Estimates of global and regional potential health gains from reducing multiple major risk factors

Background Estimates of the disease burden due to multiple risk factors can show the potential gain from combined preventive measures. But few such investigations have been attempted, and none on a global scale. Our aim was to estimate the potential health benefits from removal of multiple major risk factors. Methods We assessed the burden of disease and injury attributable to the joint effects of 20 selected leading risk factors in 14 epidemiological subregions of the world. We estimated population attributable fractions, defined as the proportional reduction in disease or mortality that would occur if exposure to a risk factor were reduced to an alternative level, from data for risk factor prevalence and hazard size. For every disease, we estimated joint population attributable fractions, for multiple risk factors, by age and sex, from the direct contributions of individual risk factors. To obtain the direct hazards, we reviewed publications and re-analysed cohort data to account for that part of hazard that is mediated through other risks. Results Globally, an estimated 47% of premature deaths and 39% of total disease burden in 2000 resulted from the joint effects of the risk factors considered. These risks caused a substantial proportion of important diseases, including diarrhoea (92%-94%), lower respiratory infections (55-62%), lung cancer (72%), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (60%), ischaemic heart disease (83-89%), and stroke (70-76%). Removal of these risks would have increased global healthy life expectancy by 9.3 years (17%) ranging from 4.4 years (6%) in the developed countries of the western Pacific to 16.1 years (43%) in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Interpretation Removal of major risk factors would not only increase healthy life expectancy in every region, but also reduce some of the differences between regions, The potential for disease prevention and health gain from tackling major known risks simultaneously would be substantial.

Productivity gains from migration: An analysis of Cape Verdean return migrants

Are return migrants more productive than non-migrants? If so, is it a causal effect or simply self-selection? Existing literature has not reached a consensus on the role of return migration for origin countries. To answer these research questions, an empirical analysis was performed based on household data collected in Cape Verde. One of the most common identification problems in the migration literature is the presence of migrant self-selection. In order to disentangle potential selection bias, we use instrumental variable estimation using variation provided by unemployment rates in migrant destination countries, which is compared with OLS and Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) methods. The results using the instrumental variable approach provide evidence of labour income gains due to return migration, while OLS underestimates the coefficient of interest. This bias points towards negative self-selection of return migrants on unobserved characteristics, although the different estimates cannot be distinguished statistically. Interestingly, migration duration and occupational changes after migration do not seem to influence post-migration income. There is weak evidence that return migrants from the United States have higher income gains caused by migration than the ones who returned from Portugal.

Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring

This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the …nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.

Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games.

In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric N-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a consequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a polynomial of degree N-1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the resulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching have at most two sign changes, as is the case for most multi-player matrix games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation. Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis.

The capital gains from trade are not enough: Evidence from the environmental accounts of Venezuela and Mexico

In principle, a country can not endure negative genuine savings for longperiods of time without experiencing declining consumption. Nevertheless,theoreticians envisage two alternatives to explain how an exporter ofnon-renewable natural resources could experience permanent negativegenuine savings and still ensure sustainability. The first one allegesthat the capital gains arising from the expected improvement in theterms of trade would suffice to compensate for the negative savings ofthe resource exporter. The second alternative points at technologicalchange as a way to avoid economic collapse. This paper uses the dataof Venezuela and Mexico to empirically test the first of these twohypotheses. The results presented here prove that the terms oftrade do not suffice to compensate the depletion of oil reservesin these two open economies.

Spinning welfare: The gains from process innovation in cotton and car production

Economists and economic historians want to know how much better life is today than in the past.Fifty years ago economic historians found surprisingly small gains from 19th century US railroads,while more recently economists have found relatively large gains from electricity, computers and cellphones. In each case the implicit or explicit assumption is that researchers were measuring the valueof a new good to society. In this paper we use the same techniques to find the value to society ofmaking existing goods cheaper. Henry Ford did not invent the car, and the inventors of mechanisedcotton spinning in the industrial revolution invented no new product. But both made existing productsdramatically cheaper, bringing them into the reach of many more consumers. That in turn haspotentially large welfare effects. We find that the consumer surplus of Henry Ford s production linewas around 2% by 1923, 15 years after Ford began to implement the moving assembly line, while themechanisation of cotton spinning was worth around 6% by 1820, 34 years after its initial invention.Both are large: of the same order of magnitude as consumer expenditure on these items, and as largeor larger than the value of the internet to consumers. On the social savings measure traditionally usedby economic historians, these process innovations were worth 15% and 18% respectively, makingthem more important than railroads. Our results remind us that process innovations can be at least asimportant for welfare and productivity as the invention of new products.

Understanding the gains from wage flexibility: The exchange rate connection

We study the gains from increased wage flexibility and their dependence on exchange rate policy, using a small open economy model with staggered price andwage setting. Two results stand out: (i) the impact of wage adjustments on employment is smaller the more the central bank seeks to stabilize the exchange rate,and (ii) an increase in wage flexibility often reduces welfare, and more likely so ineconomies under an exchange rate peg or an exchange rate-focused monetary policy.Our findings call into question the common view that wage flexibility is particularlydesirable in a currency union.

Gains from trade and measured total factor productivity

We develop and calibrate a model where diferences in factor en-dowments lead countries to trade di¤erent goods, so that the existence of international trade changes the sectorial composition of output from one country to another. Gains from trade re ect in total factor productivity. We perform a development decomposition, to assess the impact of trade and barriers to trade on measured TFP. In our sample, the median size of that e¤ect is about 6.5% of output, with a median of 17% and a maximum of 89%. Also, the model predicts that changes in the terms of trade cause a change of productivity, and that efect has an average elasticity of 0.71.

From commitment to non-commitment: allowing type dynamic in Laffont and Tirole's regulation model

This paper investigates the introduction of type dynamic in the La ont and Tirole's regulation model. The regulator and the rm are engaged in a two period relationship governed by short-term contracts, where, the regulator observes cost but cannot distinguish how much of the cost is due to e ort on cost reduction or e ciency of rm's technology, named type. There is asymmetric information about the rm's type. Our model is developed in a framework in which the regulator learns with rm's choice in the rst period and uses that information to design the best second period incentive scheme. The regulator is aware of the possibility of changes in types and takes that into account. We show how type dynamic builds a bridge between com- mitment and non-commitment situations. In particular, the possibility of changing types mitigates the \ratchet e ect". We show that for small degree of type dynamic the equilibrium shows separation and the welfare achived is close to his upper bound (given by the commitment allocation).