Intra-organizational information asymmetry in offshore ISD outsourcing

Purpose - Contemporary offshore Information System Development (ISD) outsourcing is becoming even more complex. Outsourcing partner has begun ‘re-outsourcing’ components of their projects to other outsourcing companies to minimize cost and gain efficiencies. This paper aims to explore intra-organizational Information Asymmetry of re-outsourced offshore ISD outsourcing projects. Design/methodology/approach - An online survey was conducted to get an overall view of Information Asymmetry between Principal and Agents (as per the Agency theory). Findings - Statistical analysis showed that there are significant differences between the Principal and Agent on clarity of requirements, common domain knowledge and communication effectiveness constructs, implying an unbalanced relationship between the parties. Moreover, our results showed that these three are significant measurement constructs of Information Asymmetry. Research limitations/implications - In our study we have only considered three main factors as common domain knowledge, clarity of requirements and communication effectiveness as three measurement constructs of Information Asymmetry. Therefore, researches are encouraged to test the proposed constructs further to increase its precision. Practical implications - Our analysis indicates significant differences in all three measurement constructs, implying the difficulties to ensure that the Agent is performing according to the requirements of the Principal. Using the Agency theory as theoretical view, this study sheds light on the best contract governing methods which minimize Information Asymmetry between the multiple partners within ISD outsourcing organizations. Originality/value - Currently, to the best of our knowledge, no study has undertaken research on Intra-organizational Information Asymmetry in re-outsourced offshore ISD outsourcing projects.

Accounting accruals and information asymmetry in Europe

We investigate whether the positive relation between accounting accruals and information asymmetry documented for U.S. stock markets also holds for European markets, considered as a whole and at the country level. This research is relevant because this relation is likely to be affected by differences in accounting standards used by companies for financial reporting, in the traditional use of the banking system or capital markets for firm financing, in legal systems and cultural environment. We find that in European stock markets discretionary accruals are positively related with the Corwin and Schultz high-low spread estimator used as a proxy for information asymmetry. Our results suggest that the earnings management component of accruals outweighs the informational component, but the significance of the relation varies across countries. Further, such association tends to be stronger for firms with the highest levels of positive discretionary accruals. Consistent with the evidence provided by the authors, our results also suggest that the high-low spread estimator is more efficient than the closing bid-ask spread when analysing the impact of information quality on information asymmetry.

Information Asymmetry and Accounting Conservatism under IFRS Adoption

LaFond and Watts (2008) provide evidence that information asymmetry might be a determinant of accounting conservatism. One implication of their paper is that regulators trying to reduce information asymmetry by lowering the level of accounting conservatism might be wrong. However, there is a trend in moving away from conservative accounting. The typical example is IFRS adoption. Therefore, this paper studies information asymmetry and accounting conservatism under IFRS adoption. The results show that the level of accounting conservatism decreases after mandatory IFRS adoption, but the adoption of IFRS is likely to weaken the relationship between information asymmetry and accounting conservatism. Moreover, this paper investigates how the change of accounting conservatism under IFRS is related to the change in information environment. The finding shows that accounting conservatism increases information environment, supporting the idea that, by providing comparatively credible information, conservative accounting is beneficial to the information environment.

Relationship banking: does it lower information asymmetry or increase lender monopoly power?

A literatura teórica sobre economia bancária aponta que o relacionamento duradouro entre um emprestador e uma firma tomadora pode revelar informações sobre a qualidade de crédito da firma. Entretanto, trabalhos teóricos preveem diferentes resultados do efeito do relacionamento bancário sobre a taxa de juros e volume ofertado do empréstimo. De acordo com Diamond (1991) e outros, se o relacionamento bancário for revelar a todos os credores a qualidade de crédito da firma, espera-se como efeitos o aumento do volume dos empréstimos e redução na taxa de juros. Por outro lado, se o relacionamento bancário revelar as informações de crédito da firma apenas para o fornecedor principal, então se pode não ter os efeitos de aumento do volume e redução na taxa de juros. Este trabalho demonstra empiricamente quais são os efeitos das informações públicas e privadas geradas pelo relacionamento bancário no montante do empréstimo e na taxa de juros cobrada pelas instituições financeiras para as firmas. Usamos como medida de informação pública o tempo de relacionamento entre o banco e tomador, que pode ser encontrado em bureaux externos como Serasa Experian e Serviço Central de Proteção ao Crédito (SCPC) ou no Sistema de Informação do Banco Central (SISBACEN). Usamos como modelo de informação privada medidas que indicam o pagamento do débito em atraso por parte do tomador, o qual é de conhecimento apenas de cada credor. De acordo com a teoria, espera-se que a informação pública de tempo de relacionamento bancário indicará a qualidade do credor e resultará em maior volume de empréstimo e taxa de juros menores. As informações privadas sobre pagamentos em atraso, por ser exclusiva do credor principal, não terão efeitos sobre o montante do empréstimo e sobre a taxa de juros. No teste empírico, foram analisados dois mil setecentos e oitenta e cinco empréstimos do produto capital de giro concedidos a cinquenta e três empresas, fornecidos por uma instituição financeira do Estado do Espírito Santo. Utilizando o modelo econométrico dados em painel com efeito fixo de firma, encontramos que o tempo de relacionamento bancário é positivamente correlacionado ao valor do principal do empréstimo e é negativamente correlacionado ao spread bancário. Ambos os efeitos são estatisticamente significantes ao nível de 5,00%. Resultados similares ao encontrado por Berger e Udell (1995). Os resultados mostram que um relacionamento duradouro entre firmas e instituições financeiras reduz a assimetria de informação, gerando benefícios para as firmas. Para testar o feito da informação privada, foram utilizadas informações de atraso das firmas com a instituição financeira. Esses dados foram usados internamente, não divulgados em bureaux de crédito. As variáveis testadas foram número de parcelas pagas em atraso no mês anterior, a soma das parcelas pagas em atraso, flag se já efetuou pagamento em atraso e meses desde o último pagamento em atraso. Não têm efeito as informações privadas sobre o spread e o valor do principal do empréstimo. Resultados similares aos encontrados por Sharpe (1990).

Information asymmetry and competition in credit markets: the pricing of overdraft loans in Brazil

This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

Information asymmetry and transaction costs in a cross-cultural business transaction

The intent of this paper is to provide a practitioners insight into the present and foreseeable future of problem of transaction cost economics related to culture and business etiquette that may increase the of complexity of business communication. We will also explore whether it impacts participant's mindsets regarding opportunistic or passive aggressive behavior. We will study the role of culture, ethics, information asymmetry, and legal systems regarding their importance towards the business contracts and lack of knowledge in local environments. We will make connections to contract theory strategies and objectives and recommend business practices. Furthermore, economic theory explores the role of the impossibility of the perfect contract. Historical and present day operational factors are examined for the determination of forward-looking contract law indications worldwide. This paper is intended provide a practitioners view with a global perspective of a multinational, mid-sized and small corporations giving consideration in a non-partisan and non-nationalistic view, yet examines the individual characteristics of the operational necessities and obligations of any corporation. The study will be general, yet cite specific articles to each argument and give adequate consideration to the intricacies of the global asymmetry of information. This paper defends that corporations of any kind and size should be aware of the risk of international business etiquette and cultural barriers that might jeopardize the savings you could obtain from engaging international suppliers.

Exchange-traded funds and information asymmetry

This thesis focuses on three main questions. The first uses ExchangeTraded Funds (ETFs) to evaluate estimated adverse selection costs obtained spread decomposition models. The second compares the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) in Exchange-Traded Funds to control securities. The third examines the intra-day ETF trading patterns. These spread decomposition models evaluated are Glosten and Harris (1988); George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991); Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995); Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997); Huang and Stoll (1997). Using the characteristics of ETFs it is shown that only the Glosten and Harris (1988) and Madhavan, et al (1997) models provide theoretically consistent results. When the PIN measure is employed ETFs are shown to have greater PINs than control securities. The investigation of the intra-day trading patterns shows that return volatility and trading volume have a U-shaped intra-day pattern. A study of trading systems shows that ETFs on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) have a U-shaped intra-day pattern of bid-ask spreads, while ETFs on NASDAQ do not. Specifically, ETFs on NASDAQ have higher bid-ask spreads at the market opening, then the lowest bid-ask spread in the middle of the day. At the close of the market, the bid-ask spread of ETFs on NASDAQ slightly elevated when compared to mid-day.

Assessment of Information Asymmetry

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 62P20, 91B42

Kontraszelekció és erkölcsi kockázat a politikában. Vázlat az információs aszimmetria közgazdaságtani fogalmainak politikatudományi alkalmazhatóságáról (Negative selection and moral risk in politics. An outline of the usefulness to political science of the economic concept of information asymmetry)

Az írás a kontraszelekció és az erkölcsi kockázat információ-gazdaságtani fogalmának politikatudományi alkalmazhatósága mellett érvel. Azt kívánja bemutatni, hogy a politikai piac szereplői közti információs aszimmetria mechanizmusainak éppúgy lehetnek súlyos negatív hatásai a demokratikus politikai rendszer működésére nézve, mint ahogy a gazdasági szereplők közti információs aszimmetria - Nobel-díjas közgazdászok érvei szerint - alááshatja a piaci verseny hatékonyságát. Az írás új megvilágításba helyezi a - már Platón óta ismert - politikai kontraszelekció jelenségét, továbbá részletesen foglalkozik az erkölcsi kockázat és a megbízó-megbízott relációk megjelenésével a politikában. Érinti tovább azoknak a mechanizmusoknak - a jelzésnek és a szűrésnek - a megjelenését a politikában, melyeket a közgazdászok az információs aszimmetria csökkentésére ajánlanak. / === / The paper argues in favour of employing in political science the economic concept of information asymmetry, seeking to show that the mechanisms of information asymmetry among the players on the political market may have negative effects on the operation of a democratic political system as information asymmetry among economic actors – according to arguments of Nobel prize-winning economists – has on the efficiency of market competition. The paper sheds new light on the phenomenon of negative political selection (known since Plato's time), and goes on to deal in detail with the appearance of moral risk and client/agent relations in politics. The author touches also on the appearance in politics of mechanisms – signals and filters – that economists suggest for reducing information asymmetry.

Group participative budgeting: The effect of information asymmetry on group work standards

The complexity of many organizational tasks requires perspectives, expertise, and talents that are often not found in a single individual. Organizations have therefore been placing employees into groups, assigning them to tasks they would formally have undertaken individually. The use of these groups, known as workgroups, has become an important strategy for managing this increased complexity. Empirical research on participative budgeting however has been limited almost exclusively to individuals. This dissertation empirically examines the effect of the information that management and workgroups have about group members' performance capabilities, on the work standards that workgroups select during the participative budgeting process. ^ A laboratory experiment was conducted in which two hundred and forty undergraduate business students were randomly assigned to three-member groups. The study provides empirical evidence which suggests that when management is unaware of group members' performance capabilities, workgroups select higher work standards and have higher performance levels than when management is aware of their performance capabilities. ^

Fighting for shells: how private information about resource value changes hermit crab pre-fight displays and escalated fight behaviour

Pre-fight displays typically provide honest, but sometimes dishonest, information about resource holding potential and may be influenced by assessment of resource value and hence motivation to acquire the resource. These assessments of potential costs and benefits are also predicted to influence escalated fight behaviour. This is examined in shell exchange contests of hermit crabs in which we establish an information asymmetry about a particularly poor quality shell. The poor shell was created by gluing sand to the interior whereas control shells lacked sand and the low value of the poor shell could not be accurately assessed by the opponent. Crabs in the poor shell showed changes in the use of pre-fight displays, apparently to increase the chances of swapping shells. When the fights escalated, crabs in poor shells fought harder if they took the role of attacker but gave up quickly if in the defender role. These tactics appear to be adaptive but do not result in a major shift in the roles taken or outcome. We thus link resource assessment with pre-fight displays, the roles taken, tactics used during escalation and the outcome of these contests.

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.