Surveillance Town: Social inclusion-exclusion through surveillance, ‘the dignity of work’ and income management

This paper discusses the situation of welfare claimants, constructed as faulty citizens and flawed welfare subjects at the receiving end of complex and multi-layered, private and public, forms of monitoring and surveillance aimed at securing socially responsible, consuming and compliant behaviours. In Australia as in many other western countries, the rise of neoliberal economic regimes with their harsh and often repressive treatment of welfare claimants operates in tandem with a growing arsenal of CCTV and assorted urban governance measures (Monahan 2008, Maki 2011). The capacity for all forms of surveillance to intensify social inequalities through the lens of CCTV and other modes and methods of electronic monitoring is amply demonstrated in the surveillance studies literature, raising fundamental questions around issues of social justice, equity and the expenditure of societal resources (Norris and Armstrong 1999, Lyon 1994, 2001, Loader 1996).

The Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013: Suicide, dignity and the Irish discourse on abortion

Accepted Version

The Role of Dignity in Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa

This paper examines the link made on occasion between the concept of dignity and substantive equality; it is further noted that dignity can have very different meanings in different contexts. While the notion of dignity does not often play a substantive role in the resolution of decisions, sometimes the underlying understanding of dignity does matter. However, in all cases, judges should avoid the temptation to rely on unarticulated value judgments or subjective notions of dignity. When judges make reference to dignity, they should articulate the values underpinning their conception of it.

A total Indifference to Our Dignity: Older People's Understanding of Elder Abuse

Findings show that the current definitions of elder abuse, which centre on the actions or inactions of a person or persons where there is an expectation of trust, ignore wider societal issues like the withdrawal of respect and recognition. This serves to place older people in vulnerable positions.
Standard typologies of abuse were recognised by participants, although sexual abuse was not commonly mentioned except when prompted. However, what also emerged was a new concept of ‘personhood abuse’. This refers to societal attitudes; how these affect a person’s confidence, autonomy and agency resulting in an inability to say no or to stand up for oneself against abusive
acts, words and pressures possibly from fear of negative repercussions such as withdrawal of contact and/or care. Many ways were identified to support older people and reduce the opportunity for abusive actions to occur. They centred on community-based and peer supports through ‘having someone to talk
to’ and being aware of their rights. Continued involvement in community based activity which keeps people active and participating in society, such as community transport and clubs, supported people’s access to amenities and opportunities for engagement and were identified as ways to
prevent abuse from happening. Enhanced status, resources and support therefore need to be given to these types of community activities to prevent abuse occurring in the first place. These types of supports can enable older people to share their concerns in an everyday setting and to gain informal support and confidence; seeking more formal interventions when necessary.

Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Understanding Human Dignity

“Understanding Human Dignity” aims to help the reader make sense of current debates about the meaning and implications of the idea of “human dignity.” The concept of human dignity has probably never been so omni-present in everyday speech, or so deeply embedded in political and legal discourse. In debates on torture, abortion, same-sex marriage, and welfare reform, appeals to dignity are seldom hard to find. The concept of dignity is not only a prominent feature of political debate, but also, and increasingly, of legal argument. Indeed, courts tell us that human dignity is the foundation of all human rights. But the more important it is, the more contested it seems to have become. There has, as a result, been an extraordinary explosion of scholarly writing about the concept of human dignity in law, political philosophy, and theology. This book aims to reflect on these intra-disciplinary debates about dignity in law, philosophy, history, politics, and theology, through a series of edited essays from specialists in these fields, explored the contested concept in its full richness and complexity.

Dignity and religion

This chapter, included in a book examining the relationship between Islam and English Law, considers the role that the idea of 'human dignity' plays in discussions of the relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights and freedom of religion, and the implications this has for future consideration of the place of Shari'a.

Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber’s judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment’s profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.

Promoting Dignity for All: Human Rights Approaches in the Post-2015 Climate Change, Disaster Risk Reduction and Sustainable Development Frameworks

This article takes as its starting point the potentially negative human rights implications that the effects of climate change, disasters and development practices can have on individuals and communities. It argues that key international instruments, including the post-2015 successors to the Kyoto Protocol, Hyogo Framework for Action on disaster risk reduction and the Millennium Development Goals, appear to be moving towards an express acknowledgment of the relevance of international human rights law as an important mechanism to minimise potential harms that may arise. This raises the question as to the appropriate role of the UN human rights monitoring and accountability mechanisms in identifying the relevant rights-holders and duty-bearers. The article therefore provides an examination of the linkages between climate change and international human rights law, as well as discussion of the human rights considerations and accountability mechanisms for disasters and sustainable development. The article concludes by arguing that despite differential understandings between disciplines as to the meaning of key terms such as ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’, international human rights law provides a comprehensive basis for promoting international and national accountability. It follows that a greater level of coordination and coherence between the human rights approaches of the various post-2015 legal and policy frameworks is warranted as a means of promoting the dignity of those most affected by climate change, disasters and developmental activities.

Labour Law as Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of ‘Dignity’ by Freedland and Kountouris

In their recent book, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris present an ambitious study of the personal scope of (what they would not want to call) ‘employment’ law. The book does this within a broader argument that calls for the reconceptualization of labour law as a whole, and it is this broader argument on which I shall focus in this chapter. Their aim, in urging us to see labour law through the lens of ‘dignity’ is to bring labour law and human rights law into closer alignment than has sometimes been the case in the past. Increasingly, dignity is seen as providing a, sometimes the, foundation of human rights law, particularly in Europe. I shall suggest that whilst the aim of constructing a new set of foundations for labour law is a worthy and increasingly urgent task, the concepts on which Freedland and Kountouris seek to build their project pose significant difficulties. In particular, their espousal of ‘dignity’ presents problems that must be addressed if their reconceptualization is not to prove a blind alley.

Dignity and the Challenge to Liberty :Reading Andras Sajo's Constitutional Sentiments

This paper considers debates about the anti-liberal tendencies of the concept of “human dignity”, in particular those conceptions that are “expressivist”. My aim is to examine how far conceptions of dignity are expressivist, and if so what problems the concept of dignity understood in this way poses for liberty. I consider concerns about dignity’s potential illiberality, in particular the potential illiberality of respect-based conceptions of dignity, in the context of Professor András Sajó’s recent writing, illustrating the discussion with examples drawn from recent judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding freedom of speech.

Portraying Human Dignity

I consider whether Diego Velázquez (1599-1660) in his painting Las Meninas has conveyed several aspects of the idea of human dignity in ways that not only echo some aspects of contemporary philosophical and legal analysis, but transcend them, bringing into our understanding aspects of dignity, and the controversy surrounding it, that otherwise might be underestimated.

Reva Siegel and the Role of Religion in Constructing the Meaning of ‘Human Dignity

The “religious understanding” of dignity is a topic of considerable complexity and is the subject of extensive scholarship. In this paper, I consider understandings of dignity that are currently under discussion in Roman Catholic circles, not least because Catholic discussions of dignity are often seen as influential in public policy and legal interpretation, directly and indirectly. I shall focus on one relatively neglected issue in legal scholarship: how scholars go about the task of identifying what a particular religion’s understanding of human dignity involves.
To illustrate the methodological problems that such an enterprise raises, I shall take one attempt by a scholar writing in the field of secular legal scholarship to describe Catholic understandings of dignity in the context of abortion and same-sex marriage. The discussion is that of Reva Siegel, an academic lawyer at Yale University; her recent analysis of differing understandings of dignity illustrates some of the issues that arise when the secular scholarly community addresses religious understandings of dignity.

Dignity, Rights and the Comparative Method

This chapter considers the role of dignity in the development of constitutional rights, and relates this to the use of the comparative method, which has long been associated with the development of constitutional rights.