Popper's Explications of Ad hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, and Scientific Practice

Popper's explications of 'ad hoc' in relation to hypotheses and explanations turn out to be either trivial, confused or mistaken. One such explication I discuss at length is circularity; another is reduction in empirical content. I argue that non-circularity is preferable to non-ad hocness for an acceptable explanation or explanans, and I isolate some persistent errors in his analysis. Second, Popper is barking up the wrong tree in proscribing reductions in empirical content in novel hypotheses. Such reductions may constitute scientific progress. He fails to show that ad hoc hypothesis are the threat to science he claims.

Recurrent hyperinflations and learning

This paper uses a model of boundedly rational learning to accountfor the observations of recurrent hyperinflations in the lastdecade. We study a standard monetary model where the fullyrational expectations assumption is replaced by a formaldefinition of quasi-rational learning. The model under learningis able to match remarkably well some crucial stylized factsobserved during the recurrent hyperinflations experienced byseveral countries in the 80's. We argue that, despite being asmall departure from rational expectations, quasi-rationallearning does not preclude falsifiability of the model and itdoes not violate reasonable rationality requirements.

Économétrie, théorie des tests et philosophie des sciences

Dans ce texte, nous revoyons certains développements récents de l’économétrie qui peuvent être intéressants pour des chercheurs dans des domaines autres que l’économie et nous soulignons l’éclairage particulier que l’économétrie peut jeter sur certains thèmes généraux de méthodologie et de philosophie des sciences, tels la falsifiabilité comme critère du caractère scientifique d’une théorie (Popper), la sous-détermination des théories par les données (Quine) et l’instrumentalisme. En particulier, nous soulignons le contraste entre deux styles de modélisation - l’approche parcimonieuse et l’approche statistico-descriptive - et nous discutons les liens entre la théorie des tests statistiques et la philosophie des sciences.

Logique et tests d'hypotheses: reflexions sur les problemes mal poses en econometrie

Dans ce texte, nous analysons les développements récents de l’économétrie à la lumière de la théorie des tests statistiques. Nous revoyons d’abord quelques principes fondamentaux de philosophie des sciences et de théorie statistique, en mettant l’accent sur la parcimonie et la falsifiabilité comme critères d’évaluation des modèles, sur le rôle de la théorie des tests comme formalisation du principe de falsification de modèles probabilistes, ainsi que sur la justification logique des notions de base de la théorie des tests (tel le niveau d’un test). Nous montrons ensuite que certaines des méthodes statistiques et économétriques les plus utilisées sont fondamentalement inappropriées pour les problèmes et modèles considérés, tandis que de nombreuses hypothèses, pour lesquelles des procédures de test sont communément proposées, ne sont en fait pas du tout testables. De telles situations conduisent à des problèmes statistiques mal posés. Nous analysons quelques cas particuliers de tels problèmes : (1) la construction d’intervalles de confiance dans le cadre de modèles structurels qui posent des problèmes d’identification; (2) la construction de tests pour des hypothèses non paramétriques, incluant la construction de procédures robustes à l’hétéroscédasticité, à la non-normalité ou à la spécification dynamique. Nous indiquons que ces difficultés proviennent souvent de l’ambition d’affaiblir les conditions de régularité nécessaires à toute analyse statistique ainsi que d’une utilisation inappropriée de résultats de théorie distributionnelle asymptotique. Enfin, nous soulignons l’importance de formuler des hypothèses et modèles testables, et de proposer des techniques économétriques dont les propriétés sont démontrables dans les échantillons finis.

Simulated variations in atmospheric CO2 over a Wisconsin forest using a coupled ecosystem-atmosphere model

Ecosystem fluxes of energy, water, and CO2 result in spatial and temporal variations in atmospheric properties. In principle, these variations can be used to quantify the fluxes through inverse modelling of atmospheric transport, and can improve the understanding of processes and falsifiability of models. We investigated the influence of ecosystem fluxes on atmospheric CO2 in the vicinity of the WLEF-TV tower in Wisconsin using an ecophysiological model (Simple Biosphere, SiB2) coupled to an atmospheric model (Regional Atmospheric Modelling System). Model parameters were specified from satellite imagery and soil texture data. In a companion paper, simulated fluxes in the immediate tower vicinity have been compared to eddy covariance fluxes measured at the tower, with meteorology specified from tower sensors. Results were encouraging with respect to the ability of the model to capture observed diurnal cycles of fluxes. Here, the effects of fluxes in the tower footprint were also investigated by coupling SiB2 to a high-resolution atmospheric simulation, so that the model physiology could affect the meteorological environment. These experiments were successful in reproducing observed fluxes and concentration gradients during the day and at night, but revealed problems during transitions at sunrise and sunset that appear to be related to the canopy radiation parameterization in SiB2.

Judging psychology experts: Can judges and attorneys distinguish between clinical and experimental psychologists?

A trial judge serves as gatekeeper in the courtroom to ensure that only reliable expert witness testimony is presented to the jury. Nevertheless, research shows that while judges take seriously their gatekeeper status, legal professionals in general are unable to identify well conducted research and are unable to define falsifiability, error rates, peer review status, and scientific validity (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). However, the abilities to identify quality scientific research and define scientific concepts are critical to preventing "junk" science from entering courtrooms. Research thus far has neglected to address that before selecting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys must first evaluate experts' CVs rather than their scientific testimony to determine whether legal standards of admissibility have been met. The quality of expert testimony, therefore, largely depends on the ability to evaluate properly experts' credentials. Theoretical models of decision making suggest that ability/knowledge and motivation are required to process information systematically. Legal professionals (judges and attorneys) were expected to process CVs heuristically when rendering expert witness decisions due to a lack of training in areas of psychology expertise.^ Legal professionals' (N = 150) and undergraduate students' (N = 468) expert witness decisions were examined and compared. Participants were presented with one of two versions of a criminal case calling for the testimony of either a clinical psychology expert or an experimental legal psychology expert. Participants then read one of eight curricula vitae that varied area of expertise (clinical vs. legal psychology), previous expert witness experience (previous experience vs. no previous experience), and scholarly publication record (30 publications vs. no publications) before deciding whether the expert was qualified to testify in the case. Follow-up measures assessed participants' decision making processes.^ Legal professionals were not better than college students at rendering quality psychology expert witness admissibility decisions yet they were significantly more confident in their decisions. Legal professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students in ability, knowledge, and motivation to choose an appropriate psychology expert although their expert witness decisions were equally inadequate. Findings suggest that participants relied on heuristics, such as previous expert witness experience, to render decisions.^