The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl

Developers attempting land assembly often face a potential holdout problem that raises the cost of development. To minimize this extra cost, developers will prefer land whose ownership is less dispersed. This creates a bias toward development at the urban fringe where average lot sizes are larger, resulting in urban sprawl. This paper examines the link between the holdout problem and urban sprawl and discusses possible remedies.

Free Riders, Holdouts, and Public Use: A Tale of Two Externalities

Free riders and holdouts are market failures that potentially impede the completion of otherwise beneficial transactions. The key difference is that the free rider problem is a demand side externality that requires taxation to compel payment for a public good, while the holdout problem is a supply side externality that requires eminent domain to force the sale of land for large scale projects. This paper highlights that distinction between these two problems and uses the resulting insights to clarify the meaning of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment takings clause.

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This paper models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are inevitable, threatening costly delay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessive transfer of land to the developer.

Tax Motivated Takings

Tax motivated takings are takings by a local government aimed purely at increasing its tax base. Such an action was justified by the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. New London, which allowed the use of eminent domain for a private redevelopment project on the grounds that the project promised spillover public benefits in the form of jobs and taxes. This paper argues that tax motivated takings can lead to inefficient transfers of land for the simple reason that assessed values understate owners' true values. We therefore propose a reassessment scheme that greatly reduces the risk of this sort of inefficiency.

An Efficient and Verifiable Solution to the Millionaire Problem

A new solution to the millionaire problem is designed on the base of two new techniques: zero test and batch equation. Zero test is a technique used to test whether one or more ciphertext contains a zero without revealing other information. Batch equation is a technique used to test equality of multiple integers. Combination of these two techniques produces the only known solution to the millionaire problem that is correct, private, publicly verifiable and efficient at the same time.