Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Understanding Human Dignity

“Understanding Human Dignity” aims to help the reader make sense of current debates about the meaning and implications of the idea of “human dignity.” The concept of human dignity has probably never been so omni-present in everyday speech, or so deeply embedded in political and legal discourse. In debates on torture, abortion, same-sex marriage, and welfare reform, appeals to dignity are seldom hard to find. The concept of dignity is not only a prominent feature of political debate, but also, and increasingly, of legal argument. Indeed, courts tell us that human dignity is the foundation of all human rights. But the more important it is, the more contested it seems to have become. There has, as a result, been an extraordinary explosion of scholarly writing about the concept of human dignity in law, political philosophy, and theology. This book aims to reflect on these intra-disciplinary debates about dignity in law, philosophy, history, politics, and theology, through a series of edited essays from specialists in these fields, explored the contested concept in its full richness and complexity.

Portraying Human Dignity

I consider whether Diego Velázquez (1599-1660) in his painting Las Meninas has conveyed several aspects of the idea of human dignity in ways that not only echo some aspects of contemporary philosophical and legal analysis, but transcend them, bringing into our understanding aspects of dignity, and the controversy surrounding it, that otherwise might be underestimated.

Reva Siegel and the Role of Religion in Constructing the Meaning of ‘Human Dignity

The “religious understanding” of dignity is a topic of considerable complexity and is the subject of extensive scholarship. In this paper, I consider understandings of dignity that are currently under discussion in Roman Catholic circles, not least because Catholic discussions of dignity are often seen as influential in public policy and legal interpretation, directly and indirectly. I shall focus on one relatively neglected issue in legal scholarship: how scholars go about the task of identifying what a particular religion’s understanding of human dignity involves.
To illustrate the methodological problems that such an enterprise raises, I shall take one attempt by a scholar writing in the field of secular legal scholarship to describe Catholic understandings of dignity in the context of abortion and same-sex marriage. The discussion is that of Reva Siegel, an academic lawyer at Yale University; her recent analysis of differing understandings of dignity illustrates some of the issues that arise when the secular scholarly community addresses religious understandings of dignity.

In Pursuit of Human Dignity

The discussion of human dignity raises such complex issues, and the issues that current scholarship now considers central to its understanding are so daunting, that we are in danger of not being able to see the forest for the trees. This Introduction forms the first chapter of a book of essays (Christopher McCrudden (ed.), UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY,
Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press, in press) by a multi-disciplinary group of historians, legal academics, judges, political scientists, theologians, and philosophers, arising from a Conference held in Rhodes House, Oxford In June 2012. The Introduction aims to provide a guide, a map, through the thicket of current dignity scholarship. It situates the subsequent chapters of the book within an overview of the terrain that currently constitutes debates about the use of dignity in these fields. I have not attempted to put forward my own
comprehensive account of dignity. Mostly based on the rich conversations that took place at the Conference, I have sought, rather, to probe the potential strengths and weaknesses of all of the principal positions identified, at least in some contexts taking on the role of a Devil’s Advocate.

Bouyid v Belgium: The “minimum level of severity” and Human Dignity's Role in Article 3 ECHR

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently delivered an important judgment on Article 3 ECHR in the case of Bouyid v Belgium. In Bouyid, the Grand Chamber was called upon to consider whether slaps inflicted on a minor and an adult in police custody were in breach of Article 3 ECHR, which provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Overruling the Chamber judgment in the case, the Grand Chamber ruled by 14 votes to 3 that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3 in that the applicants had been subjected to degrading treatment by members of the Belgian police; it found that there had been a breach of the investigative duty under Article 3 also. In this comment, I focus on the fundamental basis of disagreement between the majority of the Grand Chamber and those who found themselves in dissent, on the question of whether there had been a substantive breach of Article 3. The crux of the disagreement lay in the understanding and application of the test of ‘minimum level of severity’, which the ECtHR has established as decisive of whether a particular form of ill-treatment crosses the Article 3 threshold, seen also in light of Article 3’s absolute character, which makes it non-displaceable – that is, immune to trade-offs of the type applicable in relation to qualified rights such as privacy and freedom of expression. I consider the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – towards finding a substantive breach of Article 3, and briefly distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of human dignity emerging in the Court’s analysis.

Human dignity and vulnerable agency : an ethical framework for forensic practice

In this paper, we present an integrated ethical framework that covers the different levels of ethical tasks inherent in forensic and correctional work. First, we briefly give an overview of the ethical framework and its component notion of human dignity. Second we analyze in depth the concept of dignity and its relationship to normative theories and ethical concepts that are particularly relevant for forensic practitioners. Third, we explore the capacity of the conceptions of human dignity and vulnerable agency to integrate principles typically contained in ethical codes and practice, such as beneficence, autonomy, and justice. Fourth, we discuss how conflict between ethical codes or duties of station adhered to by practitioners can be effectively addressed in light of the model of dignity and agency outlined earlier. Fifth, we explain how individuals' specific ethical judgments and actions should proceed in light of our framework model.

Technicians of Human Dignity : Bodies, Souls, and the Making of Intrinsic Worth /

Tracks the development of the concept of human dignity in post-war ethics and politics, focusing on the Vatican, the United Nations, and U.S. Federal Bioethics. This title was made Open Access by libraries from around the world through Knowledge Unlatched.

Labour Law as Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of ‘Dignity’ by Freedland and Kountouris

In their recent book, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris present an ambitious study of the personal scope of (what they would not want to call) ‘employment’ law. The book does this within a broader argument that calls for the reconceptualization of labour law as a whole, and it is this broader argument on which I shall focus in this chapter. Their aim, in urging us to see labour law through the lens of ‘dignity’ is to bring labour law and human rights law into closer alignment than has sometimes been the case in the past. Increasingly, dignity is seen as providing a, sometimes the, foundation of human rights law, particularly in Europe. I shall suggest that whilst the aim of constructing a new set of foundations for labour law is a worthy and increasingly urgent task, the concepts on which Freedland and Kountouris seek to build their project pose significant difficulties. In particular, their espousal of ‘dignity’ presents problems that must be addressed if their reconceptualization is not to prove a blind alley.

Internally Displaced Persons Rights in Human Rights Perspective(Specifically Focused on Pakistani IDPs Example) : “Basic Human Rights of IDPs to Attain Equality in Dignity and Rights”

After the WWII, there was much concern to protect human rights situation all over the world. During the cold wars, huge displacement took place within different countries due to internal arms/ethnic conflicts. Millions of IDPs, who were uprooted by armed conflict or ethnic strife faced human rights violence. In 2002, there were estimated between 20-25 millions IDPs in the world (Phuong, p.1). Internally displacement is a worldwide problem and millions of the people displaced in Africa and Asia. These all Internal displacements of the people are only the result of the conflicts or the violations of the Human Rights but also sometimes it happened because of the natural disasters. “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights..."(Streich, Article 1) This article works as the foundation of human rights which gives every human being an equal rights and opportunity to maintain his/her dignity. Human Rights issues related to human dignity must be taken very seriously and should not be ignored at any level; Many human rights issues are not always visible, issues such as: privacy, security, equality, protection of social and cultural values etc. In this paper I am going to apply theoretical approach of “all human being are equal in dignity and rights” to defend IDPs rights.

Dignity and human rights in correctional practice

Interventions with offenders have a normative layer as well as a scientific basis and therefore it is not possible to quarantine ethical questions from discussions of best practice. My aim in this paper is to provide an expanded ethical canvass from which to approach correctional practice with offenders. The cornerstone of this broader ethical perspective will be the concept of human dignity and its protection by human rights norms and theories. I also explore the relationship between responses to crime and offender rehabilitation based on an enriched theory of punishment that is sensitive to offenders’ moral equality and their attendant rights.

Dignity and religion

This chapter, included in a book examining the relationship between Islam and English Law, considers the role that the idea of 'human dignity' plays in discussions of the relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights and freedom of religion, and the implications this has for future consideration of the place of Shari'a.