21 resultados para incumbency
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Efforts to estimate the magnitude of the incumbency effect in U.S. House elections and assess its political meaning have been complicated by two omitted-variables problems. First, in the absence of an adequate measure of incumbent prospects, estimates of the magnitude of the incumbency effect fail to control for selection effects associated with the decision incumbents make about whether to run for reelection. Strategic incumbents enter races they think they can win and withdraw when they expect to lose. The consequence is an upward bias in estimates of incumbents’ electoral advantages. Second, the normative implications of high reelection rates cannot be assessed without measuring incumbent quality, since a possible explanation for their electoral success is that incumbents are of high quality and doing a good job. We propose a strategy for measuring incumbent prospects and quality, demonstrate the strategic nature of incumbent and challenger entry, re-estimate the incumbency effect, and show that incumbent quality has an impact on electoral outcomes. Our conclusion is that incumbents’ advantages in House elections have been over estimated while the positive basis of incumbent safety is typically under appreciated.
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The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, where voters reward or punish government at the ballot box according to economic performance. The alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis, where voters favor parties closest to their issue position, has been neglected in this literature. We explore policy voting with respect to an archetypal economic policy issue – unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) pool of Western European nations, we find some evidence for economic policy voting. However, it exists in a form conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, left incumbents actually experience a net electoral cost, if the unemployment rate climbs under their regime. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that might accrue to the left due to the unemployment issue.
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The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, where voters reward or punish government at the ballot box according to economic performance. The alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis, where voters favor parties closest to their issue position, has been neglected in this literature. We explore policy voting with respect to an archetypal economic policy issue – unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) pool of Western European nations, we find some evidence for economic policy voting. However, it exists in a form conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, left incumbents actually experience a net electoral cost, if the unemployment rate climbs under their regime. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that might accrue to the left due to the unemployment issue.
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A partir de uma pesquisa histórica sobre a regulação da atividade petrolífera nacional, constatou-se que as jazidas de petróleo e de gás natural são bens públicos cuja exploração é constitucionalmente reservada ao Estado. Ademais, a delegação da exploração desses bens, por meio de concessão ou de partilha de produção, mantém a propriedade estatal desses recursos naturais.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a “carrot and stick” approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.
Without Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.
I propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.
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Cette thése relie trois articles sur l'économie politique. Ces articles analysent à la fois théoriquement et empiriquement si, et dans quelle mesure, trois phénomènes politiques différents (les partis politiques, les guerres civiles et les menaces externes), et leur interaction, influent sur les résultats économiques. Le premier chapitre étudie l'impact de la présence au pouvoir des politiciens de nouveaux partis politiques sur la taille du gouvernement. Le chapitre se concentre sur les municipalités colombiennes, où les nouveaux partis politiques ont été nombreux et fructueux au cours des dernières années. Les estimations par régressions sur discontinuité montrent que les dépenses publiques et les recettes fiscales sont significativement plus élevées dans les municipalités gouvernées par un maire d'un nouveau parti politique. En utilisant des informations sur la politique locale et des caractéristiques des nouveaux partis, je soutiens que ce résultat peut être expliqué par le fait qu'il y a moins d'information sur les politiciens de nouveaux partis que les politiciens des partis traditionnels. Le deuxième chapitre développe une nouvelle explication de l'impact des guerres civiles et des conflits interétatiques sur le state-building qui repose sur l'idée que les protagonistes de ces deux types de conflits peuvent avoir un lien (ethnique ou idéologique). Un premier résultat montre que la force de ce lien détermine si les conflits contre des adversaires internes (i.e. guerres civiles) ou des ennemis externes (i.e. conflits interétatiques) sont complémentaires ou se substituent, conduisant à plus ou moins d'investissement en capacité fiscale. La théorie prédit également un rôle non trivial de la stabilité politique dans la relation entre les deux types de conflits et la capacité fiscale: un deuxième résultat montre que, bien que la stabilité politique se traduit par moins de capacité fiscale, plus de stabilité n'implique pas plus de state-building. Leur équivalence dépend du niveau de cohésion des institutions. Un nouveau mécanisme par lequel plus de stabilité politique peut impliquer moins de state-building est proposé. En outre, il est démontré que des corrélations dans les données cross-country sont compatibles avec la théorie. Le troisième chapitre examine la relation entre la probabilité d'occurrence d'un conflit intérieur violent et le risque qu'un tel conflit "s'externalise" (c'est à dire se propage dans un autre pays en devenant un conflit interétatique). Je considère une situation dans laquelle un conflit interne entre un gouvernement et un groupe rebelle peut s'externaliser. Je montre que le risque d'externalisation augmente la probabilité d'un accord de paix, mais seulement si le gouvernement est suffisamment puissant par rapport aux rebelles, et si le risque d'externalisation est suffisamment élevé. Je montre comment ce modèle aide à comprendre les récents pourparlers de paix entre le gouvernement colombien et le groupe le plus puissant des rebelles dans le pays, les FARC.
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What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.
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In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.
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This paper examines organizational foresight from a relational perspective. In doing this, we present relational incumbency as a transient conceptual framework to explore how the organizing social relationships and interactions of lower participants may influence organizational foresightfulness. The research employed an exploratory case-based approach with three software organisations and their four new product innovation projects serving as the empirical research sites. Drawing on the case evidence, we provide an account on how normative organizing structures, rights and authority relationships constitutively influence the creative emergence of organizational foresight in practice. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the managerial implications and some directions for future research.
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Como choques econômicos afetam eleições em democracias? Usando dados eleitorais do Congresso dos Estados Unidos, eu testo se choques adversos podem afetar desigualmente partidos incumbentes e oponentes. Esse efeito é identificado, entre vários procedimentos, por uma regressão em descontinuidade. Eu considero possibilidades teóricas para esse efeito, quando cidadãos não conseguem observar perfeitamente se a falta de bens públicos é devido a um choque adverso, ou a consumo privado do político. Quando o choque é observável, não há efeito; enquanto se não fosse, haveria. As evidências empíricas são consistentes com a teoria.
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Pós-graduação em História - FCHS
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A interação entre os Poderes Executivo e Legislativo no processo de produção de políticas públicas apresenta contornos diversificados, que variam segundo as regras inerentes ao sistema político, as estratégias adotadas por esses atores políticos e a capacidade dos grupos sociais organizados de influenciar as decisões políticas relativas a políticas públicas. Não há, portanto, um padrão único de interação entre esses Poderes no processo decisório de políticas públicas. No sistema político brasileiro o Executivo e o Legislativo são os responsáveis diretos pelo encargo estatal de editar políticas públicas, daí o objetivo deste trabalho de investigar, sob o enfoque neoinstitucionalista, as bases da interação entre esses Poderes na produção da nova política nacional de saúde mental, no período de 1989 a 2001, seu período de consolidação normativa, em meio à correlação de forças que se costuma estabelecer entre eles no processo decisório de políticas públicas. A Constituição Federal de 1988, que estabelece como um dever do Estado a formulação de políticas públicas que promovam, protejam e recuperem a saúde das pessoas, fortaleceu o papel do Congresso enquanto arena decisória de políticas públicas, mas o Executivo acaba por imprimir uma dinamicidade própria ao processo de produção de políticas públicas, fazendo uso de instrumentos institucionais diversos que podem até excluir o Parlamento do processo decisório.
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Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
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DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS ONLY AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION AT ASTON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SERVICES WITH PRIOR ARRANGEMENT This study is about leadership in American Evangelical Churches, which as a sub-set of American Christianity, are growing, while American Christianity as a whole is in decline. As a result evangelicalism is quickly becoming the dominate iteration of American Christianity. It is anecdotal that well led churches grow while poorly led churches do not, yet no one has identified what leadership, in the evangelical church context, is. Researchers have investigated a number of aspects of church leadership (much of it without identifying whether or not the churches under investigation were evangelical or not) but no one has put forth a unified theory linking these aspects together. The purpose of this research is to address that gap and develop a theory that explains how evangelicals view leadership in their local churches. In this study of three churches, dissimilar in size and governance, a purely qualitative approach to data collection and analysis was employed. The study involved 60 interviews that sought points-of-view from top and mid-level leadership along with congregant followers. The study borrowed heavily from Glaser and Strauss (1967) Grounded Theory approach to data analysis. The results developed a theory which provides a unified explanation of how leadership actually works in the three evangelical churches. Several implications for practice are discussed as to the theory's usefulness as a method of leadership education and evaluation. An original discovery was found that an individual's incumbency within the organization was identified as a social power. Limitations to this research are the limitations generally imputed to purely qualitative research in that questions are raised about the theory's applicability to evangelical churches beyond the three studied. The suggestions for further research involve addressing those limitations
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Before dawn on August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew smashed into south Florida, particularly southern Dade County, and soon become the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history. Andrew's impacts quickly overwhelmed local and state emergency response capabilities and eventually required major federal assistance, including regular military units. While the social and economic impacts of Hurricane Andrew are relatively well researched, much less attention has been given to its possible political effects. ^ Focusing on incumbent officeholders at three levels (municipal, state legislative, and statewide) who stood for reelection after Hurricane Andrew, this study seeks to determine whether they experienced any political effects from Andrew. That is, this study explores the possible interaction between the famous “incumbency advantage” and an “extreme event,” in this case a natural disaster. The specific foci were (1) campaigns and campaigning (a research process that included 43 personal interviews), and (2) election results before and after the event. ^ Given well-documented response problems, the working hypothesis was that incumbents experienced largely negative political fallout from the disaster. The null hypothesis was that incumbents saw no net political effects, but the reverse hypothesis was also considered: incumbents benefited politically from the event. ^ In the end, this study found that although the election process was physically disrupted, especially in south Dade County, the disaster largely reinforced the incumbency advantage. More specifically, the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew allowed most incumbent officeholders to (1) enhance constituency service, (2) associate themselves with the flow of external assistance, (3) achieve major personal visibility and media coverage, and yet (4) appear non-political or at least above normal politics. Overall, this combination allowed incumbents to very effectively “campaign without campaigning,” a point borne out by post-Andrew election results. ^