Regulating Services Trade Agreements - A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Disciplines Included in EU and US Free Trade Agreements

Developed countries, led by the EU and the US, have consistently called for ‘deeper integration’ over the course of the past three decades i.e., the convergence of ‘behind-the-border’ or domestic polices and rules such as services, competition, public procurement, intellectual property (“IP”) and so forth. Following the collapse of the Doha Development Round, the EU and the US have pursued this push for deeper integration by entering into deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (“DCFTAs”) that are comprehensive insofar as they are not limited to tariffs but extend to regulatory trade barriers. More recently, the EU and the US launched negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) and a Trade in Services Agreement (“TISA”), which put tackling barriers resulting from divergences in domestic regulation in the area of services at the very top of the agenda. Should these agreements come to pass, they may well set the template for the rules of international trade and define the core features of domestic services market regulation. This article examines the regulatory disciplines in the area of services included in existing EU and US DCFTAs from a comparative perspective in order to delineate possible similarities and divergences and assess the extent to which these DCFTAs can shed some light into the possible outcome and limitations of future trade negotiations in services. It also discusses the potential impact of such negotiations on developing countries and, more generally, on the multilateral process.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Free trade agreements and female labour: the Chilean situation

Includes bibliography

Free trade agreements in Latin America since 1990: an evaluation of export diversification

Includes bibliography

How do free trade agreements change import prices? : firm-level evidence from China's imports from ASEAN

The literature has revealed the positive impacts of free trade agreements (FTAs) on export prices by employing product-level trade data. This paper empirically examines the impacts of FTAs on import prices at the firm level. We focus on firm-level imports in China from ASEAN countries by employing China’s firm-product-level trade data. As a result, controlling for firm characteristics and product characteristics, we could not find significantly positive impacts of an FTA’s entry into force on import prices of FTA eligible products. Instead, we found a significant increase in import quantities of FTA eligible products. Thus, at the firm level, the gains from FTAs for exporters may be the increase in export quantities rather than the rise in export prices.

How do free trade agreements reduce tariff rates and non-tariff barriers?

This paper empirically investigates how far free trade agreements (FTAs) successfully lower tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for manufacturing industries by employing the bilateral tariff and NTB data in a time series for countries around the world. We find that FTAs under GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause contribute to reducing tariff rates by 2.1% points and 1.5% points, respectively. In the case of NTBs, their respective impacts are 6.6% points and 5.7% points. Membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not contribute greatly to reducing tariff rates but does play a significant role in reducing NTBs. These results provide important implications for the literature on numerical assessments of FTAs.