Scheffleriläinen rationaalisuus ja kasvatustodellisuuden monikerroksisuus : Jännitteitä ja ratkaisuja Israel Schefflerin kasvatusfilosofiassa

The study is a philosophical analysis of Israel Scheffler’s philosophy of education, focusing on three crucial conceptions in his philosophy: the conception of rationality, the conception of human nature, and the conception of reality. The interrelations of these three concepts as well as their relations to educational theorizing are analysed and elaborated. A conceptual problem concerning Scheffler’s ideal of rationality derives from Scheffler’s supposition of the strong analogy between science education and moral education in terms of the ideal of rationality. This analogy is argued to be conceptually problematic, since the interconnections of rationality, objectivity, and truth, appear to differ from each other in the realms of ethics and science, given the presuppositions of ontological realism and ethical naturalism, to which Scheffler explicitly subscribes. This study considers two philosophical alternatives for solving this problem. The first alternative relates the analogy to the normative concept of personhood deriving from the teleological understanding of human nature. Nevertheless, this position turns out to be problematic for Scheffler, since he rejects all teleological thinking in his philosophy. The problem can be solved, as it is argued, by limiting Scheffler’s rejection of teleology – in light of his philosophical outlook on the whole – in a manner that allows a modest version of a teleological conception of human nature. The second alternative, based especially on Scheffler’s later contributions, is to suggest that reality is actually more complex and manifold than it appears to be in light of a contemporary naturalist worldview. This idea of plurealism – Scheffler’s synthesis of pluralism and realism – is represented especially in Scheffler’s contributions related to his debate with Nelson Goodman dealing with both constructivism and realism. The idea of plurealism is not only related to the ethics-science-distinction, but is more widely related to the relationship between ontological realism and the incommensurable systems of description in diverse realms of human understanding. The Scheffler-Goodman debate is also analysed in relation to the contemporary constructivism-realism debate in educational philosophy. In terms of educational questions, Scheffler’s plurealism is argued as offering a fruitful perspective. Scheffler’s philosophy of education can be interpreted as searching for solutions to the problems deriving from the tension between the tradition of analytical philosophy and the complexity and multiplicity of educational reality. The complexity of reality combined with the supposition of the limitedness of human knowledge does not lead Scheffler to relativism or particularism, but, in contrast, Schefflerian formulations of rationality and objectivity preserve the possibility for critical inquiry in all realms of educational reality. In light of this study, Scheffler’s philosophy of education provides an exceptional example of combining ontological realism, epistemological fallibilism, and the defence of the ideal of rationality, combined with a wide-ranging understanding of educational reality.

Paul Karl Feyerabend Las proyecciones de la proliferación teórica en la relación ciencia-metafísica

La doctrina de la Proliferación teórica de Paul Karl Feyerabend ha sido interpretada por sus especialistas como un intento de salvaguardar el ideal del progreso científico. Aunque tales estudios hacen justicia, en parte, a la intencionalidad de nuestro filósofo no explicitan la crítica fundamental que implica para Feyerabend el pluralismo teórico. La proliferación teórica constituye en sí misma una reductio ad absurdum de los distintos intentos del positivismo lógico y del racionalismo crítico por definir la ciencia a expensas de lo metafísico. Este artículo presenta la proliferación teórica como una reivindicación del papel positivo que ocupa la metafísica en el quehacer científico. Se consigna la defensa que hace Feyerabend de la metafísica en cuanto que ésta constituye la posibilidad de superar el conservadurismo conceptual, aumentar de contenido empírico de la ciencia y recuperar el valor descriptivo de las teorías científicas.

A necessidade do acaso: um convite ao diálogo filosófico

Um posicionamento filosófico realista que não coloque em dúvida a inteligibilidade do universo ao qual investiga e não se pretenda detentor de qualquer privilégio para alcançar a verdade admite a falibilidade de qualquer representação da realidade, não vendo motivo para fugir ao diálogo com aqueles que propõem explicações diferentes das suas, mesmo que por vezes com elas conflitantes.