Realisable climate change narratives in public discourse: an East/West comparative analysis of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) as a response to global climate change

This thesis looks at how non-experts develop an opinion on climate change, and how those opinions could be changed by public discourse. I use Hubert Dreyfus’ account of skill acquisition to distinguish between experts and non-experts. I then use a combination of Walter Fisher’s narrative paradigm and the hermeneutics of Paul Ricœur to explore how non-experts form opinions, and how public narratives can provide a point of critique. In order to develop robust narratives, they must be financially realistic. I therefore consider the burgeoning field of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) analysis as a way of informing realistic public narratives. I identify a potential problem with this approach: the Western assumptions of ESG analysis might make for public narratives that are not convincing to a non-Western audience. I then demonstrate how elements of the Chinese tradition, the Confucian, Neo-Confucian, and Daoist schools, as presented by David Hall and Roger Ames, can provide alternative assumptions to ESG analysis so that the public narratives will be more culturally adaptable. This research contributes to the discipline by bringing disparate traditions together in a unique way, into a practical project with a view towards applications. I conclude by considering avenues for further research.

La inversión socialmente responsable en los fondos de pensiones y en las EPSV de empleo

Máster en Dirección Empresarial desde la Innovación y la internacionalización. Curso 2013/2014

Corporations and corporate governance: what do these concepts mean for multinational corporate power and social responsibility?

International Journal of Liability and Scientific Enquiry 2007 - Vol. 1, No.1/2 pp. 29 - 49 RAE2008

Convergence of corporate social responsibility and corporate governance in weak economies : the case of Bangladesh

The convergence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate governance (CG) has changed the corporate accountability mechanism. This has developed a socially responsible ‘corporate self-regulation’, a synthesis of governance and responsibility in the companies of strong economies. However, unlike in the strong economies, this convergence has not been visible in the companies of weak economies, where the civil society groups are unorganised, regulatory agencies are either ineffective or corrupt and the media and non-governmental organisations do not mirror the corporate conscience. Using the case of Bangladesh, this article investigates the convergence between CSR and CG in the self-regulation of companies in a less vigilant environment.

Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, And Managerial Risk-Taking

This dissertation investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-taking, as well as the differences in governance structure that affect this association. Using a sample of US public firms from 1995 to 2009, we find that firms with strong CSR records engage in higher risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that this relationship is robust when accounting for differences in governance structure and correcting for endogeneity via simultaneous equations modeling. Additional testing indicates that performance in the employee relations dimension of CSR in particular increases with risk-taking, while high firm visibility dampens the association between CSR and the accounting-based measures of risk-taking. Prior literature establishes that high managerial risk-tolerance is necessary for the undertaking of risky yet value-enhancing investment decisions. Thus, the main findings suggest that CSR, rather than being a waste of scarce corporate resources, is instead an important aspect of shareholder value creation. They contribute to the debate on CSR by documenting that corporate risk-taking is one mechanism among others through which CSR maps into higher firm value.

Corporate governance and its influence on the investment decision process of equity market's professionals: An inside view of how corporate governance issues influence the decision-making process of sell-side and buy-side professionals when analyzing Brazilian listed companies

Corporate governance has been in the spotlight for the past two decades, being subject of numerous researches all over the world. Governance is pictured as a broad and diverse theme, evolving through different routes to form distinct systems. This scenario together with 2 types of agency problems (investor vs. management and minorities vs. controlling shareholders) produce different definitions for governance. Usually, studies investigate whether corporate governance structures influence firm performance, and company valuation. This approach implies investors can identify those impacts and later take them into consideration when making investment decisions. However, behavioral finance theory shows that not always investors take rational decisions, and therefore the modus operandi of those professionals needs to be understood. So, this research aimed to investigate to what extent Brazilian corporate governance standards and practices influence the investment decision-making process of equity markets' professionals from the sell-side and buy-side. This exploratory study was carried out through qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the qualitative phase, 8 practitioners were interviewed and 3 dimensions emerged: understanding, pertinence and practice. Based on the interviews’ findings, a questionnaire was formulated and distributed to buy-siders and sell-siders that cover Brazilian stocks. 117 respondents from all over the world contributed to the study. The data obtained were analyzed through structural equation modeling and descriptive statistics. The 3 dimensions became 5 constructs: definition (institutionalized governance, informal governance), pertinence (relevance), practice (valuation process, structured governance assessment) The results of this thesis suggest there is no definitive answer, as the extent to which governance will influence an investment decision process will depend on a number of circumstances which compose the context. The only certainty is the need to present a “corporate governance behavior”, rather than simply establishing rules and regulations at firm and country level.

Security of employee entitlements : corporate governance issues

Following the collapse across the last decade of a number of large organizations such as Enron in the USA and several domestic organizations including Ansett Airlines, HIH Insurance and One.Tel, much discussion has ensued about the need to secure employee entitlements. However, tangible improvements in this area are elusive. Good corporate governance policies would suggest that deferred obligations as well as current debts should not be neglected and that appropriate arrangements be put in place to adequately fund employee entitlements. In this paper we consider recent Australian attempts to introduce better governance of employee entitlements.

Private rule-making and European governance - issues of legitimacy

Private rule-making is widely discussed as supporting institutional policy making and legislation at EU level. The following argues for a different perspective on private actor rule-making, focusing on the autonomy of social realms within which self-governance may be possible. From this perspective, private actor rule-making is considered as a potential gain in self-determination. Substantive autonomy and enhanced self-determination of all those affected are considered as prerequisites for accepting rules made by private actors. Opening the field for discussion, some manifestations of (envisaged) private rule-making at EU level are explored and discussed as to whether they should be accepted as legitimate forms of self-governance.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

International risk management:systems, internal control and corporate governance

This book is very practical in its international usefulness (because current risk practice and understanding is not equal across international boundaries). For example, an accountant in Belgium would want to know what the governance regulations are in that country and what the risk issues are that he/she needs to be aware of. This book covers the international aspect of risk management systems, risk and governance, and risk and accounting. In doing so the book covers topics such as: internal control and corporate governance; risk management systems; integrating risk into performance management systems; risk and audit; governance structures; risk management of pensions; pension scheme risks e.g. hedging derivatives, longevity bonds etc; risk reporting; and the role of the accountant in risk management. There are the case studies through out the book which illustrate by way of concrete practical examples the major themes contained in the book. The book includes highly topical areas such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act and pension risk management.

School education as social and economic governance : responsibilising communities through industry-school engagement

This article examines shifts in educational and social governance taking place in Queensland, Australia, through Industry School Engagement Strategy of Education Queensland and its Gateway Schools program. This significant educational initiative is set within the context of the social investment agenda first articulated in the education policy framework, Queensland State Education-2010. The article traces the historic extension of this governmental strategy through establishment of the Gateway Schools concept that brokers industry-school partnerships with global players in the Queensland economy. Industry sectors forming the partnerships include Minerals and Energy, Aerospace, Wine Tourism, Agribusiness, Manufacturing and Engineering, Building and Construction and ICT. We argue that this ‘post-bureaucratic’ model of schooling represents a new social settlement of neoliberal governance, in which educational outcomes align with economic objectives, and frame the conditions for community self-governance.

Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.