Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

Argentine convertibility: is it a relevant precedent for the dollarization process in Ecuador?

Includes bibliography

The political economy of Mexico's dollarization debate

Includes bibliography

The monetary crisis, dollarization and the exchange rate

Includes bibliography

Bankruptcy Costs, Liability Dollarization, and Vulnerability to Sudden Stops

Emerging market countries that have improved institutions and attained intermediate levels of institutional quality have experienced severe financial crises following capital flow reversals. However, there is also evidence that countries with strong institutions and deep capital markets are less affected by external shocks. We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors. ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerability to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liability dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between bankruptcy recovery rates and the output loss following sudden stops. We provide empirical evidence that this non-linear relationship exists.

An Assessment of the Case for Monetary Union or Official Dollarization in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela

We use a data set covering the whole period of Argentina's currency board and most of that spanned by the Mercosur trade agreement to examine the case for either a Latin American monetary union or monetary union with the USA (through official dollarization). Our econometric evidence using VAR techniques indicates that macroeconomic shocks are still so highly asymmetric in Latin America and between Latin American countries and the USA as to make monetary union or official dollarization somewhat doubtful policies.

Liability dollarization and fear of floating

This paper explores the idea that fear of floating can be justified as an optimal discretionary monetary policy in a dollarized emerging economy. Specifically, I consider a small open economy in which intermediate goods importers borrow in foreign currency and face a credit constraint. In this economy, exchange rate depreciation not only worsens importers' net-worth but also increases the financing amount in domestic currency, therefore exaggerating their borrowing finance premium. Besides, because of high exchange rate pass-through into import prices, fluctuations in the exchange rate also have strong impacts on domestic prices and production. These effects, together, magnify the macroeconomic consequences of the floating exchange rate policy in response to external shocks. The paper shows that the floating exchange rate regime is dominated by the fixed exchange rate regime in the role of cushioning shocks and in welfare terms.

Deposit dollarization in Myanmar

Myanmar has peculiar conditions of deposit dollarization that were shaped by administrative controls. On the one hand, restrictive controls encouraged the accumulation of foreign currency deposits (FCD). On the other hand, foreign currency loans (FCL) were not practiced officially; therefore, FCD was not utilized for credit. Given the adverse effects and persistence of dollarization in other dollarized economies and the recent recovery of local currency deposits in Myanmar, this paper opts for the prohibition of FCL and offers policy measures for de-dollarization.

Inflation, currency substitution and dollarization: The case of Argentina

This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several decades.^ First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional lump-sum transfers.^ Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the other.^ Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a constraint on governments' inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect substitutability between currencies.^ We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation, individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign ones.^ We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process.^ Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency. Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is intricately linked to "populist" solutions. ^

Inflation, currency substitution, and dollarization : the case of Argentina

This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several decades. First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional lump-sum transfers. Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the other. Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a constraint on governments inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect substitutability between currencies. We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation, individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign ones. We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process. Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency. Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is intricately linked to "populist" solutions.

Efectos de la globalización con medidas monetarias como la dolarización sobre los países latinoamericanos. Estudio de caso: Dolarización en el Ecuador

La globalización está generando la adopción de políticas de choque en los países en vía de desarrollo, lo cual podría traer un mayor estancamiento al interior. Analizar los efectos de la dolarización como medidas sobre los países latinoamericanos

El Ecuador y el ALCA: temas para la reflexión (Tema Central)

El artículo analiza los avances de las negociaciones comerciales del Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas. Se sostiene que Ecuador debe tomar previsiones, principalmente dada la dolarización. Falconí plantea un necesario cambio de perspectiva de la política pública y la gestión microeconómica para así generar un régimen especial para los países menores. Se propone también algunas líneas generales de un Programa de Cooperación Hemisférica. Dado que el ALCA podría implicar riesgos para la región, se enfatiza la necesidad de una estrategia a largo plazo.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.