Debts “incurred” by receivers, administrators and liquidators : the case for a harmonised construction of ss 419, 443A and 556(1)(a) of the Corporations Act

This article analyses the inconsistent approaches taken by courts when interpreting provisions of the Corporations Act which address debts or expenses “incurred” by receivers, administrators and liquidators. The article contends for a consistent construction of these provisions which will enable the legislation to operate (as was intended) for the benefit of persons who supply goods, services or labour to companies in external administration. The article explains how and why debts can be “incurred” by insolvency practitioners continuing on pre-existing contracts. Specifically, the article contends for a construction of ss 419 and 443A of the Corporations Act which renders receivers and administrators personally liable for certain entitlements of employees (eg, wages and superannuation contributions) which become due and payable by reason of the decision of a receiver or administrator to continue a pre-existing contract rather than terminate it.

List of debts to K. K. S. I.

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Accounts of K. K. S. I--Membership, Debts, Bonds and Interest

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Debts of honor

UANL

"Sexually transmitted debts":the scope of defences to directors' liability for insolvent trading

The recent demise of prominent Australian corporations, such as GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, One.Tel Ltd, HIH Insurance Ltd and Ansett Australia Ltd, have highlighted the relevance of, inter alia, the Australian insolvent trading provisions embodied in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (formerly Corporations Law). What may not be appreciated, however, is that insolvent trading is not only concerned with large public companies. Many of the insolvent trading cases that come before the courts involve small proprietary companies. Moreover, in many cases these are small “family” companies where there may only be one active director. This gives rise to a difficult issue as to the appropriateness of imposing liability for insolvent trading on a spouse who is, factually, merely a dormant director. This article explores the issue of spousal liability for insolvent trading, particularly focusing on the scope of the current defences to insolvent
trading under s 588H.

Charges over book debts in the United Kingdom and Australia : the way forward

Is it possible to create a fixed charge over book debts? This question was recently decided by the House of Lords in National Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Limited & Ors [2005] UKHL 41 where the full House was against the idea of a fixed charge on book debts and insisted that only a
floating charge had been created. The law in this area is still vague and uncertain in Australia. This article argues that the financiers and the companies should be given the freedom to decide how they wish to structure their charge documents. The article sets out to argue that it is possible to create a sustained workable fixed charge or even a multiple combination of fixed and floating charge over book debts and argues that this would be the only way for both the financiers and the companies to do business together, in respect to the use of book debts as security for a loan. The author explains how this could be possible and how the proposed model would not deny the statutory priority rights of the preferential creditors.

Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

Apresentação 10: “Inflation Targeting”, “Currency Regimes with Defaultable Debts” e Sistema Tributário na Presença de Informalidade e Evasão Fiscal…A disseminação internacional das pesquisas aplicadas relacionadas a agenda brasileira

Coordenadora: Goret P. Paulo

National debts : partly read before the British Association, at Liverpool, Sept. 1870

by R. Dudley Baxter