Communication and essentialism: Grounding the shared reality of a social category

Essentialism is an ontological belief that there exists an underlying essence to a category. This article advances and tests in three studies the hypothesis that communication about a social category, and expected or actual mutual validation, promotes essentialism about a social category. In Study 1, people who wrote communications about a social category to their ingroup audiences essentialized it more strongly than those who simply memorized about it. In Study 2, communicators whose messages about a novel social category were more elaborately discussed with a confederate showed a stronger tendency to essentialize it. In Study 3, communicators who elaborately talked about a social category with a naive conversant also essentialized the social category. A meta-analysis of the results supported the hypothesis that communication promotes essentialism. Although essentialism has been discussed primarily in perceptual and cognitive domains, the role of social processes as its antecedent deserves greater attention.

Psychological essentialism, implicit theories, and intergroup relations

Research on implicit person theories shows that beliefs about the malleability of human attributes have important implications for social cognition, interpersonal behavior, and intergroup relations. We argue that these implications can be understood within the framework of psychological essentialism, which extends work on implicit theories in promising directions. We review evidence that immutability beliefs covary with a broader set of essentialist beliefs, and that these essentialist beliefs are associated with stereotyping and prejudice. We then present recent studies indicating that associations between implicit person theories and stereotyping may be explained in terms of essentialist beliefs, implying a significant role for these beliefs in the psychology of group perception. Finally, we propose ways in which research and theory on essentialist beliefs might clarify and advance research on implicit person theories.

The effect of essentialism in settings of historic intergroup atrocities

Three studies tested the effects of essentialist beliefs regarding the national ingroup in situations where a perpetrator group has inflicted harm on a victim group. For members of the perpetrator group, it was hypothesised that ‘essentialism’ has a direct positive association with ‘collective guilt’ felt as a result of misdeeds conducted by other ingroup members in the past. Simultaneously, it was hypothesised to have an indirect negative association with collective guilt, mediated by perceived threat to the ingroup. Considering these indirect and direct effects jointly, it was hypothesised that the negative indirect effect suppresses the direct positive effect, and that the latter would only emerge if perceived ‘ingroup threat’ was controlled for. This was tested in a survey conducted in Latvia among Russians (N?=?70) and their feelings toward how Russians had treated ethnic Latvians during the Soviet occupation; and in a survey in Germany among Germans (N?=?84), focussing on their feelings toward the Holocaust. For members of the victim group, it was hypothesised that essentialism would be associated with more anger and reluctance to forgive past events inflicted on other ingroup members. It was proposed that this effect would be mediated by feeling connected to the ingroup victims. This was tested in a survey conducted among Hong Kong Chinese and their feelings toward the Japanese and the Nanjing massacre (N?=?56). Results from all three studies supported the hypotheses.

Essentialism and Folkbiology: evidence from Brazil

Experimental results in reference to Brazilian children and adults are presented in the context of current discussions about essentialism and folkbiology. Using an adoption paradigm, we replicate the basic findings of a previous article in this journal concerning the early emergence in children of a birth-parent bias (Atran et al. 2001). This cognitive bias supports the claim that causal essentialism cross-culturally constrains the reasoning about the origin, development and maintenance of the characteristics and identity of living kinds. We also report some intriguing differences with earlier findings that speak to theoretical and methodological issues of cultural relativity.

Lewis’ Theory of Counterfactuals and Essentialism

La logique contemporaine a connu de nombreux développements au cours de la seconde moitié du siècle dernier. Le plus sensationnel est celui de la logique modale et de sa sémantique des mondes possibles (SMP) dû à Saul Kripke dans les années soixante. Ces dans ce cadre que David Lewis exposera sa sémantique des contrefactuels (SCF). Celle-ci constitue une véritable excroissance de l’architecture kripkéenne. Mais sur quoi finalement repose l’architecture kripkéenne elle-même ? Il semble bien que la réponse soit celle d’une ontologie raffinée ultimement basée sur la notion de mondes possible. Ce mémoire comporte quatre objectifs. Dans un premier temps, nous allons étudier ce qui distingue les contrefactuels des autres conditionnels et faire un survol historique de la littérature concernant les contrefactuels et leur application dans différent champs du savoir comme la philosophie des sciences et l’informatique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous ferons un exposé systématique de la théorie de Lewis telle qu’elle est exposée dans son ouvrage Counterfactuals. Finalement, nous allons explorer la fondation métaphysique des mondes possible de David Lewis dans son conception de Réalisme Modal.

Rethinking disability theory and practice: challenging essentialism

This edited volume argues that even in recent Critical Disability Studies which have sought to critique essentialist assumptions in relation to Disability, nevertheless essentialisms remain which predetermine and predirect definitions and arguments in the field. This volume analyses such essentialisms in a wide range of areas such as childhood, gender, sexuality, reproduction, ADHD, autism, the animal, d/Deafness, hirsutism, the body, and vision. Particularly issues such as 'agency', 'voice' and 'body' are explored in terms of their political implications.

Essentialism i religionsundervisningen : Ett religionsdidaktiskt problem

Essentialist concepts of religion are common in the teaching of religion in schools and to a certain extent also in the academic discipline of religious studies. In this article, a number of problems with essentialist perceptions of religion are discussed. In the first part of the article a thesis is maintained, according to which essentialist conceptions of religion or specific religions are too limited to be of value in the teaching of religion. This is done through examples of essentialist expressions about religion. The examples are grouped according to a typology of different kinds of essentialism. Two main categories, each with two sub-categories are identified. Thus, the category of essentialism regarding the substance of religion is divided into transcendental or theological essentialism (which presupposes the existence of a sacred power of some kind, the experience of which is the basis for religion), and core essentialism (where it is presupposed that certain ideas or concepts constitute religion as a general category or specific religions). Likewise, the category of essentialism regarding the function of religion has two sub-categories: positive and negative essentialism. These kinds of essentialism presuppose that religion or specific religions are inherently good or harmful respectively to human beings. Examples from each of these categories are given and discussed. In the second part of the article, Benson Saler’s open concept of religion is presented as an alternative to essentialist or bounded perceptions. It is based on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblances and on prototype theory. In connection with this, it is argued that a certain kind of conscious ethnocentrism is needed as a point of departure in the study and teaching of religion. The metaphor of education as a journey from the familiar out into the unfamiliar and back again is suggested as a possible pattern for such teaching. Finally,some examples of non-essentialist ways to introduce religions are offered.