Societal cleavages and institutional change in Canada : retention, reform and removal of nominee councils

En concevant que toute société a deux clivages dominants, l’un social et l’autre partisan, cette thèse développe une théorie sur le changement institutionnel. L’hypothèse initiale, selon laquelle les groupes sociaux créés par le premier clivage agiront pour restreindre le changement institutionnel et que le changement aura lieu lors de l’émergence d’un groupe partisan capable de croiser le clivage social, fut testée par les processus traçant les changements qui furent proposés et qui ont eu lieu au sein des conseils nominés en Amérique du Nord britannique. Ces conseils furent modifiés un bon nombre de fois, devenant les chambres secondaires de législatures provinciales avant d’être éventuellement abolies. La preuve supporte l’hypothèse, bien qu’il ne soit pas suffisant d’avoir un groupe partisan qui puisse croiser le clivage qui mène le changement : un débat partisan sur le changement est nécessaire. Ceci remet aussi en cause la théorie prédominante selon laquelle les clivages sociaux mènent à la formation de partis politiques, suggérant qu’il est plus bénéfique d’utiliser ces deux clivages pour l’étude des institutions.

Nominations of Mary Schapiro, Christina D. Romer, Austan D. Goolsbee, Cecilia E. Rouse, and Daniel K. Tarullo : hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, on nominations of Mary Schapiro, of New York, chairman-designate, Securities and Exchange Commission; Christina D. Romer, of California, chairman-designate, Council of Economic Advisors; Austan D. Goolsbee, of Illinois, member-designate, Council of Economic Advisors; Cecilia E. Rouse, of New Jersey, member-designate, Council of Economic Advisors; Daniel K. Tarullo, of Maryland, member-designate, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 15, 2009.

Shipping list no.: 2009-0407-P.

Report to the annual meeting of the Court of Governors ...

Mode of access: Internet.

The governors of the States, 1900-1950

Mode of access: Internet.

The governors of the States, 1900-1958; a compilation showing for each State the name, term, party, and place of residence arranged for convenient reference.

Mode of access: Internet.

Air pollution; summary report to the Governors' Conference.

Mode of access: Internet.

Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil`s Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2006

This article examines the relative importance of regional and national forces in shaping the behavior of Brazilian legislators at the national level. A widely held view is that national legislators respond to state pressures in making decisions, rather than pressures from the national government. Governors not only can influence national debates but also can determine outcomes by exerting control over their states` legislative delegations. This article examines a dataset of all roll-call votes in the Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2006 to isolate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on legislative voting. Spanning the terms of five presidents and five different congresses, the data show that the local influence is weaker than the national on the voting decisions of individual legislators and the voting cohesion of state delegations. Alternative institutional resources allow the central government to counteract the centrifugal pressures of federalism and other institutional influences.