Corporate social responsibility disclosures and earnings quality: Are they a reflection of managers’ opportunistic behavior?

Purpose – This paper aims to explore the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures and earnings quality proxied by earnings accruals. Specifically, we examine whether CSR disclosures are context-specific, that is, whether companies dominated by powerful stakeholders are obliged to behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management, thereby reporting higher-quality earnings to investors. Design/methodology/approach – This paper explores the relationship between CSR disclosures and earnings quality proxied by earnings accruals. Specifically, we examine whether CSR disclosures are context-specific, that is, whether companies dominated by powerful stakeholders are obliged to behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management, thereby reporting higher-quality earnings to investors. Findings – Results show that managers in an emerging economy manage earnings when they provide more CSR disclosures. Such earnings management is achieved through income increasing discretionary accruals. Furthermore, companies from export-oriented industries dominated by powerful stakeholders (international buyers) disclosing more CSR activities, provide transparent financial reports through constraining earnings management. Originality/value – The findings of this study are significant for both investors and policymakers. Investors should not take for granted that firms engage in CSR activities, behave ethically and provide transparent financial reports. As we document that firms might manipulate earnings through discretionary accruals and provide less transparent financial reports to shareholders, the credibility of firms’ CSR policies should be assessed with caution. Policies directing at promoting socially responsible practices instead of motivating the desired behaviour, may provide managers with additional incentives to utilise CSR for opportunistic behaviour. Thus, policymakers need to be cautious about this opportunistic behaviour and enhance monitoring to enforce social compliance. Possibly, some guidelines can be introduced to confirm that CSR disclosures are based on actual practice and not just a “green wash” statement to deceive stakeholders.

Auditor industry specialization, political economy and earnings quality: some cross-country evidence

Using cross-country data, we evaluate the impact of investor protection on the association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists. Our findings show that the positive association between industry specialist auditors and earnings quality as documented in the literature is affected by the political electoral system, which reflects investor protection rights in a country. We document that audits by industry specialists are associated with higher earnings quality in countries with the proportional electoral system, reflecting weak investor protection. Our results also confirm Kwon et al.'s findings that overall there is a positive association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists in countries with weak legal enforcement. Our findings, however, indicate that Kwon et al.'s results are valid only for countries with weak investor protection reflected by the proportional electoral system and not for countries with strong investor protection reflected by the majoritarian electoral system. These findings thus suggest that higher earnings quality of firms audited by industry specialists across countries can especially be expected when investor protection is low and legal enforcement is also weak. In addition, our research suggests that future cross-country studies could explicitly consider the role of the political electoral system of a country in evaluating corporate governance, management and accounting issues.

Distress risk, growth and earnings quality

We extend and complement prior work by investigating the earnings quality of firms with different financial health characteristics and growth prospects. By using three alternative measures of default likelihood and two alternative measures of growth options, without being limited to a specific event, we provide a more comprehensive setup for analysing the earnings characteristics of the universe of firms than examining distressed firms with persistent losses, dividend reductions or bankruptcy-filings. Our dataset consists of 15,049 healthy U.S. firms over the period 1990-2004. Results show that the relation between earnings quality and financial health is not monotonic. Distressed firms have a low level of earnings timeliness for bad news and a high level for good news, and manage earnings toward a positive target more frequently than healthy firms. On the other hand, healthy firms have a high level of earnings timeliness for bad news. Growth aspects play an important role in a firm's ability to manage earnings. In contrast to the findings of prior studies, growth firms have greater earnings timeliness for bad news, whereas value firms manage earnings toward a positive target more frequently than growth firms. © 2011 The Authors. Abacus© 2011 Accounting Foundation, The University of Sydney.

Earnings quality : some evidence on the role of auditor tenure and auditors' industry expertise

Prior studies suggest that auditors with short tenure are associated with lower earnings quality because of the lack of client-specific knowledge and/or low balling. In this study, we examine whether industry specialization of auditors and low balling affect the association between auditor tenure and earnings quality. We find that the association between shorter auditor tenure and lower earnings quality is weaker for firms audited by industry specialists compared to non-specialists. In addition, we do not find results consistent with the low balling explanation.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Gender-diverse boards and properties of analyst earnings forecasts

Using a sample of 2,200 US listed firm year observations (2001-2007)this study shows a positive (negative) relation between female participation in corporate boards and analysts' earnings forecast accuracy (dispersion), after controlling for earnings quality, corporate governance, audit quality, stock price informativeness and potential endogeneity. Our findings are important as they suggest that board diversity adds to the transparency and accuracy of financial reports such that earnings expectations are likely to be more accurate for these firms.

Busy auditors, ethical behavior, and discretionary accruals quality in Malaysia

The required professional and ethical pronouncements of accountants mean that auditors need to be competent and exercise due care and skill in the performance of their audits. In this study, we examine what happens when auditors take on more clients than they should, thus raising doubts about their ability to maintain competence and audit quality. Using 2803 observations of Malaysian companies from 2010 to 2013, we find that auditors with multiple clients are associated with lower earnings quality, proxied by total accruals and discretionary accruals. Our results demonstrate that associating client firms’ reported discretionary accruals with individual auditors, rather than their firms or offices, is important in determining audit quality. Moreover, we demonstrate that the disclosure of auditors’ signatures on their reports is useful for assessing auditor quality at the individual level, thus contributing to the debate on the usefulness of having auditor identities on reports.

Gender-diverse boards and properties of analyst earnings forecasts

Using a sample of 2,200 U.S. listed firm-year observations (2001-2007), this study shows a positive (negative) relation between gender diversity on corporate boards and analysts' earnings forecast accuracy (dispersion), after controlling for earnings quality, corporate governance, audit quality, stock price informativeness, and potential endogeneity. Our findings are important as they suggest that board diversity adds to the transparency and accuracy of financial reports such that earnings expectations are likely to be more accurate for these firms.

Response to the Discussion of "The Effect on Financial Reporting Quality of an Exemption From the SEC Reporting Requirements for Foreign Private Issuers"

We appreciate the thorough discussion provided by Professor Yuan Ding. His comments raise legitimate issues. In this response, we offer clarifications and suggest avenues for future research. Our response follows the structure of the discussant’s paper and elaborates on each point separately.

The Effect on Financial Reporting Quality of an Exemption From the SEC Reporting Requirements for Foreign Private Issuers

We test for differences in financial reporting quality between companies that are required to file periodically with the SEC and those that are exempted from filing reports with the SEC under Rule 12g3-2(b). We examine three earnings quality measures: conservatism, abnormal accruals, and the predictability of earnings. Our results, for all three measures, show different financial reporting quality for companies that file with the SEC than for companies exempt from filing requirements. This paper provides empirical evidence of a link between filing with the SEC and financial reporting quality for foreign firms.

Loan loss provisions, earnings management and capital management under IFRS:the case of EU commercial banks

Prior research has shown that loan loss provisions are primarily used as a tool for earnings management and capital management by listed banks. Effective 2005 all listed companies in the European Union (EU) are required to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Adherence to IFRS, it is claimed, should enhance transparency of reporting practices relative to local General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The overall objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the implementation of IFRS on the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) to manage earnings and capital. We use a sample of 91 EU listed commercial banks covering a period of 10 years (before and after implementation of IFRS). Since early adopters may have different incentives and motivations relative to those who adopt mandatorily, we dichotomize our sample into early and late adopters. Overall, we find that earnings management (using loan loss provisions) for both early and late adopters while significant over the estimation window is significantly reduced after implementation of IFRS. We also find that, for risky banks, earnings management behavior is more pronounced when compared to the less risky banks, but is significantly reduced in the post IFRS period. Capital management behavior by bank managers is not significant in both pre and post IFRS regimes. Overall, we conclude that the implementation of IFRS in the EU appears to have improved earnings quality by mitigating the tendency of bank managers of listed commercial banks to engage in earnings management using loan loss provisions.

Impact of financial crisis on earnings management in listed companies of Portugal and UK

Firm’s financial information is essential to stakeholders’ decision making. Although not always financial statements show the firm’s real image. This study examines listed firms from Portugal and UK. Firms have different purposes to manipulate earnings: some strive for influencing investors’ perception about a particular company, some try to provide better position for gaining finance from credit institutions or paying less tax to tax authorities. Usually, this behaviour is induced when firms have financial problems. Consequently, the study also aims to see the impact of financial crisis on earnings management. We try to answer question how does extent of firms’ involvement in earnings management change when the world undergoes financial crisis. Furthermore, we also compare two countries with different legal forces in terms of quality of accounting to see the main differences. We used a panel data methodology to analyse financial data from 2004 till 2014 of listed firms from Portugal and UK. Beneish (1999) model was applied to categorize manipulator and non-manipulator firms. Analysing accounting information according to Beneish’s ratios, findings suggest that financial crisis had certain impact on firms’ tendency to manipulate financial results in UK although it is not statistically significant. Moreover, besides the differences between Portugal and UK, results contradict the common view of legal systems’ quality, as UK firms tend to apply more accounting techniques for manipulation than the Portuguese ones. Our main results also confirm that some UK firms manipulate ratios of receivables’ days, asset quality index, depreciation index, leverage, sales and general administrative expenses whereas Portuguese firms manipulate only receivables’ days. Finally, we also find that the main reason to manipulate results is not to influence the cost of obtained funds neither to minimize tax burden since net profit does not explain the ratios used in the Beneish model. Results suggest that the main concern to listed firms manipulate results is to influence financial investors perception.