A game theoretical approach to the evolution of structured communication codes

Structured meaning-signal mappings, i.e., mappings that preserve neighborhood relationships by associating similar signals with similar meanings, are advantageous in an environment where signals are corrupted by noise and sub-optimal meaning inferences are rewarded as well. The evolution of these mappings, however, cannot be explained within a traditional language evolutionary game scenario in which individuals meet randomly because the evolutionary dynamics is trapped in local maxima that do not reflect the structure of the meaning and signal spaces. Here we use a simple game theoretical model to show analytically that when individuals adopting the same communication code meet more frequently than individuals using different codes-a result of the spatial organization of the population-then advantageous linguistic innovations can spread and take over the population. In addition, we report results of simulations in which an individual can communicate only with its K nearest neighbors and show that the probability that the lineage of a mutant that uses a more efficient communication code becomes fixed decreases exponentially with increasing K. These findings support the mother tongue hypothesis that human language evolved as a communication system used among kin, especially between mothers and offspring.

Refinement of defection strategies stabilizes cooperation

Cooperation among unrelated individuals is an enduring evolutionary riddle and a number of possible solutions have been suggested. Most of these suggestions attempt to refine cooperative strategies, while little attention is given to the fact that novel defection strategies can also evolve in the population. Especially in the presence of punishment to the defectors and public knowledge of strategies employed by the players, a defecting strategy that avoids getting punished by selectively cooperating only with the punishers can get a selective benefit over non-conditional defectors. Furthermore, if punishment ensures cooperation from such discriminating defectors, defectors who punish other defectors can evolve as well. We show that such discriminating and punishing defectors can evolve in the population by natural selection in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game scenario, even if discrimination is a costly act. These refined defection strategies destabilize unconditional defectors. They themselves are, however, unstable in the population. Discriminating defectors give selective benefit to the punishers in the presence of non-punishers by cooperating with them and defecting with others. However, since these players also defect with other discriminators they suffer fitness loss in the pure population. Among the punishers, punishing cooperators always benefit in contrast to the punishing defectors, as the latter not only defect with other punishing defectors but also punish them and get punished. As a consequence of both these scenarios, punishing cooperators get stabilized in the population. We thus show ironically that refined defection strategies stabilize cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation stabilized by such defectors can work under a wide range of initial conditions and is robust to mistakes.

D3.5 – First Storytelling Framework

This document presents the first release of the project’s storytelling framework, which is composed by two assets. The purpose of this framework is to facilitate the use of interactive storytelling for the development of applied games. More precisely, the framework is meant to aid developers in the creation of game scenarios where both players and autonomous characters are playing an active role in a narrative that unfolds according to their actions. The document describes the current state for the assets that are part of this framework, also providing links to the source code of the assets as well as associated demonstrations and documentation. The primary audience for the contents of this deliverable are the game developers that will use the proposed framework in their development process. The information about the specific RAGE use cases that are using the framework is written in Deliverable 4.2.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Pricing and Power allocation in Femtocells using Stackelberg Game Theory

We consider a system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. The transmissions in one Femtocell interfere with its neighboring Femtocells as well as with the Macrocell Base Station. We model Femtocells as selfish nodes and the Macrocell Base Station protects itself by pricing subchannels for each usage. We use Stackelberg game model to study this scenario and obtain equilibrium policies that satisfy certain quality of service.

Learning and practising supply chain management strategies from a business simulation game: a comprehensive supply chain simulation

An Internet based supply chain simulation game (ISCS) is introduced and demonstrated in this paper. Different from other games and extended from the Beer Game, a comprehensive set of supply chain (SC) management strategies can be tested in the game, and these strategies can be evaluated and appraised based on the built-in Management Information System (MIS). The key functionalities of ISCS are designed to increase players SC awareness, facilitate understanding on various SC strategies and challenges, foster collaboration between partners, and improve problem solving skills. It is concluded that an ISCS can be used as an efficient and effective teaching tool as well as a research tool in operations research and management science. Problems and obstacles have been observed while engaging in the SC business scenario game. The actions proposed and implemented to solve these problems have resulted in improved SC performance.

Play the game or get played? Researchers’ strategies around R&D policies

This chapter focuses on possible effects of current R&D policies in the scientific work, exploring some of the dilemmas they cause to researchers. In a transnational scale, R&D policies embrace performance-based research funding systems, calling for a growing accountability and a more useful and published research. Often justified by the importance of knowledge in public policies or as part of the new managerialism regime, these trends emphasize performativity on research. In this scenario, how researchers receive and interpret R&D policies is influenced according to their values and interests? Do they play the game or do they get played by it? These questions rely on a conceptual framework that conceives the research as a political scene, where researchers and R&D policies meet. Moreover, researchers’ strategies are perceived as political, considering that it is in the context of the practices that policy is interpreted and reinvented. The chapter presents an empirical study conducted in Portugal, which will be taken as an example of what Waitere et al (2011) already named as “choosing whether to resist or reinforce” R&D policies. In fact, the study revealed a strategic calculation made by researchers and the coexistence of convergent and divergent strategies concerning R&D policies. I will argue that the tensions in this strategic game are both a reflex and generator of the dilemmas of scientific work today and a sign of the complexity of public policies.

iServe:a serious game for servitization

Servitization concerns the process of manufacturers shifting from a focus on producing and selling tangible goods to service-based business models. Factors that drive adoption of servitization are financial, strategic (competitive advantage) and marketing. However, uptake is slow and active efforts are being made to transfer knowledge about servitization to the manufacturing sector. This paper presents early results from the first test of a serious computer game which has the goal of educating managers about what advanced services are and how they fit in supply chains. Results suggest the role-play scenario tested is appropriate for an audience of largely non-expert gamers, and that the approach has the potential to instruct users about the role of services in the supply chain.

Serious Game no tratamento de obesidade infantil: uma proposta de interação natural com monitoramento remoto

The number of overweight people has increased in the last few years. Factors such as attention to diet and changes in lifestyle are crucial in the prevention and control of obesity and diseases related to it. Experts believe that such actions are most effective when initiated during childhood, and that children raised in an environment that encourages physical activity ultimately become healthier adults. However, to arouse and maintain interest in such activities represent a major challenge, which are initially perceived as repetitive and boring, and, thus, soon abandoned. Computer games, traditionally seen as stimulants to a sedentary lifestyle are changing this perception using non-conventional controls that require constant movement of the player. Applications that combine the playfulness of such games to physical activity through devices, like Microsoft Kinect, might become interesting tools in this scenario, by using the familiarity of Natural User Interfaces along with the challenge and the fun of video games, in order to make attractive exercise routines for schoolchildren. The project carried out consists of an exergame composed of several activities designed and implemented with the participation of a Physical Educator, aimed at children between eight and ten years old, whose performance and progress can be remotely monitored by a professional via web interface. The application arising from this work was accompanied by tests with a group of graduating Physical Education students from the University of Rio Verde GO, and subsequently validated through questionnaires whose results are shown on this work.

D5.5 – First Version Scenario Arrangement Document – round 1

This deliverable outlines the implementation plan for each of the first-round studies of the RAGE pilots. The main goal of these pilots is to perform a small-scale test of the RAGE games with end-users and intermediary stakeholders in five different non-leisure domains to guide the further development of the games for the final validation studies. At the same time the pilots implement the pre-testing of the research instruments and methodology for answering the main evaluation questions in the five areas of investigation identified in D8.1: 1) usability, 2) game experience, 3) learning effectiveness, 4) transfer effect and 5) pedagogical costs and benefits. Finally, the pilots are aimed at collecting preliminary results for a first formative evaluation of the games and game technologies, with the goal of feeding back useful information to development for the final versions of games and assets. The results of the first pilot will be compared with the results of the final evaluation studies to demonstrate improvements of the game and game effects from first to final version. A revision of the deliverable will be done in the next few months to produce the final arrangement document (D5.1, due at M21).

D5.1 – Scenario Arrangement Document – round 1

This deliverable is a confirmation and update of 'D5.5 - First Version Scenario Arrangement Document – round 1' after a revisions with game developers. It outlines the implementation plan for each of the first-round studies of the RAGE pilots. The main goal of these pilots is to perform a small-scale test of the RAGE games with end-users and intermediary stakeholders in five different non-leisure domains to guide the further development of the games for the final validation studies.

Mapping Learning and Game Mechanics for Serious Games Analysis in Engineering Education

In a world where students are increasing digitally tethered to powerful, ‘always on’ mobile devices, new models of engagement and approaches to teaching and learning are required from educators. Serious Games (SG) have proved to have instructional potential but there is still a lack of methodologies and tools not only for their design but also to support game analysis and assessment. This paper explores the use of SG to increase student engagement and retention. The development phase of the Circuit Warz game is presented to demonstrate how electronic engineering education can be radically reimagined to create immersive, highly engaging learning experiences that are problem-centered and pedagogically sound. The Learning Mechanics–Game Mechanics (LM-GM) framework for SG game analysis is introduced and its practical use in an educational game design scenario is shown as a case study.

The Blame Game: Perceptions of Blame, Responsibility and Seriousness in Cyberbullying

Cyberbullying is gaining increasing media attention. Victims may be reluctant to report such bullying due to the perception by others that these victims somehow play a role in their own victimization. This perception, often referred to as victim blame, has been commonly researched in child sexual abuse, rape and hate crime cases, but it has not really been examined in cases of cyberbullying. To assess victim blame, 241 participants were recruited and asked to read a scenario of cyberbullying that involved either a 14-year-old or a 20-year old victim. Perpetrator gender and victim gender were also manipulated. It was found that perceptions regarding the scenario were influenced by the gender of the perpetrator and the age of the victim. This was particularly the case when perceptions of the seriousness of the crime and the necessity for legal action were assessed.