neurons.

Enhanced information transmission with signal-dependent noise in an array of nonlinear elements

We have investigated information transmission in an array of threshold units that have signal-dependent noise and a common input signal. We demonstrate a phenomenon similar to stochastic resonance and suprathreshold stochastic resonance with additive noise and show that information transmission can be enhanced by a nonzero level of noise. By comparing system performance to one with additive noise we also demonstrate that the information transmission of weak signals is significantly better with signal-dependent noise. Indeed, information rates are not compromised even for arbitrary small input signals. Furthermore, by an appropriate selection of parameters, we observe that the information can be made to be (almost) independent of the level of the noise, thus providing a robust method of transmitting information in the presence of noise. These result could imply that the ability of hair cells to code and transmit sensory information in biological sensory systems is not limited by the level of signal-dependent noise. © 2007 The American Physical Society.

Secure transmission of information by digital chaotic signals

Protecting signals is one of the main tasks in information transmission. A large number of different methods have been employed since many centuries ago. Most of them have been based on the use of certain signal added to the original one. When the composed signal is received, if the added signal is known, the initial information may be obtained. The main problem is the type of masking signal employed. One possibility is the use of chaotic signals, but they have a first strong limitation: the need to synchronize emitter and receiver. Optical communications systems, based on chaotic signals, have been proposed in a large number of papers. Moreover, because most of the communication systems are digital and conventional chaos generators are analogue, a conversion analogue-digital is needed. In this paper we will report a new system where the digital chaos is obtained from an optically programmable logic structure. This structure has been employed by the authors in optical computing and some previous results in chaotic signals have been reported. The main advantage of this new system is that an analogue-digital conversion is not needed. Previous works by the authors employed Self-Electrooptical Effect Devices but in this case more conventional structures, as semiconductor laser amplifiers, have been employed. The way to analyze the characteristics of digital chaotic signals will be reported as well as the method to synchronize the chaos generators located in the emitter and in the receiver.

Singing in the Rain Forest: How a Tropical Bird Song Transfers Information

How information transmission processes between individuals are shaped by natural selection is a key question for the understanding of the evolution of acoustic communication systems. Environmental acoustics predict that signal structure will differ depending on general features of the habitat. Social features, like individual spacing and mating behavior, may also be important for the design of communication. Here we present the first experimental study investigating how a tropical rainforest bird, the white-browed warbler Basileuterus leucoblepharus, extracts various information from a received song: species-specific identity, individual identity and location of the sender. Species-specific information is encoded in a resistant acoustic feature and is thus a public signal helping males to reach a wide audience. Conversely, individual identity is supported by song features susceptible to propagation: this private signal is reserved for neighbors. Finally, the receivers can locate the singers by using propagation-induced song modifications. Thus, this communication system is well matched to the acoustic constraints of the rain forest and to the ecological requirements of the species. Our results emphasize that, in a constraining acoustic environment, the efficiency of a sound communication system results from a coding/decoding process particularly well tuned to the acoustic properties of this environment.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.