Compliant cryptologic protocols

Literally, the word compliance suggests conformity in fulfilling official requirements. The thesis presents the results of the analysis and design of a class of protocols called compliant cryptologic protocols (CCP). The thesis presents a notion for compliance in cryptosystems that is conducive as a cryptologic goal. CCP are employed in security systems used by at least two mutually mistrusting sets of entities. The individuals in the sets of entities only trust the design of the security system and any trusted third party the security system may include. Such a security system can be thought of as a broker between the mistrusting sets of entities. In order to provide confidence in operation for the mistrusting sets of entities, CCP must provide compliance verification mechanisms. These mechanisms are employed either by all the entities or a set of authorised entities in the system to verify the compliance of the behaviour of various participating entities with the rules of the system. It is often stated that confidentiality, integrity and authentication are the primary interests of cryptology. It is evident from the literature that authentication mechanisms employ confidentiality and integrity services to achieve their goal. Therefore, the fundamental services that any cryptographic algorithm may provide are confidentiality and integrity only. Since controlling the behaviour of the entities is not a feasible cryptologic goal,the verification of the confidentiality of any data is a futile cryptologic exercise. For example, there exists no cryptologic mechanism that would prevent an entity from willingly or unwillingly exposing its private key corresponding to a certified public key. The confidentiality of the data can only be assumed. Therefore, any verification in cryptologic protocols must take the form of integrity verification mechanisms. Thus, compliance verification must take the form of integrity verification in cryptologic protocols. A definition of compliance that is conducive as a cryptologic goal is presented as a guarantee on the confidentiality and integrity services. The definitions are employed to provide a classification mechanism for various message formats in a cryptologic protocol. The classification assists in the characterisation of protocols, which assists in providing a focus for the goals of the research. The resulting concrete goal of the research is the study of those protocols that employ message formats to provide restricted confidentiality and universal integrity services to selected data. The thesis proposes an informal technique to understand, analyse and synthesise the integrity goals of a protocol system. The thesis contains a study of key recovery,electronic cash, peer-review, electronic auction, and electronic voting protocols. All these protocols contain message format that provide restricted confidentiality and universal integrity services to selected data. The study of key recovery systems aims to achieve robust key recovery relying only on the certification procedure and without the need for tamper-resistant system modules. The result of this study is a new technique for the design of key recovery systems called hybrid key escrow. The thesis identifies a class of compliant cryptologic protocols called secure selection protocols (SSP). The uniqueness of this class of protocols is the similarity in the goals of the member protocols, namely peer-review, electronic auction and electronic voting. The problem statement describing the goals of these protocols contain a tuple,(I, D), where I usually refers to an identity of a participant and D usually refers to the data selected by the participant. SSP are interested in providing confidentiality service to the tuple for hiding the relationship between I and D, and integrity service to the tuple after its formation to prevent the modification of the tuple. The thesis provides a schema to solve the instances of SSP by employing the electronic cash technology. The thesis makes a distinction between electronic cash technology and electronic payment technology. It will treat electronic cash technology to be a certification mechanism that allows the participants to obtain a certificate on their public key, without revealing the certificate or the public key to the certifier. The thesis abstracts the certificate and the public key as the data structure called anonymous token. It proposes design schemes for the peer-review, e-auction and e-voting protocols by employing the schema with the anonymous token abstraction. The thesis concludes by providing a variety of problem statements for future research that would further enrich the literature.

Economicidade e eficiência temporal estudo de caso no Instituto Federal de Goiás

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade UnB Planaltina, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Gestão Pública, Mestrado Profissional em Gestão Pública, 2016.

A Multiplicative Homomorphic Sealed-Bid Auction-Based on Goldwasser-Micali Encryption

Instead of the costly encryption algorithms traditionally employed in auction schemes, efficient Goldwasser-Micali encryption is used to design a new sealed-bid auction. Multiplicative homomorphism instead of the traditional additive homomorphism is exploited to achieve security and high efficiency in the auction. The new scheme is the currently known most efficient non-interactive sealed-bid auction with bid privacy.

Design of multiunit electronic exchanges through decomposition

In this paper, we exploit the idea of decomposition to match buyers and sellers in an electronic exchange for trading large volumes of homogeneous goods, where the buyers and sellers specify marginal-decreasing piecewise constant price curves to capture volume discounts. Such exchanges are relevant for automated trading in many e-business applications. The problem of determining winners and Vickrey prices in such exchanges is known to have a worst-case complexity equal to that of as many as (1 + m + n) NP-hard problems, where m is the number of buyers and n is the number of sellers. Our method proposes the overall exchange problem to be solved as two separate and simpler problems: 1) forward auction and 2) reverse auction, which turns out to be generalized knapsack problems. In the proposed approach, we first determine the quantity of units to be traded between the sellers and the buyers using fast heuristics developed by us. Next, we solve a forward auction and a reverse auction using fully polynomial time approximation schemes available in the literature. The proposed approach has worst-case polynomial time complexity. and our experimentation shows that the approach produces good quality solutions to the problem. Note to Practitioners- In recent times, electronic marketplaces have provided an efficient way for businesses and consumers to trade goods and services. The use of innovative mechanisms and algorithms has made it possible to improve the efficiency of electronic marketplaces by enabling optimization of revenues for the marketplace and of utilities for the buyers and sellers. In this paper, we look at single-item, multiunit electronic exchanges. These are electronic marketplaces where buyers submit bids and sellers ask for multiple units of a single item. We allow buyers and sellers to specify volume discounts using suitable functions. Such exchanges are relevant for high-volume business-to-business trading of standard products, such as silicon wafers, very large-scale integrated chips, desktops, telecommunications equipment, commoditized goods, etc. The problem of determining winners and prices in such exchanges is known to involve solving many NP-hard problems. Our paper exploits the familiar idea of decomposition, uses certain algorithms from the literature, and develops two fast heuristics to solve the problem in a near optimal way in worst-case polynomial time.

Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market

The existence of undesirable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market requires an efficient auction mechanism. However, many of the existing auction mechanism have difficulties in suppressing such unreasonable price spikes effectively. A new auction mechanism is proposed to suppress effectively unreasonable price spikes in a competitive electricity market. It optimally combines system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction mechanisms. A threshold value is determined to activate the switching between the marginal price auction and the proposed composite auction. Basically when the system marginal price is higher than the threshold value, the composite auction for high price electricity market is activated. The winning electricity sellers will sell their electricity at the system marginal price or their own bid prices, depending on their rights of being paid at the system marginal price and their offers' impact on suppressing undesirable price spikes. Such economic stimuli discourage sellers from practising economic and physical withholdings. Multiple price caps are proposed to regulate strong market power. We also compare other auction mechanisms to highlight the characteristics of the proposed one. Numerical simulation using the proposed auction mechanism is given to illustrate the procedure of this new auction mechanism.

A truthful double auction for device-to-device communications in cellular networks

Data traffic in cellular networks has dramatically increased in recent years as the emergence of various new wireless applications, which imposes an immediate requirement for large network capacity. Although many efforts have been made to enhance wireless channel capacity, they are far from solving the network capacity enhancement problem. Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is recently proposed as a promising technique to increase network capacity. However, most existing work on D2D communications focuses on optimizing throughput or energy efficiency, without considering economic issues. In this paper, we propose a truthful double auction for D2D communications (TAD) in multi-cell cellular networks for trading resources in frequencytime domain, where cellular users with D2D communication capability act as sellers, and other users waiting to access the network act as buyers. Both intra-cell and inter-cell D2D sellers are accommodated in TAD while the competitive space in each cell is extensively exploited to achieve a high auction efficiency. With a sophisticated seller-buyer matching, winner determination and pricing, TAD guarantees individual rationality, budget balance, and truthfulness. Furthermore, we extend our TAD design to handle a more general case that each seller and buyer ask/bid multiple resource units. Extensive simulation results show that TAD can achieve truthfulness as well as high performance in terms of seller/buyer sanctification ratio, auctioneer profit and network throughput.

Electronic and vibrational spectra of gaspeite

Visible, near-infrared, IR and Raman spectra of magnesian gaspeite are presented. Nickel ion is the main source of the electronic bands as it is the principal component in the mineral where as the bands in IR and Raman spectra are due to the vibrational processes in the carbonate ion as an entity. The combination of electronic absorption and vibrational spectra (including near-infrared, FTIR and Raman) of magnesian gaspeite are explained in terms of the cation co-ordination and the behaviour of CO32– anion in the Ni–Mg carbonate. The electronic absorption spectrum consists of three broad and intense bands at 8130, 13160 and 22730 cm–1 due to spin-allowed transitions and two weak bands at 20410 and 30300 cm–1 are assigned to spin-forbidden transitions of Ni2+ in an octahedral symmetry. The crystal field parameters evaluated from the observed bands are Dq = 810; B = 800 and C = 3200 cm–1. The two bands in the near-infrared spectrum at 4330 and 5130 cm–1 are overtone and combination of CO32– vibrational modes. For the carbonate group, infrared bands are observed at 1020 cm–1(1 ), 870 cm–1 (2), 1418 cm–1 (3) and 750 cm–1 (4), of which3, the asymmetric stretching mode is most intense. Three well resolved Raman bands at 1571, 1088 and 331 cm–1 are assigned to 3, 1 and MO stretching vibrations.

Batch Verification of Validity of Bids in Homomorphic E-auction

Bid opening in e-auction is efficient when a homomorphic secret sharing function is employed to seal the bids and homomorphic secret reconstruction is employed to open the bids. However, this high efficiency is based on an assumption: the bids are valid (e.g., within a special range). An undetected invalid bid can compromise correctness and fairness of the auction. Unfortunately, validity verification of the bids is ignored in the auction schemes employing homomorphic secret sharing (called homomorphic auction in this paper). In this paper, an attack against the homomorphic auction in the absence of bid validity check is presented and a necessary bid validity check mechanism is proposed. Then a batch cryptographic technique is introduced and applied to improve the efficiency of bid validity check.