iiNet’s Hollywood ending : what does its court victory mean for copyright law?

In what is being billed as iiNet versus Hollywood, the Australian internet service provider has come out an apparent winner after the High Court dismissed a copyright infringement case brought by industry movie studios. The case was a final appeal by the industry in its attempts to crack down on internet users infringing copyright by using BitTorrent to download movies.

The only way to fix copyright is to make it fair

Everyone knows there’s a problem with copyright. Artists get paid very little for their work, and legitimate consumers aren’t getting a very fair deal either. Unfortunately, nobody agrees about how we should fix it. Speaking at the Australian Digital Alliance forum last Friday, the Attorney-General and Arts Minister George Brandis said we might have to ask Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to police copyright, in order to deal with “piracy”. In 2012, the High Court in the iiNet case thought it wasn’t a good idea to make ISPs responsible for protecting the rights of third parties...

Brandis' leaked anti-piracy proposal is unrealistic

The Australian Government has proposed Internet Service Providers (ISPs) monitor and punish Australians who download and infringe copyright. In a discussion paper circulated by Attorney-General George Brandis, and leaked by Crikey last Friday, the government proposes a sweeping change to Australian copyright law. If implemented, it would force ISPs to take steps to prevent Australians from infringing copyright. What these steps might be is very vague. They could include blocking peer-to-peer traffic, slowing down internet connections, passing on warnings from industry groups, and handing over subscriber details to copyright owners.

Duty and control in intermediary copyright liability: An Australian perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This article argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

What now after the Dallas Buyers Club pirate claim is rejected as ‘surreal’?

The makers of Dallas Buyers Club have been dealt a blow in their attempt to extract payment from people alleged to have downloaded illegal copies of the movie. Voltage Pictures, which owns Dallas Buyers Club, has been trying to identify over 4,700 iiNet subscribers who it alleges downloaded illicit copies of the movie. Earlier this year, the Federal Court agreed that iiNet should hand over subscriber details, but warned that any letter sent to account holders must first be approved by the court to protect consumers from abuse of the legal system. In a win for consumer protection, the Federal Court has now rejected Voltage’s draft letters, criticising Voltage’s attempts to avoid explaining what fee it would demand.

Australian Media Law [5th Edition]

Australian Media Law details and explains the complex case law, legislation and regulations governing media practice in areas as diverse as journalism, advertising, multimedia and broadcasting. It examines the issues affecting traditional forms of media such as television, radio, film and newspapers as well as for recent forms such as the internet, online forums and digital technology, in a clear and accessible format. New additions to the fifth edition include: - the implications of new anti-terrorism legislation for journalists; - developments in privacy law, including Law Reform recommendations for a statutory cause of action to protect personal privacy in Australia and the expanding privacy jurisprudence in the United Kingdom and New Zealand; - liability for defamation of internet search engines and service providers; - the High Court decision in Roadshow v iiNet and the position of internet service providers in relation to copyright infringement via their services; - new suppression order regimes; - statutory reforms providing journalists with a rebuttable presumption of non-disclosure when called upon to reveal their sources in a court of law; - recent developments regarding whether journalists can use electronic devices to collect and disseminate information about court proceedings; - contempt committed by jurors via social media; and an examination of recent decisions on defamation, confidentiality, vilification, copyright and contempt.

Moments of flux in intermediary liability for copyright infringement

This chapter provides an overview of a recent shift in regulatory strategies to address copyright infringement toward enlisting the assistance of general purpose Internet Service Providers. In Australia, the High Court held in 2012 that iiNet, a general purpose ISP, had no legal duty to police what its subscribers did with their internet connections. We provide an overview of three recent developments in Australian copyright law since that decision that demonstrate an emerging shift in the way that obligations are imposed on ISPs to govern the actions of their users without relying on secondary liability. The first is a new privately negotiated industry code that introduces a 'graduated response' system that requires ISPs to pass on warnings to subscribers who receive allegations of infringement. The second involves a recent series of Federal Court cases where rightsholders made a partially successful application to require ISPs to hand over the identifying details of subscribers whose households are alleged to have infringed copyright. The third is a new legislative scheme that will require ISPs to block access to foreign websites that 'facilitate' infringement. We argue that these shifts represent a greater sophistication in approaches to enrolling general purpose intermediaries in the regulatory project. We also suggest that these shifts represent a potentially disturbing trend towards enforcement of copyright law in a way that does not provide strong safeguards for the legitimate constitutional due process interests of users. We conclude with a call for greater attention and research to better understand how intermediaries make decisions when governing the conduct of users, how those decisions may be influenced by both state and non-state actors, and how the rights of individuals to due process can be adequately protected.

Duty and Control in Intermediary Copyright Liability: An Australian Perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This chapter argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.