731 resultados para electoral outcomes
Resumo:
An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.
Resumo:
An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.
Resumo:
[spa] En este trabajo se analiza con datos de España los efectos de la corrupción local sobre los resultados electorales. En base a las noticias publicadas entre 1996 y 2009, se construye una nueva base de datos que recoge los casos de corrupción y noticias relativas a cambios en los planes urbanísticos que no han seguido el procedimiento legal. La base de datos muestra que los primeros escándalos de corrupción urbanística surgieron durante el mandato electoral de 1999-2003, pero que éstos alcanzaron sus niveles máximos justo antes de las elecciones de 2007. Se estima una ecuación del porcentaje de voto obtenido por el partido en el poder en estas elecciones locales y se encuentra que la pérdida media de voto después de un caso de corrupción se sitúa alrededor del 4%. Este efecto es más elevado (del 9%) si el caso de corrupción ha recibido una amplia cobertura por los diarios. Los efectos estimados para las elecciones de 2003 son significativamente inferiores. Cuando se consideran los casos en que los políticos han tenido cargas judiciales por corrupción y amplia cobertura por los diarios, la pérdida de voto asciende hasta el 12%. No obstante, la cobertura por los diarios genera un efecto negativo en el voto incluso cuando no hay cargas judiciales.
Resumo:
[spa] En este trabajo se analiza con datos de España los efectos de la corrupción local sobre los resultados electorales. En base a las noticias publicadas entre 1996 y 2009, se construye una nueva base de datos que recoge los casos de corrupción y noticias relativas a cambios en los planes urbanísticos que no han seguido el procedimiento legal. La base de datos muestra que los primeros escándalos de corrupción urbanística surgieron durante el mandato electoral de 1999-2003, pero que éstos alcanzaron sus niveles máximos justo antes de las elecciones de 2007. Se estima una ecuación del porcentaje de voto obtenido por el partido en el poder en estas elecciones locales y se encuentra que la pérdida media de voto después de un caso de corrupción se sitúa alrededor del 4%. Este efecto es más elevado (del 9%) si el caso de corrupción ha recibido una amplia cobertura por los diarios. Los efectos estimados para las elecciones de 2003 son significativamente inferiores. Cuando se consideran los casos en que los políticos han tenido cargas judiciales por corrupción y amplia cobertura por los diarios, la pérdida de voto asciende hasta el 12%. No obstante, la cobertura por los diarios genera un efecto negativo en el voto incluso cuando no hay cargas judiciales.
Resumo:
Efforts to estimate the magnitude of the incumbency effect in U.S. House elections and assess its political meaning have been complicated by two omitted-variables problems. First, in the absence of an adequate measure of incumbent prospects, estimates of the magnitude of the incumbency effect fail to control for selection effects associated with the decision incumbents make about whether to run for reelection. Strategic incumbents enter races they think they can win and withdraw when they expect to lose. The consequence is an upward bias in estimates of incumbents’ electoral advantages. Second, the normative implications of high reelection rates cannot be assessed without measuring incumbent quality, since a possible explanation for their electoral success is that incumbents are of high quality and doing a good job. We propose a strategy for measuring incumbent prospects and quality, demonstrate the strategic nature of incumbent and challenger entry, re-estimate the incumbency effect, and show that incumbent quality has an impact on electoral outcomes. Our conclusion is that incumbents’ advantages in House elections have been over estimated while the positive basis of incumbent safety is typically under appreciated.
Resumo:
Recent studies have shown that party systems in emerging democracies do not always adequately reflect the various cleavages of society. Under such circumstances, retrospective voting may play a more important role than cleavage voting in determining electoral outcomes. For studies of retrospective voting, the choice between macro and micro level as the independent variable is a major methodological issue. Using individual-level data on Turkey, this paper addresses two major questions: (1) Are voters' decisions based on household economic conditions or national economic conditions? Do sociopolitical conditions also count? (2) Does the future evaluation of the economy affect voting decisions apart from past evaluation? Logit models are used in this research to answer these questions.
Resumo:
Land Ownership and Development: Evidence from Postwar Japan This paper analyzes the effect of land ownership on technology adoption and structural transformation. A large-scale land reform in postwar Japan enforced a large number of tenant farmers who were cultivating land to become owners of this land. I find that the municipalities which had many owner farmers after the land reform tended to experience a quick entry of new agricultural machines which became available after the reform. The adoption of the machines reduced the dependence on family labor, and led to a reallocation of labor from agriculture to industries and service sectors in urban centers when these sectors were growing. I also analyze the aggregate impact of labor reallocation on economic growth by using a simple growth model and micro data. I find that it increased GDP by about 12 percent of the GDP in 1974 during 1955-74. I also find a large and positive effect on agricultural productivity. Loyalty and Treason: Theory and Evidence from Japan's Land Reform A historically large-scale land reform in Japan after World War II enforced by the occupation forces redistributed a large area of farmlands to tenant farmers. The reform demolished hierarchical structures by weakening landlords' power in villages and towns. This paper investigates how the change in the social and economic structure of small communities affects electoral outcomes in the presence of clientelism. I find that there was a considerable decrease in the vote share of conservative parties in highly affected areas after the reform. I find the supporting evidence that the effect was driven by the fact that the tenant farmers who had obtained land exited from the long-term tenancy contract and became independent landowners. The effect was relatively persistent. Finally, I also find the surprising result that there was a decrease, rather than an increase, in turnout in these areas after the reform. Geography and State Fragmentation We examine how geography affects the location of borders between sovereign states in Europe and surrounding areas from 1500 until today at the grid-cell level. This is motivated by an observation that the richest places in this region also have the highest historical border presence, suggesting a hitherto unexplored link between geography and modern development, working through state fragmentation. The raw correlations show that borders tend to be located on mountains, by rivers, closer to coasts, and in areas suitable for rainfed, but not irrigated, agriculture. Many of these patterns also hold with rigorous spatial controls. For example, cells with more rivers and more rugged terrain than their neighboring cells have higher border densities. However, the fragmenting effects of suitability for rainfed agriculture are reversed with such neighbor controls. Moreover, we find that borders are less likely to survive over time when they separate large states from small, but this size-difference effect is mitigated by, e.g., rugged terrain.
Resumo:
¿Cuáles son los efectos de la guerra sobre el comportamiento político? Colombia es un caso interesante en el que el conflicto y las elecciones coexisten y los grupos armados ilegales intencionalmente afectan los resultados electorales. Sin embargo, los grupos usan diferentes estrategias para alterar estos resultados. Este artículo argumenta que los efectos diferenciales de la violencia sobre los resultados electorales son el resultado de estrategias deliberadas de los grupos ilegales, que a su turno, son consecuencia de las condiciones militares que difieren entre ellos. Usando datos panel de las elecciones al Senado de 1994 a 2006 y una aproximación por variables instrumentales para resolver posibles problemas de endogenidad, este artículo muestra que la violencia guerrillera disminuye la participación electoral, mientras que la violencia paramilitar no tiene ningún efecto sobre la participación pero reduce la competencia electoral y beneficia a nuevos partidos no-tradicionales. Esto es consistente con la hipótesis de que la estrategia de la guerrilla es sabotear las elecciones, mientras que los paramiltares establecen alianzas con ciertos candidatos.
Resumo:
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.
Resumo:
In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.
Resumo:
The present study was concerned with evaluating one basic institution in Bolivian democracy: its electoral system. The study evaluates the impact of electoral systems on the interaction between presidents and assemblies. It sought to determine whether it is possible to have electoral systems that favor multipartism but can also moderate the likelihood of executive-legislative confrontation by producing the necessary conditions for coalition building. ^ This dissertation utilized the case study method as a methodology. Using the case of Bolivia, the research project studied the variations in executive-legislative relations and political outcomes from 1985 to the present through a model of executive-legislative relations that provided a typology of presidents and assemblies based on the strategies available to them to bargain with each other for support. A complementary model that evaluated the state of their inter-institutional interaction was also employed. ^ Results indicated that executive-legislative relations are profoundly influenced by the choice of the electoral system. Similarly, the project showed that although the Bolivian mixed system for legislative elections, and executive formula favor multipartism, these electoral systems do not necessarily engender executive-legislative confrontation in Bolivia. This was mainly due to the congressional election of the president, and the formulas utilized to translate the popular vote into legislative seats. However, the study found that the electoral system has also allowed for anti-systemic forces to emerge and gain political space both within and outside of political institutions. ^ The study found that government coalitions in Bolivia that are promoted by the system of congressional election of the president and the D'Hondt system to allocate legislative seats have helped ameliorate one of the typical problems of presidential systems in Latin America: the presence of a minority government that is blocked in its capacity to govern. This study was limited to evaluating the impact of the electoral system, as the independent variable, on executive-legislative interaction. However, the project revealed a need for more theoretical and empirical work on executive-legislative bargaining models in order to understand how institutional reforms can have an impact on the incentives of presidents and legislators to form coherent coalitions. ^
Resumo:
Since the 1985 return to democracy, Brazilian politicians have resorted to vote-pooling arrangements to elect representatives. A puzzle thus presents itself: What drives parties to join these electoral cartels? The dissertation unraveled the incentives party elites have to participate in coalitions under a presidencialist system of government. I also investigated the effect of electoral coalitions on congressional representation. I applied a model of binary outcomes and relied on standard deviations to assess the ideological homogeneity/heterogeneity of electoral coalitions. I also calculated the Index of Disproportionality to measure the gaps between the proportion of votes and seats received by all parties in Brazil with and without electoral coalitions. Finally, I assessed the effects of the electoral formula on proportionality. An unexpected exogenous factor resulted crucial in explaining proportional electoral coalition building: The district's majoritarian election for governor. In each district, political actors often synchronize coalition partners to maximize winning results while minimizing electoral efforts.
Resumo:
Purpose. To determine the mechanisms predisposing penile fracture as well as the rate of long-term penile deformity and erectile and voiding functions. Methods. All fractures were repaired on an emergency basis via subcoronal incision and absorbable suture with simultaneous repair of eventual urethral lesion. Patients' status before fracture and voiding and erectile functions at long term were assessed by periodic follow-up and phone call. Detailed history included cause, symptoms, and single-question self-report of erectile and voiding functions. Results. Among the 44 suspicious cases, 42 (95.4%) were confirmed, mean age was 34.5 years (range: 18-60), mean follow-up 59.3 months (range 9-155). Half presented the classical triad of audible crack, detumescence, and pain. Heterosexual intercourse was the most common cause (28 patients, 66.7%), followed by penile manipulation (6 patients, 14.3%), and homosexual intercourse (4 patients, 9.5%). Woman on top was the most common heterosexual position (n = 14, 50%), followed by doggy style (n = 8, 28.6%). Four patients (9.5%) maintained the cause unclear. Six (14.3%) patients had urethral injury and two (4.8%) had erectile dysfunction, treated by penile prosthesis and PDE-5i. No patient showed urethral fistula, voiding deterioration, penile nodule/curve or pain. Conclusions. Woman on top was the potentially riskiest sexual position (50%). Immediate surgical treatment warrants long-term very low morbidity.
Resumo:
The vast majority of maternal deaths in low-and middle-income countries are preventable. Delay in obtaining access to appropriate health care is a fairly common problem which can be improved. The objective of this study was to explore the association between delay in providing obstetric health care and severe maternal morbidity/death. This was a multicentre cross-sectional study, involving 27 referral obstetric facilities in all Brazilian regions between 2009 and 2010. All women admitted to the hospital with a pregnancy-related cause were screened, searching for potentially life-threatening conditions (PLTC), maternal death (MD) and maternal near-miss (MNM) cases, according to the WHO criteria. Data on delays were collected by medical chart review and interview with the medical staff. The prevalence of the three different types of delays was estimated according to the level of care and outcome of the complication. For factors associated with any delay, the PR and 95%CI controlled for cluster design were estimated. A total of 82,144 live births were screened, with 9,555 PLTC, MNM or MD cases prospectively identified. Overall, any type of delay was observed in 53.8% of cases; delay related to user factors was observed in 10.2%, 34.6% of delays were related to health service accessibility and 25.7% were related to quality of medical care. The occurrence of any delay was associated with increasing severity of maternal outcome: 52% in PLTC, 68.4% in MNM and 84.1% in MD. Although this was not a population-based study and the results could not be generalized, there was a very clear and significant association between frequency of delay and severity of outcome, suggesting that timely and proper management are related to survival.