826 resultados para generic entry competition
Resumo:
This article examines how the nature of competition between brands in a therapeutic category changes after generic entry and provides a framework for analyzing the effect of generic entry on consumer welfare that takes into account the generic free riding problem. It demonstrates that changes in competition along dimensions other than retail price - such as competition in research and development efforts and in promotional activities - may, in certain situations, result in generic entry having an overall negative impact on consumer welfare.
Resumo:
The evolution of pharmaceutical competition since Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 raises questions about whether the act's intended balance of incentives for cost savings and continued innovation has been achieved. Generic drug usage and challenges to brand-name drugs' patents have increased markedly, resulting in greatly increased cost savings but also potentially reduced incentives for innovators. Congress should review whether Hatch-Waxman is achieving its intended purpose of balancing incentives for generics and innovation. It also should consider whether the law should be amended so that some of its provisions are brought more in line with recently enacted legislation governing approval of so-called biosimilars, or the corollary for biologics of generic competition for small-molecule drugs.
Resumo:
Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.
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This paper studies the effects of generic drug’s entry on bidding behavior of drug suppliers in procurement auctions for pharmaceuticals, and the consequences on procurer’s price paid for drugs. Using an unique data set on procurement auctions for off-patent drugs organized by Brazilian public bodies, we surprisingly find no statistically difference between bids and prices paid for generic and branded drugs. On the other hand, some branded drug suppliers leave auctions in which there exists a supplier of generics, whereas the remaining ones lower their bidding price. These findings explain why we find that the presence of any supplier of generic drugs in a procurement auction reduces the price paid for pharmaceuticals by 7 percent. To overcome potential estimation bias due to generic’s entry endogeneity, we exploit variation in the number of days between drug’s patent expiration date and the tendering session. The two-stage estimations document the same pattern as the generalized least square estimations find. This evidence indicates that generic competition affects branded supplier’s behavior in public procurement auctions differently from other markets.
Resumo:
Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity. Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. ^ Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. ^ Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.^
Resumo:
Patents for several blockbuster biological products are expected to expire soon. The Food and Drug Administration is examining whether biologies can and should be treated like pharmaceuticals with regard to generics. In contrast with pharmaceuticals, which are manufactured through chemical synthesis, biologies are manufactured through fermentation, a process that is more variable and costly. Regulators might require extensive clinical testing of generic biologies to demonstrate equivalence to the branded product. The focus of the debate on generic biologies has been on legal and health concerns, but there are important economic implications. We combine a theoretical model of generic biologies with regression estimates from generic pharmaceuticals to estimate market entry and prices in the generic biologic market. We find that generic biologies will have high fixed costs from clinical testing and from manufacturing, so there will be less entry than would be expected for generic pharmaceuticals. With fewer generic competitors, generic biologies will be relatively close in price to branded biologies. Policy makers should be prudent in estimating financial benefits of generic biologies for consumers and payers. We also examine possible government strategies to promote generic competition. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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A large number of expensive, but highly profitable branded prescription drugs will go off-patent in the USA between 2011 and 2015. Their revenues are crucial to fund the immense costs associated with the development of an innovative drug. The rising cost pressure on pharmaceutical stakeholders has increased the demand for more affordable medications, as provided by the branded drug's generic counterpart. Yet, research based incumbents are moving beyond the traditional late lifecycle strategies and deploy more aggressive tactics in order to protect their brands, as seen with Pfizer's Lipitor!. It is doubtful, whether these efforts will help the blockbuster business model to resist current market conditions.
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This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.
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No abstract.
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In this paper we advocate for the continued need for consumer protection and fair trading regulation, even in competitive markets. For the purposes of this paper a ‘competitive market’ is defined as one that has low barriers to entry and exit, with homogenous products and services and numerous suppliers. Whilst competition is an important tool for providing consumer benefits, it will not be sufficient to protect at least some consumers, particularly vulnerable, low income consumers. For this reason, we argue, setting competition as the ‘end goal’ and assuming that consumer protection and consumer benefits will always follow, is a flawed regulatory approach. The ‘end goal’ should surely be consumer protection and fair markets, and a combination of competition law and consumer protection law should be applied in order to achieve those goals.
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The U2 Tower competition entry involved the architectural design for a landmark office tower with associated head office for the world acclaimed rock band U2. The selected site for the office tower was located on the banks of the river Liffey, Dublin. The tower design was intended as a signifier or gateway to the docklands and the city itself. The proposed design incorporated a podium level for music retail and a media centre, a concourse level including cafeteria and outdoor areas as well as a commercial tower.
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A challenge for regulators and the courts has been establishing the boundary between behaviour is exclusionary and should be condemned under s 46 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), now s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), and behaviour that is not exclusionary and might even be pro-competitive. This boundary can be especially difficult to draw in the case of entry deterring strategies. Section 46(1) prohibits corporations with a substantial degree of market power from taking advantage of that market power for one of the statutorily proscribed purposes which include preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market. Section 45(2) separately prohibits corporations from making and giving effect to contracts arrangements and understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The latest case in which the ACCC has failed to satisfy the s 46 criteria is the decision of Greenwood J in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 909 (Cement Australia case). Final orders were published in a separate judgment, in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 148 (28 February 2014). The case concerned an entry deterring strategy, namely the pre-emptive buying of input factors in an upstream market to protect an incumbent with substantial market power in a downstream market and to prevent new entry in the downstream market. Greenwood J found that while Cement Australia Pty Ltd, formerly known as Queensland Cement Ltd (QCL), had substantial market power, its conduct in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was not a contravention of s 46, because Cement Australia had not “taken advantage” of its market power. However, since Cement Australia’s purpose in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was anti-competitive, they were held to contravene s 45(2) of the TPA. The purpose of this Note is to consider only the reasons for judgment in the Cement Australia case in relation to the “taking advantage” element. The judgment was handed down on 10 September 2013. The final hearing date was 15 July 2011, so it was long-awaited. At 714 pages, it is carefully drafted.
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A vast amount of public services and goods are contracted through procurement auctions. Therefore it is very important to design these auctions in an optimal way. Typically, we are interested in two different objectives. The first objective is efficiency. Efficiency means that the contract is awarded to the bidder that values it the most, which in the procurement setting means the bidder that has the lowest cost of providing a service with a given quality. The second objective is to maximize public revenue. Maximizing public revenue means minimizing the costs of procurement. Both of these goals are important from the welfare point of view. In this thesis, I analyze field data from procurement auctions and show how empirical analysis can be used to help design the auctions to maximize public revenue. In particular, I concentrate on how competition, which means the number of bidders, should be taken into account in the design of auctions. In the first chapter, the main policy question is whether the auctioneer should spend resources to induce more competition. The information paradigm is essential in analyzing the effects of competition. We talk of a private values information paradigm when the bidders know their valuations exactly. In a common value information paradigm, the information about the value of the object is dispersed among the bidders. With private values more competition always increases the public revenue but with common values the effect of competition is uncertain. I study the effects of competition in the City of Helsinki bus transit market by conducting tests for common values. I also extend an existing test by allowing bidder asymmetry. The information paradigm seems to be that of common values. The bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes are influenced more by the common value elements than those whose garages are further away. Therefore, attracting more bidders does not necessarily lower procurement costs, and thus the City should not implement costly policies to induce more competition. In the second chapter, I ask how the auctioneer can increase its revenue by changing contract characteristics like contract sizes and durations. I find that the City of Helsinki should shorten the contract duration in the bus transit auctions because that would decrease the importance of common value components and cheaply increase entry which now would have a more beneficial impact on the public revenue. Typically, cartels decrease the public revenue in a significant way. In the third chapter, I propose a new statistical method for detecting collusion and compare it with an existing test. I argue that my test is robust to unobserved heterogeneity unlike the existing test. I apply both methods to procurement auctions that contract snow removal in schools of Helsinki. According to these tests, the bidding behavior of two of the bidders seems consistent with a contract allocation scheme.