Inflation targeting and macroeconomic stability in a Post Keynesian economy

This paper examines the compatibility of inflation targeting with an economy that is Post Keynesian in character. We show that in a Post Keynesian environment, policymakers can both set and achieve an inflation target without adverse consequences for the real economy, as long as an appropriate policy mix is chosen. The latitude that policymakers have in making this choice is investigated. One of our key results is that orthodox policy regimes do not provide appropriate policy mixes. Indeed, the more orthodox the policy regime becomes, the less viable is inflation targeting in a Post Keynesian economy.

Inflation Targeting Matters: Evidence from OECD Economies` Sacrifice Ratios

Using data from OECD economies, we show that inflation targeters suffered smaller output losses during disinflations when compared to nontargeters. We also study why some countries choose to inflation target while others do not and find that higher average inflation and smaller debt levels render the adoption of the regime more likely. Applying Heckman`s procedure to control for selection bias does not alter the link between inflation targeting and less costly disinflations.

Inflation targeting in emerging economies: What do the data say?

In a recent thought-provoking paper, Ball and Sheridan [Ball, L., Sheridan, N., 2005. Does inflation targeting matter? In: Bernanke, B.S., Woodford, M. (Eds.), The Inflation-Targeting Debate, University of Chicago Press] show that the available evidence for a group of developed economies does not lend credence to the belief that adopting an inflation targeting regime (IT) was instrumental in bringing inflation and inflation volatility down. Here, we extend Ball and Sheridan`s analysis for a subset of 36 emerging market economies and find that, for them, the story is quite different. Compared to non-targeters, developing countries adopting the IT regime not only experienced greater drops in inflation, but also in growth volatility, thus corroborating the view that the regime`s ""constrained flexibility"" to deal with adverse shocks delivered concrete welfare gains. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

From Bretton Woods to inflation targeting: financial change and monetary policy evolution in Europe

Different ‘monetary architectures’ are distinguished, as a background to a discussion of the change in developed country monetary policy frameworks from fixed exchange rates under the Bretton Woods international monetary system to, ultimately, formal or informal inflation targeting. The introduction and experience of monetary targets in the 1970s is considered, followed by an analysis of the changes in countries’ monetary architectures, with particular reference to money and bond markets and to France and Italy, in the 1980s. Exchange rate targeting in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s is examined, followed by the changes in central bank independence in the 1990s. This leads to a discussion of the introduction of inflation targeting, and the issues raised for inflation targeting by the financial crisis of the late 2000s.

How does monetary policy change? evidence on inflation targeting countries

We examine the evolution of monetary policy rules in a group of inflation targeting countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom) applying moment- based estimator at time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. Using this novel flexible framework, our main findings are threefold. First, monetary policy rules change gradually pointing to the importance of applying time-varying estimation framework. Second, the interest rate smoothing parameter is much lower that what previous time-invariant estimates of policy rules typically report. External factors matter for all countries, albeit the importance of exchange rate diminishes after the adoption of inflation targeting. Third, the response of interest rates on inflation is particularly strong during the periods, when central bankers want to break the record of high inflation such as in the U.K. or in Australia at the beginning of 1980s. Contrary to common wisdom, the response becomes less aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting suggesting the positive effect of this regime on anchoring inflation expectations. This result is supported by our finding that inflation persistence as well as policy neutral rate typically decreased after the adoption of inflation targeting.

A note on inflation targeting and economic growth in Brazil

This paper analyzes the relation between monetary policy and economic performance in Brazil during the period 1999-2006. In particular, it discusses the growth effects of the inflation targeting regime through its effects on aggregate demand. It is argued that monetary policy under IT reacts in a procyclical and asymmetric way to fluctuations in economic activity (too "tight" during recessions, not so "loose" during expansions). Such pattern may generate a downward bias in aggregate demand, with negative real effects on output growth and employment. Our results suggest that monetary policy has been procyclical and asymmetrical in Brazil under inflation targeting. The main economic policy implication of this study is that central banks should consider more seriously the real effects of monetary policy on output and employment.

Uncertainties, monetary policy and financial stability: challenges on inflation targeting

This work aims at presenting the challenges that inflation targeting central banks may face since uncertainties represent a harmful element for the effectiveness of monetary policy, and since financial instabilities may disturb the transmission mechanisms - in particular, the expectation channel - and thus the economic stability. Financial stability must not be considered as a simple goal of monetary policy, but a precondition for central banks operate their policies and reach the goals of inflation and output stability. The work identifies different sources of uncertainties that surround central banks' decisions; and approaches the role that inflation targeting central banks should play according to some basic principles that can serve as useful guides for central banks to help them achieve successful outcomes in their conduct of monetary policy.

Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price Level?

This paper reports graphical and statistical evidence that the inflation targeting regimes in Canada and the UK - but not in Australia, New Zealand, or Sweden - actually resemble price-level targeting. In particular, the price level closely tracks the path implied by the inflation target, and the time-series predictions of the "bygones-are-bygones" version of inflation targeting are rejected by the data in favor of those implied by price-level targeting. These results indicate heterogeneity in the actual application of inflation targeting across countries and, for Canada and the UK, imply that the characterization of inflation targeting as a policy where shocks are accommodated is at odds with the data. Moreover, up to extent that their current policies already resemble price-level targeting, the welfare gains of replacing inflation with (explicit) price-level targeting are likely to be small.

Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises

We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.

Inflation targeting in Brazil: a Keynesian approach

O Regime de Meta de Inflação se Tornou Dominante na Formulação de Políticas dos Bancos Centrais nos Últimos 15 Anos. a Teoria Subjacente, Particularmente a Regra de Taylor, Pode ser Vista como uma Competente Generalização Desse Comportamento. de um Ponto de Vista Keynesiano, Ele Será Aceitável se Encararmos a Taxa de Juros de Equilíbrio como Apenas uma Convenção Variável e se a Combinarmos ou com uma Taxa de Câmbio ou com uma Meta de Emprego. no Caso do Brasil, Porém, Além Dessa Ressalva Teórica e da Condição do Duplo Mandato, o Regime de Metas de Inflação Enfrenta um Problema de Incoerência. esta é uma Política que se Destinava a ser Utilizada na Administração da Política Monetária, não na Mudança do Regime de Política Monetária . a Política de Metas de Inflação foi Introduzida no Brasil em 1999 como um Substituto para a Âncora Cambial, que Havia Sido Usada Desastrosamente entre 1995 e 1998. Durante Muitos Anos, o País Havia Enfrentado uma Armadilha de Alta Taxa de Juros / Taxa de Câmbio Valorizada E, Portanto, Precisava Mudar seu Regime de Política Monetária Antes de Eventualmente Adotar o Regime de Meta de Inflação. Essa Mudança, que Começou com a Flutuação de Janeiro de 1999, Deveria ter Sido Completada com Reformas Específicas (Fim da Indexação dos Serviços Públicos e dos Próprios Juros Básicos). no Entanto, em Lugar de Desenvolver uma Estratégia para Reduzir a Taxa de Juros, o Governo Continuou a Definir a Inflação como o Principal Problema a ser Enfrentado e Adotou uma Política Formal de Metas de Inflação. a Conseqüência é que Desde 1999 Essa Política se Tornou o Obstáculo que a Economia Brasileira Enfrenta para Escapar da Armadilha da Taxa de Juros

Inflation targeting, credibility and coordination aspects

There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal dominance, for inflation targeting framework be implemented in successful (credible) way. Essays on how public targets could be used in the absence of such requirements are unusual. In this papel' we appraise how central banks could use inflation targeting before soundness economic fundamentaIs have been achieved. First, based on concise framework, where confidence crises and imperfect information are neglected, we conclude that less ambitious (greater) target for inflation increases the credibility in the precommitment. Optimal target is higher than the one obtained using the Cukierman-Liviatan [7] model, where increasing credibility effect is not considered. Second, extending the model to make confidence crises possible, multiple equilibria solutions becomes possible too. In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crises and reduce the policymaker credibility. On the other hand, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. The optimal target depends on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Finally, when perturbing common knowledge uniqueness is restored even considering confidence crises, as in Morris-Shin[ 14]. The first result, i.e. less ambitious target for inflation increases credibility in precommitment, is also recovered. Adding a precise public signal, cOOl'dinated self-fulfilling actions and equilibrium multiplicity may still exist for some lack of common knowledge (as in Angeleto and Weming[l]). In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crisis again, reducing the policymaker credibility. From another aspect, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. Optimal policy prescriptions depend on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Results also indicate that more precise public information may open the door for bad equilibrium, contrary to the conventional wisdom that more central oank transparency is always good when considering inflation targeting framework.