Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm

This paper considers the role of opportunism in three contractual theories of the firm: rent-seeking theory, property rights theory, and agency theory. In each case I examine whether it is possible to have a functioning contractual theory of the firm without recourse to opportunism. Without opportunism firms may still exist as a result of issues arising from (incomplete) contracting. Far from posing a problem for the theory of the firm, questioning the role of opportunism and the ubiquity of the hold-up problem helps us understand more about the purpose and functions of contracts which go beyond mere incentive alignment.

Captain Daylight and the big hold-up.

El Capitán Daylight es un simpático asaltante de caminos, al que le gusta más gastar bromas a la gente que robar. Pero un día, decide que quiere cambiar su imagen y para ello se disfraza como el osado atracador de diligencias, Black Jack Midnight. Sin embargo, su carácter bonachón y su torpeza no han cambiado con el nuevo ropaje.

The effect of vessel diameter on time dependent gas hold-up variations in highly viscous impeller agitated liquids

Time dependent gas hold-up generated in the 0.3 and 0.6 m diameter vessels using high viscosity castor oil and carboxy methyl cellulose (CMC) solution was compared on the basis of impeller speed (N) and gas velocity (V-G). Two types of hold-up were distinguished-the hold-up due to tiny bubbles (epsilon(ft)) and total hold-up (epsilon(f)), which included large and tiny bubbles. It was noted that vessel diameter (i.e. the scale of operation) significantly influences (i) the trends and the values of epsilon(f) and epsilon(ft), and (ii) the values of tau (a constant reflecting the time dependency of hold-up). The results showed that a scale independent correlation for gas hold-up of the form epsilon(f) or epsilon(ft) = A(N or P-G/V)(a) (V-G)(b), where "a" and "b" are positive constants is not appropriate for viscous liquids. This warrants further investigations into the effect of vessel diameter on gas hold-up in impeller agitated high viscosity liquids (mu or mu(a) > 0.4 Pa s). (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Parceria público-privada como alternativa para mitigar o problema de hold up em investimentos de infra-estrutura no setor ferroviário: estudo de caso

O presente estudo apresenta o problema de hold up que aparece em situações de contratos incompletos e investimentos específicos onde um dos agentes de um contrato pode não estar disposto a investir no ativo específico por temer um futuro prejuízo. São apresentados dois projetos de investimento de infra-estrutura no setor ferroviário brasileiro, passíveis de hold up e tem-se como objetivo mostrar que as parcerias público-privadas podem ser arranjos contratuais eficientes e que resultem no investimento ótimo.

The ballast pick-up problem. A theoretical approach and two experimental campaigns

The aim of this contribution is to present a theoretical approach and two experimental campaigns (on wind tunnel and on the track) concerning the research work about the ballast train-induced-wind erosion (BTIWE) phenomenon. When a high speed train overpasses the critical speed, it produces a wind speed close to the track large enough to start the motion of the ballast elements, eventually leading to the rolling of the stones (Kwon and Park, 2006) and, if these stones get enough energy, they can jump and then initiate a saltation-like chain reaction, as found in the saltation processes of soil eolian erosion (Bagnold, 1941). The expelled stones can reach a height which is larger than the lowest parts of the train, striking them (and the track surroundings) producing considerable damage that should be avoided. There is not much published work about this phenomenon, in spite of the great interest that exists due to its relevant applications in increasing the maximum operative train speed. Particularly, the initiation of flight of ballast due to the pass of a high speed train has been studied by Kwon and Park (2006) by performing field and wind tunnel experiments.

A model burglar and hold-up alarm business licensing and regulatory statute : a report.

"April 1975."

Comparison of gas hold-up distribution measurement in a flotation cell using capturing and conductivity techniques

This paper presents and interprets results of experimental measurements of the spatial gas hold-up distribution in a 3 (3) glass rectangular flotation cell at the JKMRC using two different techniques. The gas hold-up device with the capturing technique was developed at the JKMRC and has been used widely in the P9 project(1) while the one with conductivity technique was developed at the CSIRO Thermal and Fluids Engineering laboratory at Highett, Victoria, Australia. Measurements were conducted at more than 64 locations in the cell to determine the local gas hold-up distribution in the cell. Since the measurements using the two techniques were conducted at the same locations, the results may be compared with each other. The results indicate that the gas hold-up varies widely inside the flotation cell. The gas hold-up distributions measured by the two techniques are relatively similar except in some locations which can be reasonably explained. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Financial Markets and Real Ecinomy: Four Essays in International Trade

Financial markets play an important role in an economy performing various functions like mobilizing and pooling savings, producing information about investment opportunities, screening and monitoring investments, implementation of corporate governance, diversification and management of risk. These functions influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and, therefore, have important implications for welfare. In my PhD dissertation I examine the interplay of financial and product markets by looking at different channels through which financial markets may influence an economy.My dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is a co-authored work with Martin Strieborny, a PhD student from the University of Lausanne. The second chapter is a co-authored work with Melise Jaud, a PhD student from the Paris School of Economics. The third chapter is co-authored with both Melise Jaud and Martin Strieborny. The last chapter of my PhD dissertation is a single author paper.Chapter 1 of my PhD thesis analyzes the effect of financial development on growth of contract intensive industries. These industries intensively use intermediate inputs that neither can be sold on organized exchange, nor are reference-priced (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). A typical example of a contract intensive industry would be an industry where an upstream supplier has to make investments in order to customize a product for needs of a downstream buyer. After the investment is made and the product is adjusted, the buyer may refuse to meet a commitment and trigger ex post renegotiation. Since the product is customized to the buyer's needs, the supplier cannot sell the product to a different buyer at the original price. This is referred in the literature as the holdup problem. As a consequence, the individually rational suppliers will underinvest into relationship-specific assets, hurting the downstream firms with negative consequences for aggregate growth. The standard way to mitigate the hold up problem is to write a binding contract and to rely on the legal enforcement by the state. However, even the most effective contract enforcement might fail to protect the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks a reliable source of external financing. This suggests the potential role of financial intermediaries, banks in particular, in mitigating the incomplete contract problem. First, financial products like letters of credit and letters of guarantee can substantially decrease a risk and transaction costs of parties. Second, a bank loan can serve as a signal about a buyer's true financial situation, an upstream firm will be more willing undertake relationship-specific investment knowing that the business partner is creditworthy and will abstain from myopic behavior (Fama, 1985; von Thadden, 1995). Therefore, a well-developed financial (especially banking) system should disproportionately benefit contract intensive industries.The empirical test confirms this hypothesis. Indeed, contract intensive industries seem to grow faster in countries with a well developed financial system. Furthermore, this effect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market. These results are reaffirmed examining the effect of US bank deregulation on the growth of contract intensive industries in different states. Beyond an overall pro-growth effect, the bank deregulation seems to disproportionately benefit the industries requiring relationship-specific investments from their suppliers.Chapter 2 of my PhD focuses on the role of the financial sector in promoting exports of developing countries. In particular, it investigates how credit constraints affect the ability of firms operating in agri-food sectors of developing countries to keep exporting to foreign markets.Trade in high-value agri-food products from developing countries has expanded enormously over the last two decades offering opportunities for development. However, trade in agri-food is governed by a growing array of standards. Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS) and technical regulations impose additional sunk, fixed and operating costs along the firms' export life. Such costs may be detrimental to firms' survival, "pricing out" producers that cannot comply. The existence of these costs suggests a potential role of credit constraints in shaping the duration of trade relationships on foreign markets. A well-developed financial system provides the funds to exporters necessary to adjust production processes in order to meet quality and quantity requirements in foreign markets and to maintain long-standing trade relationships. The products with higher needs for financing should benefit the most from a well functioning financial system. This differential effect calls for a difference-in-difference approach initially proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). As a proxy for demand for financing of agri-food products, the sanitary risk index developed by Jaud et al. (2009) is used. The empirical literature on standards and norms show high costs of compliance, both variable and fixed, for high-value food products (Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2004; Maskus et al., 2005). The sanitary risk index reflects the propensity of products to fail health and safety controls on the European Union (EU) market. Given the high costs of compliance, the sanitary risk index captures the demand for external financing to comply with such regulations.The prediction is empirically tested examining the export survival of different agri-food products from firms operating in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania. The results suggest that agri-food products that require more financing to keep up with food safety regulation of the destination market, indeed sustain longer in foreign market, when they are exported from countries with better developed financial markets.Chapter 3 analyzes the link between financial markets and efficiency of resource allocation in an economy. Producing and exporting products inconsistent with a country's factor endowments constitutes a serious misallocation of funds, which undermines competitiveness of the economy and inhibits its long term growth. In this chapter, inefficient exporting patterns are analyzed through the lens of the agency theories from the corporate finance literature. Managers may pursue projects with negative net present values because their perquisites or even their job might depend on them. Exporting activities are particularly prone to this problem. Business related to foreign markets involves both high levels of additional spending and strong incentives for managers to overinvest. Rational managers might have incentives to push for exports that use country's scarce factors which is suboptimal from a social point of view. Export subsidies might further skew the incentives towards inefficient exporting. Management can divert the export subsidies into investments promoting inefficient exporting.Corporate finance literature stresses the disciplining role of outside debt in counteracting the internal pressures to divert such "free cash flow" into unprofitable investments. Managers can lose both their reputation and the control of "their" firm if the unpaid external debt triggers a bankruptcy procedure. The threat of possible failure to satisfy debt service payments pushes the managers toward an efficient use of available resources (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). The main sources of debt financing in the most countries are banks. The disciplining role of banks might be especially important in the countries suffering from insufficient judicial quality. Banks, in pursuing their rights, rely on comparatively simple legal interventions that can be implemented even by mediocre courts. In addition to their disciplining role, banks can promote efficient exporting patterns in a more direct way by relaxing credit constraints of producers, through screening, identifying and investing in the most profitable investment projects. Therefore, a well-developed domestic financial system, and particular banking system, would help to push a country's exports towards products congruent with its comparative advantage.This prediction is tested looking at the survival of different product categories exported to US market. Products are identified according to the Euclidian distance between their revealed factor intensity and the country's factor endowments. The results suggest that products suffering from a comparative disadvantage (labour-intensive products from capital-abundant countries) survive less on the competitive US market. This pattern is stronger if the exporting country has a well-developed banking system. Thus, a strong banking sector promotes exports consistent with a country comparative advantage.Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis further examines the role of financial markets in fostering efficient resource allocation in an economy. In particular, the allocative efficiency hypothesis is investigated in the context of equity market liberalization.Many empirical studies document a positive and significant effect of financial liberalization on growth (Levchenko et al. 2009; Quinn and Toyoda 2009; Bekaert et al., 2005). However, the decrease in the cost of capital and the associated growth in investment appears rather modest in comparison to the large GDP growth effect (Bekaert and Harvey, 2005; Henry, 2000, 2003). Therefore, financial liberalization may have a positive impact on growth through its effect on the allocation of funds across firms and sectors.Free access to international capital markets allows the largest and most profitable domestic firms to borrow funds in foreign markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As domestic banks loose some of their best clients, they reoptimize their lending practices seeking new clients among small and younger industrial firms. These firms are likely to be more risky than large and established companies. Screening of customers becomes prevalent as the return to screening rises. Banks, ceteris paribus, tend to focus on firms operating in comparative-advantage sectors because they are better risks. Firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors finding it harder to finance their entry into or survival in export markets either exit or refrain from entering export markets. On aggregate, one should therefore expect to see less entry, more exit, and shorter survival on export markets in those sectors after financial liberalization.The paper investigates the effect of financial liberalization on a country's export pattern by comparing the dynamics of entry and exit of different products in a country export portfolio before and after financial liberalization.The results suggest that products that lie far from the country's comparative advantage set tend to disappear relatively faster from the country's export portfolio following the liberalization of financial markets. In other words, financial liberalization tends to rebalance the composition of a country's export portfolio towards the products that intensively use the economy's abundant factors.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.