Disclosure, conservatism and the cost of equity capital : a review of the foundation literature

In this review piece, we survey the literature on the cost of equity capital implications of corporate disclosure and conservative accounting policy choice decisions with the principle objective of providing insights into the design and methodological issues, which underlie the empirical investigations. We begin with a review of the analytical studies most typically cited in the empirical research as providing a theoretical foundation. We then turn to consider literature that offers insights into the selection of proxies for each of our points of interest, cost of equity capital, disclosure quality and accounting conservatism. As a final step, we review selected empirical studies to illustrate the relevant evidence found within the literature. Based on our review, we interpret the literature as providing the researcher with only limited direct guidance on the appropriate choice of measure for each of the constructs of interest. Further, we view the literature as raising questions about both the interpretation of empirical findings in the face of measurement concerns and the suitability of certain theoretical arguments to the research setting. Overall, perhaps the message which is most clear is that one of the most controversial and fundamental issues underlying the literature is the issue of the diversifiability or nondiversifiability of information effects.

Conservatism, disclosure and the cost of equity capital

This study seeks insights into the economic consequences of accounting conservatism by examining the relation between conservatism and cost of equity capital. Appealing to the analytical and empirical literatures, we posit an inverse relation. Importantly, we also posit that the strength of the relation is conditional on the firm’s information environment, being the strongest for firms with high information asymmetry and the weakest (potentially negligible) for firms with low information asymmetry. Based on a sample of US-listed entities, we find, as predicted, an inverse relation between conservatism and the cost of equity capital, but further, that this relation is diminished for firms with low information asymmetry environments. This evidence indicates that there are economic benefits associated with the adoption of conservative reporting practices and leads us to conclude that conservatism has a positive role in accounting principles and practices, despite its increasing rejection by accounting standard setters.

Does Opaqueness Make Equity Capital Expensive for Banks?

Bank managers often claim that equity is expensive, which contradicts the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem. An opaque bank must signal its solvency by paying high and stable dividends in order to keep depositors tranquil. This signalling may require costly liquidations if the return on assets has been poor, but not paying the dividend might trigger a run. A strongly capitalized bank should keep substantial amounts of risk-free yet non-productive currency because the number of shares is high, which is costly. The dividend is informative of the state of the bank; rational depositors react to it.

The costs of raising equity capital by Australian property trust initial public offerings

This paper reports some of the direct costs of raising equity capital by property trust initial public offerings (IPOs) in Australia from 1994 to 2004. It also documents the amount of underpricing by these IPOs. The results indicate the average fees paid to underwriters and/or stockbrokers in managing and marketing the issue was around 3.3% of the public equity capital raised. The average fees paid to legal firms, accounting firms and valuers for their professional involvement and expert reports were 0.4%, 0.2% and 0.1% respectively, totaling 0.7% of the equity raised. Other fees such as printing, listing fees, postage, distribution and advertising cost around 2.1%. The total average direct costs amounted to around 6.1% of the proceeds raised. The average underpricing by these property trust IPOs was 2.6%. This paper also investigates the hypotheses that the percentage direct capital raising costs are influenced by the size of the IPO and whether the IPO is underwritten. This study confirms that larger property trust equity capital raisings have lower percentage total direct cost;, however, it does not find that underwriting significantly influences the percentage of total direct costs for these property trust IPOs.

The costs of raising equity capital for closed-end fund IPOs

This article reports on some of the direct costs of raising equity capital by closed-end fund licensed investment company (LIC) initial public offerings (IPOs) in Australia from 1995 to 2005. The amount of underpricing by these IPOs is also identified. The average total direct costs amounted to a relatively low 3.4% of the capital raised, while fees paid to underwriters and/or stockbrokers was around 2.3%, to legal firms around 0.25% and to accounting firms around 0.07%. The average underpricing by these LIC IPOs was 1.3%. This article also confirms that the percentage total direct capital raising costs are inversely related to the size of the IPO and underwritten closed-end fund IPOs tend to have higher percentage total capital raising costs than those not underwritten.

Costs of raising equity capital by renounceable rights issues in Australia

Rights issues remain a common method for raising equity capital in Australia for companies listed on me Australian Stock Exchange. This study investigates the capital raising costs of Anstralian renounceable equity rights issues from 2001 to 2006. Both direct and indirect costs are investigated and the explanatory power of potential influencing factors is analyzed. The total direct costs averaged nearly 4% of gross proceeds raised and the mean offer price was discounted around 17% from the current market price. Issue size, percentage underwritten, concentration of ownership and issuer risk significantly influence the percentage direct costs of the rights issue. The age of the issuer, the average historical volume of shares traded and the offer price appear to influence the percentage discount.

The direct costs of raising external equity capital for US REIT IPOs

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the total direct costs of raising external equity capital for US real estate investment trust (REIT) initial public offerings (IPOs).

Design/methodology/approach – The study provides recent evidence on total direct costs for a comprehensive dataset of 125 US REIT IPOs from 1996 until June 2010. A multivariate OLS regression is performed to determine significant factors influencing the level of total direct costs and also underwriting fees and non-underwriting direct expenses.

Findings – The study finds economies of scale in total direct costs, underwriting fees and non-underwriting expenses. The equally (value) weighted average total direct costs are 8.33 percent (7.52 percent), consisting of 6.49 percent (6.30 percent) underwriting fees and 1.87 percent (1.22 percent) non-underwriting direct expenses. The study finds a declining trend of total direct costs for post 2000 IPOs which is attributed to the declining trend in both underwriting fees and non-underwriting direct expenses. Offer size is a critical determinant for both total direct costs and their individual components and inversely affects these costs. The total direct costs are found significantly higher for equity REITs than for mortgage REITs and are also significantly higher for offers listed in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Underwriting fees appear to be negatively influenced by the offer price, the number of representative underwriters involved in the issue, industry return volatility and the number of potential specific risk factors but positively influenced by prior quarter industry dividend yield and ownership limit identified in the prospectus. After controlling for time trend, the paper finds REIT IPOs incur higher non-underwriting direct expenses in response to higher industry return volatility prior to the offer.

Originality/value – This paper adds to the international REIT IPO literature by exploring a number of new influencing factors behind total direct costs, underwriting fees and non-underwriting direct expenses. The study includes data during the recent GFC period.

Costs of raising equity capital for U.S. REITs

The direct and indirect costs of raising equity capital by U.S. REITs through IPOs average 8.43% and 3.07%, respectively while these costs through SEOs average 4.63% and 1.18%, respectively. Ownership limit and the number of adverse risk factors identified in the IPO prospectus and underwriting syndicate structure determine such costs.

Mitigating high ‘equity capital’ risk exposure to ‘small cap’ sector in India: analysing ‘key factors of success’ for ‘Institutional Investors’ whilst Investing in small cap sector in India

This paper deals with the subject of mitigating high ‘Equity Capital’ Risk Exposure to ‘Small Cap’ Sector in India. Institutional investors in India are prone to be risk averse when it comes to investing in the small cap sector in India as they find the companies risky and volatile. This paper will help analyse ‘Key Factors of success’ for ‘Institutional Investors’ whilst investing in Small Cap sector in India as some of these Indian small cap stocks offer handsome returns despite economic downturn. This paper has been harnessed carefully under the influence of expert investors, which includes Benjamin Graham (Security Analysis); Warren Buffet; Philip Fisher (Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits); and Aswath Damodaran.

Especificidades dos investimentos em cleantech realizados pelos fundos de private equity e venture capital no Brasil

Este trabalho procura identificar e analisar as particularidades inerentes ao investimento em tecnologias limpas (Cleantech) no Brasil que fazem destes ativos uma classe tão promissora ao investimento da indústria de Private Equity e Venture Capital (PE/VC). Foram conduzidas entrevistas semi-estruturadas em profundidade com alguns gestores de fundos de PE/VC do mercado brasileiro, e três estudos de caso: uma empresa num segmento do setor agrícola (aquicultura), uma empresa de reciclagem de resíduos sólidos e uma empresa de energia limpa. Uma indústria com histórico de sucesso na promoção de tecnologias hoje essenciais para o dia a dia da sociedade, habituada a financiar projetos nas áreas de internet, software, tecnologia da informação (TI), telecomunicação e saúde, agora, mostra-se cada vez mais interessada em financiar projetos que endereçam a problemática das mudanças climáticas. Principalmente projetos que abordam os temas mais sensíveis às questões climáticas como geração de energia, agricultura, água, resíduos, eficiência energética e industrial. Os estudos de caso e as entrevistas tornam evidentes diversas particularidades do investimento em Cleantech. Trata-se de projetos intensivos em capital e, em alguns casos, com longos períodos de maturação. São altamente dependentes de políticas públicas que regulamentem e incentivem sua adoção, não só nos estágios iniciais de desenvolvimento, mas também favorecendo seu ganho de escala. Não podem ser empregados em qualquer localização pois dependem da vocação geográfica da localidade onde serão instalados. Em muitos casos, apresentam custos iniciais superiores às tecnologias vigentes relacionados principalmente ao estágio tecnológico em que se encontram e à curva de aprendizado. Conclui que tais particularidades não limitam o interesse da indústria de PE/VC, pelo contrário, muitas delas favorecem o investimento de capital de risco na medida em que reduzem determinados riscos do investimento.

O impacto da implementação do Basel III no capital dos bancos portugueses

Este trabalho é uma análise dos efeitos da implementação das últimas recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) também conhecidas como o Basel III de 2010 que deverão ser faseadamente implementadas desde 1 de Janeiro de 2013 até 1 de Janeiro de 2019, no capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses. Neste trabalho assume-se que os ativos pesados pelo risco de 2012 mantêm-se constantes e o capital terá de ser aumentado segundo as recomendações ano após ano até ao fim de 2018. Com esta análise, pretende-se entender o nível de robustez do capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses e se os mesmos têm capital e reservas suficientes para satisfazer as recomendações de capital mínimo sugeridas pelo BCBS ou caso contrário, se necessitarão de novas injeções de capital ou terão de reduzir a sua atividade económica. O Basel III ainda não foi implementado em Portugal, pois a União Europeia está no processo de desenvolvimento e implementação do Credit Requirement Directive IV (CRD IV) que é uma recomendação que todos os bancos centrais dos países da zona Euro deverão impor aos respetivos bancos. Esta diretiva da União Europeia é baseada totalmente nas recomendações do Basel III e deverá ser implementada em 2014 ou nos anos seguintes. Até agora, os bancos Portugueses seguem um sistema com base no aviso 6/2010 do Banco de Portugal que recomenda o cálculo dos rácios core tier 1, tier 1 e tier 2 usando o método notações internas (IRB) de avaliação da exposição do banco aos riscos de crédito, operacional, etc. e onde os ativos ponderados pelo risco são calculados como 12,5 vezes o valor dos requisitos totais de fundos calculados pelo banco. Este método é baseado nas recomendações do Basel II que serão substituídas pelo Basel III. Dado que um dos principais motivos para a crise económica e financeira que assolou o mundo em 2007 foi a acumulação de alavancagem excessiva e gradual erosão da qualidade da base do capital próprio dos bancos, é importante analisar a posição dos bancos Portugueses, que embora não sejam muito grandes a nível global, controlam a economia do país. Espera-se que com a implementação das recomendações do Basel III não haja no futuro uma repetição dos choques sistémicos de 2007. Os resultados deste estudo usando o método padrão recomendado pelo BCBS mostram que de catorze bancos Portugueses incluídos neste estudo, apenas seis (BES, Montepio, Finantia, BIG, Invest e BIC) conseguem enquadrar nas recomendações mínimas do Basel III até 1-1- 2019 e alguns outros estão marginalmente abaixo dos rácios mínimos (CGD, Itaú e Crédito Agrícola).