Share the fame or share the blame? The reputational implications of partnerships

We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of firms' reputations when firms implement joint projects. We show that in contrast with projects implemented by a single firm, in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not necessarily decrease following a failure. We also study how reputation considerations affect firms ' decisions to participate in joint projects. We show that a high quality partner may not be preferable to a low quality partner, and that a high reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low reputation partner.

Iowa Women's Hall of Fame Book, 2007

Biographies of Iowa Women's Hall of Fame 1975-2007 inductees by the Iowa Commission on the Status of Women.

Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

Iowa Women's Hall of Fame Book

Biographies of Iowa Women's Hall of Fame 1975-2006 inductees.

Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.

De annonae saevitia ac fame, ejusque praesagiis, causis, effectis, atque remediis

Invokaatio: I.N.J.

Gender stereotyping and decision processes: extending and reversing the gender bias in fame judgements

M. R. Banaji and A. G. Greenwald (1995) demonstrated a gender bias in fame judgments—that is, an increase in judged fame due to prior processing that was larger for male than for female names. They suggested that participants shift criteria between judging men and women, using the more liberal criterion for judging men. This "criterion-shift" account appeared problematic for a number of reasons. In this article, 3 experiments are reported that were designed to evaluate the criterion-shift account of the gender bias in the false-fame effect against a distribution-shift account. The results were consistent with the criterion-shift account, and they helped to define more precisely the situations in which people may be ready to shift their response criterion on an item-by-item basis. In addition, the results were incompatible with an interpretation of the criterion shift as an artifact of the experimental situation in the experiments reported by M. R. Banaji and A. G. Greenwald. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)

Deciding the price of fame

Previous studies of ignorance-driven decision-making have either analyzed when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds, or else they have examined whether human behavior is consistent with an ignorance driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). The current study merges these research goals by examining whether – under conditions where ignorance driven inference might be expected – the type of advantages theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgments, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgments. Their wealth judgments under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all the names (the “less-is-more effect”). these data are robust against a number of variations on the size of the pool from which participants have to choose and the nature of the wealth judgment.

FAME, A Polyglot Library for Metamodeling at Runtime

Tomorrow's eternal software system will co-evolve with their context: their metamodels must adapt at runtime to ever-changing external requirements. In this paper we present FAME, a polyglot library that keeps metamodels accessible and adaptable at runtime. Special care is taken to establish causal connection between fame-classes and host-classes. As some host-languages offer limited reflection features only, not all implementations feature the same degree of causal connection. We present and discuss three scenarios: 1) full causal connection, 2) no causal connection, and 3) emulated causal connection. Of which, both Scenario 1 and 3 are suitable to deploy fully metamodel-driven applications.