Evaluating Form and Functionality of Pay-For-Performance Plans: The Relative Incentive and Sorting Effects of Merit Pay, Bonuses, and Long-Term Incentives

Using two-year longitudinal data from a large sample of US employees from a service-related organization, the present study investigates the relative effects of three forms of pay-for-performance plans on employees’ job performance (incentive effects) and voluntary turnover (sorting effects). The study differentiates between three forms of pay: merit pay, individual-based bonuses, and long-term incentives. By definition, these PFP plans have different structural elements that distinguish them from each other (i.e., pay plan form) and different characteristics (functionality), such as the degree to which pay and performance are linked and the size of the rewards, which can vary both within and across plan types. Our results provide evidence that merit raises have larger incentive and sorting effects than bonuses and long-term incentives in multi-PFP plan environments where the three PFP plans are operating simultaneously. Only merit pay has both incentive and sorting effects among the three PFP plans. The implications for the PFP-related theory, as well as for the design and implementation of PFP plans, are discussed.

L’illusion des signaux pénaux : l’effet tendancieux de l’impunité différentielle

Réalisé sous la co-direction de Pierre Tremblay

The effect of incentive reforms upon productivity : evidence from the Vietnamese rice industry

In this study we use region-level panel data on rice production in Vietnam to investigate total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the period since reunification in 1975. Two significant reforms were introduced during this period, one in 1981 allowing farmers to keep part of their produce, and another in 1987 providing improved land tenure. We measure TFP growth using two modified forms of the standard Malmquist data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, which we have named the Three-year-window (TYW) and the Full Cumulative (FC) methods. We have developed these methods to deal with degrees of freedom limitations. Our empirical results indicate strong average TFP growth of between 3.3 and 3.5 per cent per annum, with the fastest growth observed in the period following the first reform. Our results support the assertion that incentive related issues have played a large role in the decline and subsequent resurgence of Vietnamese agriculture.

The effect of national governance codes on firm disclosure practices : evidence from analyst earnings forecasts

This study examines whether voluntary national governance codes have a significant effect on company disclosure practices. Two direct effects of the codes are expected: 1) an overall improvement in company disclosure practices, which is greater when the codes have a greater emphasis on disclosure; and 2) a leveling out of disclosure practices across companies (i.e., larger improvements in companies that were previously poorer disclosers) due to the codes new comply-or-explain requirements. The codes are also expected to have an indirect effect on disclosure practices through their effect on company governance practices. The results show that the introduction of the codes in eight East Asian countries has been associated with lower analyst forecast error and a leveling out of disclosure practices across companies. The codes are also found to have an indirect effect on company disclosure practices through their effect on board independence. This study shows that a regulatory approach to improving disclosure practices is not always necessary. Voluntary national governance codes are found to have both a significant direct effect and a significant indirect effect on company disclosure practices. In addition, the results indicate that analysts in Asia do react to changes in disclosure practices, so there is an incentive for small companies and family-owned companies to further improve their disclosure practices.

The Effect of Risk Sensitivity on Collaborative New Product Development in a Supply Chain

The increasing risks and costs of new product development require firms to collaborate with their supply chain partners in product management. In this paper, a supply chain model is proposed with one risk-neutral supplier and one risk-averse manufacturer. The manufacturer has an opportunity to enhance demand by developing a new product, but both the actual demand for new product and the supplier’s wholesale price are uncertain. The supplier has an incentive to share risks of new product development via an advance commitment to wholesale price for its own profit maximization. The effects of the manufacturer’s risk sensitivity on the players’ optimal strategies are analyzed and the trade-off between innovation incentives and pricing flexibility is investigated from the perspective of the supplier. The results highlight the significant role of risk sensitivity in collaborative new product development, and it is found that the manufacturer’s innovation level and retail price are always decreasing in the risk sensitivity, and the supplier prefers commitment to wholesale price only when the risk sensitivity is below a certain threshold.

Impact of Free Glasses and a Teacher Incentive on Children's Use of Eyeglasses: A Cluster-Randomized Controlled Trial.

Purpose: To study the effect of free glasses combined with teacher incentives on in-school glasses wear among Chinese urban migrant children. Design: Cluster-randomized controlled trial. Methods: Children with VA <= 6/12 in either eye due to refractive error in 94 randomly-chosen primary schools underwent randomization by school to receive free glasses, education on their use and a teacher incentive (Intervention), or glasses prescriptions only (Control). Intervention group teachers received a tablet computer if >= 80% of children given glasses wore them during un-announced visits 6 weeks and 6 months (main outcome) after intervention. Results: Among 4376 children, 728 (16.7%, mean age 10.9 years, 51.0% boys) met enrollment criteria and were randomly allocated, 358 (49.2%, 47 schools) to Intervention and 370 (50.8%, 47 schools) to Control. Among these, 693 children (95.2%) completed the study and underwent analysis. Spectacle wear was significantly higher at 6 months among Intervention children (Observed [main outcome]: 68.3% versus 23.9%, Adjusted Odds Ratio [OR]=11.5, 95% Confidence Interval [CI] 5.91-22.5, P<0.001; Self-reported: 90.6% versus 32.1%, OR = 43.7, 95% CI = 21.7-88.5, P < 0.001). Other predictors of observed wear at 6 months included baseline spectacle wear (P<0.001), uncorrected VA<6/18 (P=0.01) and parental spectacle wear (P=0.02). The 6-month observed wear rate was only 41% among similar-aged children provided free glasses in our previous trial without teacher incentives. Conclusions: Free spectacles and teacher incentives maintain classroom wear in the large majority of children needing glasses over a school year. Low wear among Control children demonstrates the need for interventions.

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.

Effect of Information about benefits of biotechnology on consumer acceptance of genetically modified food; evidence from experimental auctions in the United States, England, and France

This study investigates the effect of information about potential benefits of biotechnology on consumer acceptance of genetically modified (GM) foods. Consumer willingness to accept compensation to consume a GM food was elicited using an incentive compatible auction mechanism in three US states (California, Florida, and Texas) and in two European countries (England and France). Results indicate that information on environmental benefits, health benefits and benefits to the third world significantly decreased the amount of money consumers demanded to consume GM food; however, the effect of information varied by type of information and location. Consistent with prior research, we find that initial attitudes toward biotechnology have a significant effect on how individuals responded to new information.

Neural basis of the undermining effect of monetary reward on intrinsic motivation

Contrary to the widespread belief that people are positively motivated by reward incentives, some studies have shown that performance-based extrinsic reward can actually undermine a person's intrinsic motivation to engage in a task. This “undermining effect” has timely practical implications, given the burgeoning of performance-based incentive systems in contemporary society. It also presents a theoretical challenge for economic and reinforcement learning theories, which tend to assume that monetary incentives monotonically increase motivation. Despite the practical and theoretical importance of this provocative phenomenon, however, little is known about its neural basis. Herein we induced the behavioral undermining effect using a newly developed task, and we tracked its neural correlates using functional MRI. Our results show that performance-based monetary reward indeed undermines intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the number of voluntary engagements in the task. We found that activity in the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas decreased along with this behavioral undermining effect. These findings suggest that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system underlies the undermining effect through the integration of extrinsic reward value and intrinsic task value.

Incentive effects on risk attitude in small probability prospects

We report between-subject results on the effect of monetary stakes on risk attitudes. While we find the typical risk seeking for small probabilities, risk seeking is reduced under high stakes. This suggests that utility is not consistently concave.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

The risk-incentive trade-off in competitive search

Usando a abordagem de competitive search, modelo um mercado de trabalho com trabalhadores heterogêneos no qual há um problema de risco moral na relação entre firmas e trabalhadores. Nesse contexto, consigo prever como contratos reagem a mudanças nos parâmetros do mercado (em particular, o risco de produção), assim como a variação da probabilidade dos trabalhadores serem contratados. Minha contribuição principal é ver que, no nível individual, existe uma relação negativa entre risco e incentivos, mas efeitos de equilíbrio geral implicam que essa relação pode ser positiva no nível agregado. Esse resultado ajuda a esclarecer resultados empíricos contraditórios sobre a relação entre risco e incentivos.

Incentive spirometry for prevention of postoperative pulmonary complications in upper abdominal surgery

BackgroundThis is an update of a Cochrane Review first published in The Cochrane Library 2008, Issue 3.Upper abdominal surgical procedures are associated with a high risk of postoperative pulmonary complications. The risk and severity of postoperative pulmonary complications can be reduced by the judicious use of therapeutic manoeuvres that increase lung volume. Our objective was to assess the effect of incentive spirometry compared to no therapy or physiotherapy, including coughing and deep breathing, on all-cause postoperative pulmonary complications andmortality in adult patients admitted to hospital for upper abdominal surgery.ObjectivesOur primary objective was to assess the effect of incentive spirometry (IS), compared to no such therapy or other therapy, on postoperative pulmonary complications and mortality in adults undergoing upper abdominal surgery.Our secondary objectives were to evaluate the effects of IS, compared to no therapy or other therapy, on other postoperative complications, adverse events, and spirometric parameters.Search methodsWe searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (The Cochrane Library 2013, Issue 8), MEDLINE, EMBASE, and LILACS (from inception to August 2013). There were no language restrictions. The date of the most recent search was 12 August 2013. The original search was performed in June 2006.Selection criteriaWe included randomized controlled trials (RCTs) of IS in adult patients admitted for any type of upper abdominal surgery, including patients undergoing laparoscopic procedures.Data collection and analysisTwo authors independently assessed trial quality and extracted data.Main resultsWe included 12 studies with a total of 1834 participants in this updated review. The methodological quality of the included studies was difficult to assess as it was poorly reported, so the predominant classification of bias was 'unclear'; the studies did not report on compliance with the prescribed therapy. We were able to include data from only 1160 patients in the meta-analysis. Four trials (152 patients) compared the effects of IS with no respiratory treatment. We found no statistically significant difference between the participants receiving IS and those who had no respiratory treatment for clinical complications (relative risk (RR) 0.59, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.30 to 1.18). Two trials (194 patients) IS compared incentive spirometry with deep breathing exercises (DBE). We found no statistically significant differences between the participants receiving IS and those receiving DBE in the meta-analysis for respiratory failure (RR 0.67, 95% CI 0.04 to 10.50). Two trials (946 patients) compared IS with other chest physiotherapy. We found no statistically significant differences between the participants receiving IS compared to those receiving physiotherapy in the risk of developing a pulmonary condition or the type of complication. There was no evidence that IS is effective in the prevention of pulmonary complications.Authors' conclusionsThere is low quality evidence regarding the lack of effectiveness of incentive spirometry for prevention of postoperative pulmonary complications in patients after upper abdominal surgery. This review underlines the urgent need to conduct well-designed trials in this field. There is a case for large RCTs with high methodological rigour in order to define any benefit from the use of incentive spirometry regarding mortality.