La protezione dei diritti sociali nell'ordinamento dell'Unione Europea

This study deals with the protection of social rights in Europe and aims to outline the position currently held by these rights in the EU law. The first two chapters provide an overview of the regulatory framework in which the social rights lie, through the reorganisation of international sources. In particular the international instruments of protection of social rights are taken into account, both at the universal level, due to the activity of the United Nations Organisation and of its specialized agency, the International Labour Organization, and at a regional level, related to the activity of the Council of Europe. Finally an analysis of sources concludes with the reconstruction of the stages of the recognition of social rights in the EU. The second chapter describes the path followed by social rights in the EU: it examines the founding Treaties and subsequent amendments, the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989 and, in particularly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the legal status of which was recently treated as the primary law by the Treaty of Lisbon signed in December 2007. The third chapter is, then, focused on the analysis of the substantive aspects of the recognition of the rights made by the EU: it provides a framework of the content and scope of the rights accepted in the Community law by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is an important contribution to the location of the social rights among the fundamental and indivisible rights of the person. In the last section of the work, attention is focused on the two profiles of effectiveness and justiciability of social rights, in order to understand the practical implications of the gradual creation of a system of protection of these rights at Community level. Under the first profile, the discussion is focused on the effectiveness in the general context of the mechanisms of implementation of the “second generation” rights, with particular attention to the new instruments and actors of social Europe and the effect of the procedures of soft law. Second part of chapter four, finally, deals with the judicial protection of rights in question. The limits of the jurisprudence of the European Union Court of Justice are more obvious exactly in the field of social rights, due to the gap between social rights and other fundamental rights. While, in fact, the Community Court ensures the maximum level of protection to human rights and fundamental freedoms, social rights are often degraded into mere aspirations of EU institutions and its Member States. That is, the sources in the social field (European Social Charter and Community Charter) represent only the base for interpretation and application of social provisions of secondary legislation, unlike the ECHR, which is considered by the Court part of Community law. Moreover, the Court of Justice is in the middle of the difficult comparison between social values and market rules, of which it considers the need to make a balance: despite hesitancy to recognise the juridical character of social rights, the need of protection of social interests has justified, indeed, certain restrictions to the free movement of goods, freedom to provide services or to Community competition law. The road towards the recognition and the full protection of social rights in the European Union law appears, however, still long and hard, as shown by the recent judgments Laval and Viking, in which the Community court, while enhancing the Nice Charter, has not given priority to fundamental social rights, giving them the role of limits (proportionate and justified) of economic freedoms.

All Roads Lead to Rome: Background, Context and Legacy of the Treaty on the European Community. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue 3, August 2012

From the Introduction. The rejection by the French National Assembly of the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty in August 30, 1954, together with the automatic shelving of the equally faulty European Political Community (EPC) proposal, put an end, at least for the time being, to any form of political and military union of the existing Western Europe on a supranational level. The times were difficult in Europe and the international atmosphere was cloudy. The end of the Korean War coincided with the insistence of the Soviets to stick to a policy of détente, leading to the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion. France was facing opposition to her colonial presence in Indochina, as well as in North Africa. But the crisis of Suez prompted the French government to distance itself from the British and the United States. The defeat of the EDC and EPC was not going to be the end of the story and the dream inaugurated by Monnet and Schuman in 1950. It was not long before plans in favor of a European re-launch were taking shape. 1

The Legitimation of authority in the European Union

The founding Treaties of the European Union (EU) provide the Commission with bureaucratic structures and functions, and the authority to take a political leadership role in the integration process. However, the legitimacy of the Commission's authority to act either as a bureaucracy or as a political institution is periodically contested, as is the authority and leadership of its President. Max Weber's theory of the legitimation of authority suggests itself in this context as a working tool for assessing the nature of institutional and individual authority and leadership in the Commission and the broader EU context. Weber's typology of authority offers both an understanding of the changes in the Commission's fortunes within the 'would-be polity' of the European institutions, and an appraisal of claims to authority at the individual level by the Commission President. When applied to two contrasting moments in the Commission's life during the presidency of Jacques Delors (the generating of the White Papers of 1985 and 1993), Weber's typology provides an explanation for the evolution of the legitimation of these forms of authority in terms of, first, the Union's imperfect provisions for legitimate claims to leadership authority on 'charismatic' grounds and, second, the absence in the Union of resources for leadership legitimacy based on 'traditional'-type authority, such as explicit, popular, or party political European-wide support for the project of European union. These are resources which, if present in the EU, would legitimise calls to reform the EU's institutions in the direction of more integration and a more federal polity. The case studies offer an appraisal of the functioning and malfunctioning of authority within the Union, as well as a critical assessment of the applicability of the Weberian model to the legitimation of authority in the EU.

The allocation of taxing rights of ship and aircraft leasing profits under Australia's tax treaties

The Australian Federal Commissioner of Taxation recently released Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2008/D3 with the stated purpose of clarifying ‘what profits derived from the leasing of ships or aircraft fall within the ship and aircraft articles of each of Australia’s tax treaties’. In particular, TR 2008/D3 explains the taxing rights over different types of leasing profits, such as a full basis lease in respect of any transport by a ship operated in international traffic and bareboat leases which are ancillary to the lessor transport operations of ships in international traffic. This article outlines the Commissioner’s views on the application of the standard ships and aircraft articles in the tax treaties to which it is a party as well as considering the major variations on the standard adoption. In doing so, guidance is provided as to the allocation of taxing rights of ship and aircraft leasing profits under Australia’s tax treaties.

L’internationalisation des jeunes entreprises de hautes technologies : Le rôle des compétences internationales des fondateurs [The internationalization of new technology based firms : the role of the international skills of founding teams]

Extending recent research on the importance of specific resources and skills for the internationalization of start-ups, this article tests a negative binomial model on a sample of 520 recently created high technology firms from the UK and Germany. The results show that previous international experience of entrepreneurs facilitates the rapid penetration of foreign markets, especially when the company features a clear and deliberate strategic intent of internationalization from the outset. This research provides one of the first empirical studies linking the influence of entrepreneurial teams to a high probability of success in the internationalization of high-technology ventures.

The Australia-Chile free trade agreement 2008: Intellectual property and development. A submission to the Joint Standing Committee on treaties

A submission to the Joint Standing Committee on treaties

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA)

Australia and South Korea have signed a new free trade agreement - the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA). Is it a fair trade fairytale? Or is it a dirty deal done dirt cheap? Or somewhere in between? It is hard to tell, given the initial secrecy of the negotiations, and the complexity of the texts of the agreement There has been much debate in Parliament over the transparency of the trade agreement; the scope of market access provided under the deal; the impact of the investment chapter, with its investor-state dispute settlement clause; the intellectual property chapter; the environment chapter; its impact upon public health; and the labor rights chapter. KAFTA provides an indication of the approach of the new Conservative Government in Australia to other trade deals – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

John Nathan Cobb (1868–1930): Founding Director of the College of Fisheries, University of Washington, Seattle

John Nathan Cobb (1868–1930) became the founding Director of the College of Fisheries, University of Washington, Seattle, in 1919 without the benefit of a college education. An inquisitive and ambitious man, he began his career in the newspaper business and was introduced to commercial fisheries when he joined the U.S. Fish Commission (USFC) in 1895 as a clerk, and he was soon promoted to a “Field Agent” in the Division of Statistics, Washington, D.C. During the next 17 years, Cobb surveyed commercial fisheries from Maine to Florida, Hawaii, the Pacific Northwest, and Alaska for the USFC and its successor, the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries. In 1913, he became editor of the prominent west coast trade magazine, Pacific Fisherman, of Seattle, Wash., where he became known as a leading expert on the fisheries of the Pacific Northwest. He soon joined the campaign, led by his employer, to establish the nation’s first fisheries school at the University of Washington. After a brief interlude (1917–1918) with the Alaska Packers Association in San Francisco, Calif., he was chosen as the School’s founding director in 1919. Reflecting his experience and mindset, as well as the University’s apparent initial desire, Cobb established the College of Fisheries primarily as a training ground for those interested in applied aspects of the commercial fishing industry. Cobb attracted sufficient students, was a vigorous spokesman for the College, and had ambitions plans for expansion of the school’s faculty and facilities. He became aware that the College was not held in high esteem by his faculty colleagues or by the University administration because of the school’s failure to emphasize scholastic achievement, and he attempted to correct this deficiency. Cobb became ill with heart problems in 1929 and died on 13 January 1930. The University soon thereafter dissolved the College and dismissed all but one of its faculty. A Department of Fisheries, in the College of Science, was then established in 1930 and was led by William Francis Thompson (1888–1965), who emphasized basic science and fishery biology. The latter format continues to the present in the Department’s successor, The School of Aquatic Fisheries and Science.