Cross–Sectoral Variation in Firm–Level Idiosyncratic Risk

We estimate firm–level idiosyncratic risk in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Our proxy for risk is the volatility of the portion of growth in sales or TFP which is not explained by either industry– or economy–wide factors, or firm characteristics systematically associated with growth itself. We find that idiosyncratic risk accounts for about 90% of the overall uncertainty faced by firms. The extent of cross–sectoral variation in idiosyncratic risk is remarkable. Firms in the most volatile sector are subject to at least three times as much uncertainty as firms in the least volatile. Our evidence indicates that idiosyncratic risk is higher in industries where the extent of creative destruction is likely to be greater.

Cross-Industry Product Diversification and Contagion in Risk and Return: The Case of Bank-Insurance and Insurance-Bank Takeovers

We investigate the impact of domestic/international bancassurance deals on the risk-return profiles of announcing and non-announcing banks and insurers within a GARCH model. Bank-insurance deals produce intra- and inter-industry contagion in both risk and return, with larger deals producing greater contagion. Bidder banks and peers experience positive abnormal returns, with the effects on insurer peers being stronger than those on bank peers. Insurance-bank deals produce insignificant excess returns for bidder and peer insurers and positive valuations for peer banks. Following the deal, the bank bidders’ idiosyncratic (systematic) risk falls (increases), while insurance bidders exhibit a lower systematic risk and maintain their idiosyncratic risk.

Idiosyncratic volatility around information release date

Several papers document idiosyncratic volatility is time-varying and many attempts have been made to reveal whether idiosyncratic risk is priced. This research studies behavior of idiosyncratic volatility around information release dates and also its relation with return after public announcement. The results indicate that when a company discloses specific information to the market, firm’s specific volatility level shifts and short-horizon event-induced volatility vary significantly however, the category to which the announcement belongs is not important in magnitude of change. This event-induced volatility is not small in size and should not be downplayed in event studies. Moreover, this study shows stocks with higher contemporaneous realized idiosyncratic volatility earn lower return after public announcement consistent with “divergence of opinion hypothesis”. While no significant relation is found between EGARCH estimated idiosyncratic volatility and return and also between one-month lagged idiosyncratic volatility and return presumably due to significant jump around public announcement both may provide some signals regarding future idiosyncratic volatility through their correlations with contemporaneous realized idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, the study show that positive relation between return and idiosyncratic volatility based on under-diversification is inadequate to explain all different scenarios and this negative relation after public announcement may provide a useful trading rule.

Cross-sectoral variation in the volatility of plant-level idiosyncratic shocks

We estimate the volatility of plant–level idiosyncratic shocks in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Our measure of volatility is the variation in Revenue Total Factor Productivity which is not explained by either industry– or economy–wide factors, or by establishments’ characteristics. Consistent with previous studies, we find that idiosyncratic shocks are much larger than aggregate random disturbances, accounting for about 80% of the overall uncertainty faced by plants. The extent of cross–sectoral variation in the volatility of shocks is remarkable. Plants in the most volatile sector are subject to about six times as much idiosyncratic uncertainty as plants in the least volatile. We provide evidence suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is higher in industries where the extent of creative destruction is likely to be greater.

Comparing different explanations of the volatility trend

We analyze the puzzling behavior of the volatility of individual stock returns over the past few decades. The literature has provided many different explanations to the trend in volatility and this paper tests the viability of the different explanations. Virtually all current theoretical arguments that are provided for the trend in the average level of volatility over time lend themselves to explanations about the difference in volatility levels between firms in the cross-section. We therefore focus separately on the cross-sectional and time-series explanatory power of the different proxies. We fail to find a proxy that is able to explain both dimensions well. In particular, we find that Cao et al. [Cao, C., Simin, T.T., Zhao, J., 2008. Can growth options explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk? Review of Financial Studies 21, 2599–2633] market-to-book ratio tracks average volatility levels well, but has no cross-sectional explanatory power. On the other hand, the low-price proxy suggested by Brandt et al. [Brandt, M.W., Brav, A., Graham, J.R., Kumar, A., 2010. The idiosyncratic volatility puzzle: time trend or speculative episodes. Review of Financial Studies 23, 863–899] has much cross-sectional explanatory power, but has virtually no time-series explanatory power. We also find that the different proxies do not explain the trend in volatility in the period prior to 1995 (R-squared of virtually zero), but explain rather well the trend in volatility at the turn of the Millennium (1995–2005).

Economic growth and inequality patterns in the presence of costly technology adoption and uncertainty

We develop a stochastic endogenous growth model to explain the diversity in growth and inequality patterns and the non-convergence of incomes in transitional economies where an underdeveloped financial sector imposes an implicit, fixed cost on the diversification of idiosyncratic risk. In the model endogenous growth occurs through physical and human capital deepening, with the latter being the more dominant element. We interpret the fixed cost as a ‘learning by doing’ cost for entrepreneurs who undertake risk in the absence of well developed financial markets and institutions that help diversify such risk. As such, this cost may be interpreted as the implicit returns foregone due to the lack of diversification opportunities that would otherwise have been available, had such institutions been present. The analytical and numerical results of the model suggest three growth outcomes depending on the productivity differences between the projects and the fixed cost associated with the more productive project. We label these outcomes as poverty trap, dual economy and balanced growth. Further analysis of these three outcomes highlights the existence of a diversity within diversity. Specifically, within the ‘poverty trap’ and ‘dual economy’ scenarios growth and inequality patterns differ, depending on the initial conditions. This additional diversity allows the model to capture a richer range of outcomes that are consistent with the empirical experience of several transitional economies.

Three Essays on the Volatility of Finnish Stock Returns (summary section only)

First, in Essay 1, we test whether it is possible to forecast Finnish Options Index return volatility by examining the out-of-sample predictive ability of several common volatility models with alternative well-known methods; and find additional evidence for the predictability of volatility and for the superiority of the more complicated models over the simpler ones. Secondly, in Essay 2, the aggregated volatility of stocks listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange is decomposed into a market, industry-and firm-level component, and it is found that firm-level (i.e., idiosyncratic) volatility has increased in time, is more substantial than the two former, predicts GDP growth, moves countercyclically and as well as the other components is persistent. Thirdly, in Essay 3, we are among the first in the literature to seek for firm-specific determinants of idiosyncratic volatility in a multivariate setting, and find for the cross-section of stocks listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange that industrial focus, trading volume, and block ownership, are positively associated with idiosyncratic volatility estimates––obtained from both the CAPM and the Fama and French three-factor model with local and international benchmark portfolios––whereas a negative relation holds between firm age as well as size and idiosyncratic volatility.

Angel Investing in Finland: An Analysis Based on Agency Theory and the Incomplete Contracting Theory

Wealthy individuals - business angels who invest a share of their net worth in entrepreneurial ventures - form an essential part of an informal venture capital market that can secure funding for entrepreneurial ventures. In Finland, business angels represent an untapped pool of capital that can contribute to fostering entrepreneurial development. In addition, business angels can bridge knowledge gaps in new business ventures by means of making their human capital available. This study has two objectives. The first is to gain an understanding of the characteristics and investment behaviour of Finnish business angels. The strongest focus here is on the due diligence procedures and their involvement post investment. The second objective is to assess whether agency theory and the incomplete contacting theory are useful theoretical lenses in the arena of business angels. To achieve the second objective, this study investigates i) how risk is mitigated in the investment process, ii) how uncertainty influences the comprehensiveness of due diligence as well as iii) how control is allocated post investment. Research hypotheses are derived from assumptions underlying agency theory and the incomplete contacting theory. The data for this study comprise interviews with 53 business angels. In terms of sample size this is the largest on Finnish business angels. The research hypotheses in this study are tested using regression analysis. This study suggests that the Finnish informal venture capital market appears to be comprised of a limited number of business angels whose style of investing much resembles their formal counterparts’. Much focus is placed on managing risks prior to making the investment by strong selectiveness and by a relatively comprehensive due diligence. The involvement is rarely on a day-to-day basis and many business angels seem to see board membership as a more suitable alternative than involvement in the operations of an entrepreneurial venture. The uncertainty involved does not seem to drive an increase in due diligence. On the contrary, it would appear that due diligence is more rigorous in safer later stage investments and when the business angels have considerable previous experience as investors. Finnish business angels’ involvement post investment is best explained by their degree of ownership in the entrepreneurial venture. It seems that when investors feel they are sufficiently rewarded, in terms of an adequate equity stake, they are willing to involve themselves actively in their investments. The lack of support for a relationship between increased uncertainty and the comprehensiveness of due diligence may partly be explained by an increasing trend towards portfolio diversification. This is triggered by a taxation system that favours investments through investment companies rather than direct investments. Many business angels appear to have substituted a specialization strategy that builds on reducing uncertainty for a diversification strategy that builds on reducing firm specific (idiosyncratic) risk by holding shares in ventures whose returns are not expected to exhibit a strong positive correlation.

Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Latent Variable Models for Stochastic Discount Factors.

Latent variable models in finance originate both from asset pricing theory and time series analysis. These two strands of literature appeal to two different concepts of latent structures, which are both useful to reduce the dimension of a statistical model specified for a multivariate time series of asset prices. In the CAPM or APT beta pricing models, the dimension reduction is cross-sectional in nature, while in time-series state-space models, dimension is reduced longitudinally by assuming conditional independence between consecutive returns, given a small number of state variables. In this paper, we use the concept of Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) or pricing kernel as a unifying principle to integrate these two concepts of latent variables. Beta pricing relations amount to characterize the factors as a basis of a vectorial space for the SDF. The coefficients of the SDF with respect to the factors are specified as deterministic functions of some state variables which summarize their dynamics. In beta pricing models, it is often said that only the factorial risk is compensated since the remaining idiosyncratic risk is diversifiable. Implicitly, this argument can be interpreted as a conditional cross-sectional factor structure, that is, a conditional independence between contemporaneous returns of a large number of assets, given a small number of factors, like in standard Factor Analysis. We provide this unifying analysis in the context of conditional equilibrium beta pricing as well as asset pricing with stochastic volatility, stochastic interest rates and other state variables. We address the general issue of econometric specifications of dynamic asset pricing models, which cover the modern literature on conditionally heteroskedastic factor models as well as equilibrium-based asset pricing models with an intertemporal specification of preferences and market fundamentals. We interpret various instantaneous causality relationships between state variables and market fundamentals as leverage effects and discuss their central role relative to the validity of standard CAPM-like stock pricing and preference-free option pricing.

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP–adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods, or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.

The value premium and time-varying volatility

Numerous studies have documented the failure of the static and conditional capital asset pricing models to explain the difference in returns between value and growth stocks. This paper examines the post-1963 value premium by employing a model that captures the time-varying total risk of the value-minus-growth portfolios. Our results show that the time-series of value premia is strongly and positively correlated with its volatility. This conclusion is robust to the criterion used to sort stocks into value and growth portfolios and to the country under review (the US and the UK). Our paper is consistent with evidence on the possible role of idiosyncratic risk in explaining equity returns, and also with a separate strand of literature concerning the relative lack of reversibility of value firms' investment decisions.

Separating skill from luck in REIT mutual funds

This study uses a bootstrap methodology to explicitly distinguish between skill and luck for 80 Real Estate Investment Trust Mutual Funds in the period January 1995 to May 2008. The methodology successfully captures non-normality in the idiosyncratic risk of the funds. Using unconditional, beta conditional and alpha-beta conditional estimation models, the results indicate that all but one fund demonstrates poor skill. Tests of robustness show that this finding is largely invariant to REIT market conditions and maturity.

The private memory of aggregate shocks

We study constrained efficient aggregate risk sharing and its consequence for the behavior of macro-aggregates in a dynamic Mirrlees’s (1971) setting. Privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to be independent of i.i.d. publicly observed aggregate shocks. Yet, private allocations display memory with respect to past aggregate shocks, when idosyncratic shocks are also i.i.d.. Under a mild restriction on the nature of optimal allocations the result extends to more persistent idiosyncratic shocks, for all but the limit at which idiosyncratic risk disappears, and the model collapses to a pure heterogeneity repeated Mirrlees economy identical to Werning [2007]. When preferences are iso-elastic we show that an allocation is memoryless only if it displays a strong form of separability with respect to aggregate shocks. Separability characterizes the pure heterogeneity limit as well as the general case with log preferences. With less than full persistence and risk aversion different from unity both memory and non-separability characterize optimal allocations. Exploiting the fact that non-separability is associated with state-varying labor wedges, we apply a business cycle accounting procedure (e.g. Chari et al. [2007]) to the aggregate data generated by the model. We show that, whenever risk aversion is great than one our model produces efficient counter-cyclical labor wedges.