The significance of Marx's value for strategy theory: competitive advantage and the issue of tautology within the resource-based view of the firm

Marxian thinking following the TSSI (Temporal Single System Interpretation) of Marx is applied to refute the allegation of a tautology in the resource-based view of the firm--paired with providing an explanation of how and why resources create value--, where resources are synonymous with Marx's categories of constant and variable capital. Refuting the allegation naturally leads to the holy grail of resource-based thinking, i.e. the question of what, conceptually, constitutes a firm's competitive advantage within the industry context. The article achieves its objectives by tying the resource-based view into Marx's theory value.

The economic theory of the firm as a foundation for international business theory

The economic theory of the firm is central to the theory of the multinational enterprise. Recent literature on multinationals, however, makes only limited reference to the economic theory of the firm. Multinationals play an important role in coordinating the international division of labour through internal markets. The paper reviews the economic principles that underlie this view. Optimal internalisation equates marginal benefits and costs. The benefits of internalisation stem mainly from the difficulties of licensing proprietary knowledge, reflecting the view that MNEs possess an ‘ownership’ or ‘firm-specific’ advantage. The costs of internalisation, it is argued, reflect managerial capability, and in particular the capability to manage a large firm. The paper argues that management capability is a complement to ownership advantage. Ownership advantage determines the potential of the firm, and management capability governs the fulfilment of this potential through overcoming barriers to growth. The analysis is applied to a variety of issues, including out-sourcing, geographical dispersion of production, and regional specialisation in marketing.

Electronic commerce investments, the resource-based view of the firm, and firm market value

Firms have embraced electronic commerce as a means of doing business, either because they see it as a way to improve efficiency, grow market share, expand into new markets, or because they view it as essential for survival. Recent research in the United States provides some evidence that the market does value investments in electronic commerce. Following research that suggests that, in certain circumstances, the market values noninnovative investments as well as innovative investments in new products, we partition electronic commerce investment project announcements into innovative and noninnovative to determine whether there are excess returns associated with these types of announcements. Apart from our overall results being consistent with the United States findings that the market values investments in electronic commerce projects, we also find that noninnovative investments are perceived as more valuable to the firm than innovative investments. On average, the market expects innovative investments to earn a return commensurate with their risk. We conclude that innovative electronic commerce projects are most likely seen by the capital market as easily replicable, and consequently have little, if any, competitive advantage period. On the other hand, we conclude from the noninnovative investment results that these types of investments are seen as being compatible with a firm's assets-in-place, in particular, its information technology capabilities, a view consistent with the resource-based view of the firm.

An ambiguity-based theory of the linguistic verbal joke in English

Instytut Filologii Angielskiej

On the opportunism-independent theory of the firm

Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theory of the firm are either restricted to special cases or are derived from the capabilities or resource-based perspective. However, a more general opportunism-independent approach can be developed, based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is nevertheless contractual in nature. This depends on 'direction', that is, deriving economic value by permitting one set of actors to direct the activities of another, and of non-human factors of production. Direction helps to explain not only firm boundaries and organisation, but also the existence of firms, without appealing to opportunism or moral hazard. The paper also considers the extent to which it is meaningful to speak of 'contractual' theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysis can be extended beyond the employment contract to encompass ownership of assets by the firm. © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

A Moral Stakeholder Theory of the Firm

To be a coherent and genuinely alternative conception to the shareholder model, any moral stakeholder theory must meet the following conditions: (1) It must be an ethical theory; (2) It must identify a limited group as stakeholders; (3) The group must be identified on morally relevant grounds; (4) Stakeholder claims must be non-universal; (5) And not held against everyone. A principle for identifying the stakeholder is suggested as a person who has much to lose – financially, socially, or psychologically – by the failure of the firm. The emerging picture contrasts sharply with the conventional conception of the firm.