A Coalition game model for spectrum pooling in wireless data access networks

We consider a setting in which several operators offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain geographical region. Each operator deploys several base stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling and cooperation between operators.We use utility functions to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting coalitional game has the property that if all operators cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators while providing the operators revenues such that no subset of operators has an incentive to break away from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating points can result in utility unfairness between users of the various operators. We also study other revenue sharing concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in which only certain subsets of operators may be willing to cooperate.

Multifractal regime transition in a modified minority game model

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Model of a game for improving integrated decisions in production management

This paper presents the results obtained with a business game whose model represents the decision making process related to two moments at an industrial company. The first refers to the project of the industrial plant, and the second to its management. The game model was conceived so the player's first decision would establish capacity and other parameters such as quantities of each product to produce, marketing expenses, research and development, quality, advertising, salaries, if purchases will be made in installments or in cash, if there will be credit sales and how many installments will be allowed and the number of workers in the assembly area. An experiment was conducted with employees of a Brazilian company. Data obtained indicate that the players have lack of contents, especially in finances. Although these results cannot be generalized, they confirm prior results with undergraduate and graduate students and they indicate the need for reinforcement in this undergraduate area. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

A game theoretical approach to construction safety in the Repair, Maintenance, Alteration and Addition (RMAA) sector

Safety has long been a problem in the construction industry. Repair, maintenance, alteration and addition (RMAA) sector has emerged to play an important role in the construction industry. It accounted for 53% of the total construction market in Hong Kong in 2007. Safety performance of the RMAA words has been alarming. Statistics indicate that the percentage of fatal industrial accidents arising from RMAA work in Hong Kong was over 56% in 2006 while the remaining 44% was from new works. Effective safety measures to address the safety problems and improve safety performance of the RMAA sector are urgently needed. Unsafe behaviour has been attributed to one of the major causes of accidents. Traditional cost-benefit analysis of workers' safety behaviour seems to be inadequate. This paper proposes to adopt a game theoretical approach to analyse safety behaviour of RMAA workers. Game theory is concerned with the decision-making process in situations where outcomes depend upon choices made by one or more players. A game theoretical model between contractor and worker has been proffered. Mathematical analysis of this game model has been done and implications of the analysis have been discussed.

Pricing and Power allocation in Femtocells using Stackelberg Game Theory

We consider a system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. The transmissions in one Femtocell interfere with its neighboring Femtocells as well as with the Macrocell Base Station. We model Femtocells as selfish nodes and the Macrocell Base Station protects itself by pricing subchannels for each usage. We use Stackelberg game model to study this scenario and obtain equilibrium policies that satisfy certain quality of service.

Game-­theoretic Resource Allocation with Real-­time Probabilistic Surveillance Information

Game-theoretic security resource allocation problems have generated significant interest in the area of designing and developing security systems. These approaches traditionally utilize the Stackelberg game model for security resource scheduling in order to improve the protection of critical assets. The basic assumption in Stackelberg games is that a defender will act first, then an attacker will choose their best response after observing the defender’s strategy commitment (e.g., protecting a specific asset). Thus, it requires an attacker’s full or partial observation of a defender’s strategy. This assumption is unrealistic in real-time threat recognition and prevention. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept (i.e., a method to predict how a game will be played) for deriving the defender’s optimal strategy based on the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret. Moreover, we demonstrate the advantages of this solution concept by analyzing its properties.

Time series analysis for minority game simulations of financial markets

The minority game (MG) model introduced recently provides promising insights into the understanding of the evolution of prices, indices and rates in the financial markets. In this paper we perform a time series analysis of the model employing tools from statistics, dynamical systems theory and stochastic processes. Using benchmark systems and a financial index for comparison, several conclusions are obtained about the generating mechanism for this kind of evolution. The motion is deterministic, driven by occasional random external perturbation. When the interval between two successive perturbations is sufficiently large, one can find low dimensional chaos in this regime. However, the full motion of the MG model is found to be similar to that of the first differences of the SP500 index: stochastic, nonlinear and (unit root) stationary. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. B.V. All rights reserved.

A game-theoretic resource allocation approach for intercell device-to-device communications in cellular networks

Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is a recently emerged disruptive technology for enhancing the performance of current cellular systems. To successfully implement D2D communications underlaying cellular networks, resource allocation to D2D links is a critical issue, which is far from trivial due to the mutual interference between D2D users and cellular users. Most of the existing resource allocation research for D2D communications has primarily focused on the intracell scenario while leaving the intercell settings not considered. In this paper, we investigate the resource allocation issue for intercell scenarios where a D2D link is located in the overlapping area of two neighboring cells. Specifically, We present three intercell D2D scenarios regarding the resource allocation problem. To address the problem, we develop a repeated game model under these scenarios. Distinct from existing works, we characterize the communication infrastructure, namely Base Stations (BSs), as players competing resource allocation quota from D2D demand, and we define the utility of each player as the payoff from both cellular and D2D communications using radio resources. We also propose a resource allocation algorithm and protocol based on the Nash equilibrium derivations. Numerical results indicate that the developed model not only significantly enhances the system performance including sum rate and sum rate gain, but also sheds lights on resource configurations for intercell D2D scenarios.

Industrial land price and its impact on urban growth : a Chinese case study

China is experiencing rapid progress in industrialization, with its own rationale toward industrial land development based on a deliberate change from an extensive to intensive form of urban land use. One result has been concerted attempts by local government to attract foreign investment by a low industrial land price strategy, which has resulted in a disproportionally large amount of industrial land within the total urban land use structure at the expense of the urban sprawl of many cities. This paper first examines “Comparable Benchmark Price as Residential land use” (CBPR) as the theoretical basis of the low industrial land price phenomenon. Empirical findings are presented from a case study based on data from Jinyun County, China. These data are analyzed to reveal the rationale of industrial land price from 2000 to 2010 concerning the CBPR model. We then explore the causes of low industrial land prices in the form of a “Centipede Game Model”, involving two neighborhood regions as “major players” to make a set of moves (or strategies). When one of the players unilaterally reduces the land price to attract investment with the aim to maximize profits arising from the revenues generated from foreign investment and land premiums, a two-player price war begins in the form of a dynamic game, the effect of which is to produce a downward spiral of prices. In this context, the paradox of maximizing profits for each of the two players are not accomplished due to the inter-regional competition of attracted investment leading to a lose-lose situation for both sides’ in competing for land premium revenues. A short-term solution to the problem is offered involving the establishment of inter-regional cooperative partnerships. For the longer term, however, a comprehensive reform of the local financial system, more adroit regional planning and an improved means of evaluating government performance is needed to ensure the government's role in securing pubic goods is not abandoned in favor of one solely concerned with revenue generation.

Resolving the conflicts of sustainable world heritage landscapes in cities : fully open or limited access for visitors?

World Heritage Landscapes (WHLs) are receiving increased attention from researchers, urban planners, managers, and policy makers and many heritage values and resources are becoming irreversibly lost. This phenomenon is especially prominent for WHLs located in cities, where greater development opportunities are involved. Decision making for sustainable urban landscape planning, conservation and management of WHLs often takes place from an economic perspective, especially in developing countries. This, together with the uncertain source of funding to cover WHL operating and maintenance costs, has resulted in many urban managers seeking private sector funding either in the form of visitor access fees or leasing part of the site for high-rental facilities such as five star hotels, clubs and expensive restaurants. For the former, this can result in low-income urban citizens being unable to afford the access fees and hence contradicting the principle of equal access for all; while, for the latter, the principle of open access for all is equally violated. To resolve this conflict, a game model is developed to determine how urban managers should allocate WHL spaces to maximize the combination of economic, social and ecological benefits and cultural values. A case study is provided of the Hangzhou's West Lake Scenic Area, a WHL located at the centre of Hangzhou city, in which several high-rental facilities have recently been closed down by the local authorities due to charges of elitism and misuse of public funds by government officials. The result shows that the best solution is to lease a small space with high rents and leave the remainder of the site to the public. This solution is likely to be applicable only in cities with a strong economy.

A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

多对一供应链收入共享契约中的采购优化

为研究多对一供应链结构中基于契约协商的采购优化策略问题及其对改善供应链绩效的影响,针对该供应链结构中零售商具有内生保留利润的特点,建立了以制造商为主方、零售商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型;给出了在制造商提供契约条款的对称博弈中,零售商采购策略存在唯一最优解、制造商间的博弈存在唯一对称纳什均衡最优解的证明;讨论了收入共享契约下分散供应链决策同集中供应链决策的关系,限定了该结构中供应链协调的条件。最后,通过仿真实验分析验证了契约参数及产品的可替代性对供应链绩效的影响。

多对一供应链零售商驱动型收入共享契约下的生产决策

针对多对一供应链结构中零售商具有较强议价能力的特点,建立了零售商为主方、制造商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型;给出在零售商提供契约条款的对称博弈中,制造商生产产品策略存在唯一最优解的证明;分析了零售商契约参数变量的决策问题;讨论了收入共享契约下分散供应链同集中供应链决策的关系.通过仿真实验,分析验证了契约参数及产品的可替代性对供应链绩效的影响。

Le rôle des interfaces dans l’expérience de jeu vidéo : le jeu du ping-pong et son adaptation sur des plateformes numériques

Le succès commercial des jeux vidéo nous montre qu’ils sont devenus une alternative non négligeable en matière de loisir et de divertissement. En observant les tendances, on constate que les concepteurs de jeux vidéo cherchent à transposer ou adapter les loisirs comme la danse, l’interprétation de la musique ou la pratique d’un sport dans le contexte de jeux vidéo (l’univers virtuel) et ceci est devenu encore plus évident depuis l’apparition des nouvelles technologies intégrant le mouvement comme mode d'interaction. En rapport aux activités dont les jeux vidéo s’inspirent, ces tendances entraînent des changements considérables sur l’aspect formel de l’activité ludique et notamment l’interaction. Dans le cas particulier du tennis de table, ou ping-pong dans le langage courant, il semble y avoir des différences en terme de plaisir lors de la pratique de ce loisir de façon traditionnelle ou en mode virtuel dans ses différentes adaptations. Le but de cette recherche est de mettre en évidence les différences entre l’appréciation de l’interaction avec le contrôleur multifonctionnel Wiimote et une raquette traditionnelle de ping-pong et de découvrir les implications sur l’expérience du plaisir de la transposition du jeu ping-pong traditionnel comparé aux adaptations sur la console Wii. Ainsi, en regard du CLASSIC GAME MODEL de Juul (2005) et du modèle THE FOUR FUN KEYS de Lazzaro (2008) nous comparons les deux modes d’interaction, jeu traditionnel avec le jeu virtuel, sur le plan formel du jeu et sur les dimensions du plaisir que chacun procure. Les résultats obtenus par l’observation des tests de jeu et l’entremise des autres outils permettent de souligner le rôle déterminant des interfaces dans l’engagement des joueurs et de montrer les limites des interfaces digitales par rapport à celle des jeux traditionnels.