Endogenous Formation of Competing Partnership with Moral Hazard

Published as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44, issue 1, pages 183-194.

Coalition formation during technology adoption

The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is a prominent framework that addresses the challenge of organisations to understand and promote the factors that lead to acceptance of new technologies. Nevertheless, our understanding of one of the model's key variables – social influence – remains limited. Drawing upon earlier studies that address the role of referent individuals to technology acceptance, this paper introduces the notion of ‘coalition’ as a social group that can affect the opinion of other members within an organisation. Our empirical study centres on an organisation that has recently decided to introduce Big Data into its formal operations. Through a unique empirical approach that analyses sentiments expressed by individuals about this technology on the organisation's online forum, we demonstrate the emergence of a central referent, and in turn the dynamics of a coalition that builds around this referent as the attitudes of individuals converge upon the Big Data issue. Our paper contributes to existing TAM frameworks by elaborating the social influence variable and providing a dynamic lens to the technology acceptance process. We concurrently offer a methodological tool for organisations to understand social dynamics that form about a newly introduced technology and accelerate its acceptance by employees.

Coalition Formation With Communication Ranges and Moving Targets

A team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with limited communication ranges and limited resources are deployed in a region to search and destroy stationary and moving targets. When a UAV detects a target, depending on the target resource requirement, it is tasked to form a coalition over the dynamic network formed by the UAVs. In this paper, we develop a mechanism to find potential coalition members over the network using principles from internet protocol and introduce an algorithm using Particle Swarm Optimization to generate a coalition that destroys the target is minimum time. Monte-Carlo simulations are carried out to study how coalition are formed and the effects of coalition process delays.

Endogenous Unions Formation

This paper analyzes the process of endogenous union formation in the context of a sequential bargaining model between a firm and several unions and tries to explain why workers may be represented by several unions of different sizes. We show that the equilibrium number of unions and their relative size depend on workers' attitudes toward the risk of unemployment and union configuration is independent of labor productivity.

Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.

Trusting Groups in Coalition Formation using Social Distance

In environments where distributed team formation is key, and defections are possible, the use of trust as social capital allows social norms to be defied and compared. An agent can use this information, when invited to join a group or collation, to decide whether or not its utility will be increased by joining. In this work a social network approach is used to define and reason about the relationships contained in the agent community. Previous baseline work is extended with two decision making mechanisms. These are compared by simulating an abstract grid-like environment, and preliminary results are reported.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

A new approach for multi-agent coalition formation and management in the scope of electricity markets

This paper presents a new methodology for the creation and management of coalitions in Electricity Markets. This approach is tested using the multi-agent market simulator MASCEM, taking advantage of its ability to provide the means to model and simulate VPP (Virtual Power Producers). VPPs are represented as coalitions of agents, with the capability of negotiating both in the market, and internally, with their members, in order to combine and manage their individual specific characteristics and goals, with the strategy and objectives of the VPP itself. The new features include the development of particular individual facilitators to manage the communications amongst the members of each coalition independently from the rest of the simulation, and also the mechanisms for the classification of the agents that are candidates to join the coalition. In addition, a global study on the results of the Iberian Electricity Market is performed, to compare and analyze different approaches for defining consistent and adequate strategies to integrate into the agents of MASCEM. This, combined with the application of learning and prediction techniques provide the agents with the ability to learn and adapt themselves, by adjusting their actions to the continued evolving states of the world they are playing in.

Coalition Formation through Motivation and Trust

Cooperation is the fundamental underpinning of multi-agent systems, allowing agents to interact to achieve their goals. Where agents are self-interested, or potentially unreliable, there must be appropriate mechanisms to cope with the uncertainty that arises. In particular, agents must manage the risk associated with interacting with others who have different objectives, or who may fail to fulfil their commitments. Previous work has utilised the notions of motivation and trust in engendering successful cooperation between self-interested agents. Motivations provide a means for representing and reasoning about agents' overall objectives, and trust offers a mechanism for modelling and reasoning about reliability, honesty, veracity and so forth. This paper extends that work to address some of its limitations. In particular, we introduce the concept of a clan: a group of agents who trust each other and have similar objectives. Clan members treat each other favourably when making private decisions about cooperation, in order to gain mutual benefit. We describe mechanisms for agents to form, maintain, and dissolve clans in accordance with their self-interested nature, along with giving details of how clan membership influences individual decision making. Finally, through some simulation experiments we illustrate the effectiveness of clan formation in addressing some of the inherent problems with cooperation among self-interested agents.

Coalition Formation in Parliament and during the Policy Process

In modern democratic systems, usually no single collective actor is able to decisively influence political decision-making. Instead, actors with similar preferences form coalitions in order to gain more influence in the policy process. In the Swiss political system in particular, institutional veto points and the consensual culture of policy-making provide strong incentives for actors to form large coalitions. Coalitions are thus especially important in political decision-making in Switzerland, and are accordingly a central focus of this book. According to one of our core claims - to understand the actual functioning of Swiss consensus democracy - one needs to extend the analysis beyond formal institutions to also include informal procedures and practices. Coalitions of actors play a crucial role in this respect. They are a cornerstone of decision-making structures, and they inform us about patterns of conflict, collaboration and power among actors. Looking at coalitions is all the more interesting in the Swiss political system, since the coalition structure is supposed to vary across policy processes. Given the absence of a fixed government coalition, actors need to form new coalitions in each policy process.

Explaining Interest Group Interactions with Party Group Members in the European Parliament : Dominant Party Groups and Coalition Formation

Peer reviewed

Explaining Interest Group Interactions with Party Group Members in the European Parliament : Dominant Party Groups and Coalition Formation

Peer reviewed

A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.