Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment : criminal responsibility for established medical practice?

The law recognises the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment even if this will lead to death. Guardianship and other legislation also facilitates the making of decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in certain circumstances. Despite this apparent endorsement that such decisions can be lawful, doubts have been raised in Queensland about whether decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment would contravene the criminal law, and particularly the duty imposed by the Criminal Code (Qld) to provide the “necessaries of life”. This article considers this tension in the law and examines various arguments that might allow for such decisions to be made lawfully. It ultimately concludes, however, that criminal responsibility may still arise and so reform is needed.

Mental Abnormality And Criminal Responsibility

This is a study in criminal law. The problem probed is the relationship between mental abnormality and criminal responsibility. The subject is yet an unsolved area in criminal jurisprudence. It is of great interest to many jurists lawyers philosophers and psychiatrists. The study lays special emphasis on the Indian law .Comparative assessment wherever found necessary,especially of positions in England ,United states and Germany is made. The thesis is in six parts and sixteen chapters.

Psychopathy, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility

Peer reviewed

Criminal responsibility and social constraint.

Mode of access: Internet.

Financial and Criminal Responsibility for Public Funds – Protection of the Constitutional Fundamental Social Law of Health

Abstract: The implementation of Fundamental Constitutional Health and Social Rights is necessary, appropriate and proportionate, following the demands of the population. Accountability and self-responsibility play a very important role. This requires the development of constitutional principles that protect public funds against corruption and offer a constitutional right to health protection. Financial and criminal liability might provide an incentive to improve the management of public funds and reinforce fundamental constitutional principles, particularly regarding the right to health. Constitutional, administrative and criminal issues, as well as public management and administration and the science of good governance, should be articulated in a single strategy also in the health sector. In Portugal and Brazil, as examples, the Federal Court / Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court / High Court of Justice or the Court of Auditors should be considered together.

Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal?: ‘Redeemability’ and the Psychology of Punitive Public Attitudes

Several studies have sought to link punitive public attitudes to attribution style and/or lay theories of crime. This research finds that those who believe criminal acts are the result of freely chosen and willful behavior are more likely to be punitive than those who feel crime is the result of external circumstances and constraints. These analyses focus on only one dimension of attributions: locus of control (internal/external). In this analysis, we include a second dimension, thought to be a better predictor of attitudes in social psychological research: stability/instability. In addition to measuring lay theories of crime causation, we also test for “belief in redeemability” (or beliefs about the ability of deviants to change their ways). Our hypothesis is that this other dimension of personal attributions (stability/instability) may be as critical in explaining support for highly punitive criminal justice policies as beliefs about criminal responsibility. We find evidence supportive of this model in an analysis of data from postal survey of residents of six areas in England.

Reparative Complementarity: Ensuring an Effective Remedy for Victims in the Reparation Regime of the International Criminal Court

This article examines the reparation regime of the International Criminal Court in light of its first reparation decision. Based on the reparation jurisprudence established in international law and human rights law to provide victims of international crimes an effective remedy, this article suggests that in order for the International Criminal Court to achieve this objective it needs to go beyond individual criminal responsibility due to its limitations. This article considers the role of reparative complementarity in ensuring an effective remedy to victims of international crimes as part of the reparation regime of the International Criminal Court.

Accountability for Forced Displacement in Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda before the International Criminal Court

This article examines the challenges of investigating and prosecuting forced displacement in the Central African countries of Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, where higher loss of life was caused by forced displacement, than by any other. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, armed groups intentionally attacked civilian populations displacing them from their homes, to cut them off from food and medical supplies. In Northern Uganda, the government engaged in a forced displacement policy as part of its counter-insurgency against the Lord’s Resistance Army, driving the civilian population into “protected villages”, where at one point the weekly death toll was over 1,000 in these camps. This article critically evaluates how criminal responsibility can be established for forced displacement and alternative approaches to accountability through reparations.

Punitive damages in Brazilian law and the boundaries between criminal and civil liabilities

This article demonstrates the existence of civil responsibility with punitive purposes in Brazilian Law, explaining how it was introduced by jurisdictional activity in cases involving moral damages. Next, it points out main problems this situation represents to Brazilian Law from the standpoint of our juridical dogmatics and public policies. Additionally, it proposes the execution of an empirical research for comprehension of the structure and fundamentals of jurisprudence on the punitive character of civil responsibility for moral damages and establishes criteria for use in this research based on theories of punishment. Finally, it positions the problem of punitive function of civil responsibility in the broader ambit of relationships and boundaries between civil and criminal responsibility.

Palliative care, double effect and the law in Australia

Care and decision-making at the end of life that promotes comfort and dignity is widely endorsed by public policy and the law. In ethical analysis of palliative care interventions that are argued potentially to hasten death, these may be deemed to be ethically permissible by the application of the doctrine of double effect, if the doctor’s intention is to relieve pain and not cause death. In part because of the significance of ethics in the development of law in the medical sphere, this doctrine is also likely to be recognized as part of Australia’s common law, although hitherto there have been no cases concerning palliative care brought before a court in Australia to test this. Three Australian States have, nonetheless, created legislative defences that are different from the common law with the intent of clarifying the law, promoting palliative care, and distinguishing it from euthanasia. However, these defences have the potential to provide less protection for doctors administering palliative care. In addition to requiring a doctor to have an appropriate intent, the defences insist on adherence to particular medical practice standards and perhaps require patient consent. Doctors providing end-of-life care in these States need to be aware of these legislative changes. Acting in accordance with the common law doctrine of double effect may not provide legal protection. Similar changes are likely to occur in other States and Territories as there is a trend towards enacting legislative defences that deal with the provision of palliative care.

How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

The purpose of this paper is to provide a basis from which to start an informed and rational dialogue in Australia about voluntary euthanasia (VE) and assisted suicide (AS). It does this by seeking to chart the broad landscape of issues that can be raised as relevant to how this conduct should be regulated by the law. It is not our purpose to persuade. Rather, we have attempted to address the issues as neutrally as possible and to canvass both sides of the argument in an even-handed manner. We hope that this exercise places the reader in a position to consider the question posed by this paper: How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide? In line with the approach taken in the paper, this question does not take sides in the debate. It simply asks how VE and AS should be regulated, acknowledging that both prohibition and legalisation of such conduct involve regulation. We begin by considering the wider legal framework that governs end of life decision-making. Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that result in a person’s death can be lawful. This could be because, for example, a competent adult refuses such treatment. Alternatively, stopping or not providing treatment can be lawful when it is no longer in a person’s best interests to receive it. The law also recognises that appropriate palliative care should not attract criminal responsibility. By contrast, VE and AS are unlawful in Australia and could lead to prosecution for crimes such as murder, manslaughter or aiding and abetting suicide. But this is not to say that such conduct does not occur in practice. Indeed, there is a body of evidence that VE and AS occur in Australia, despite them being unlawful. There have been repeated efforts to change the law in this country, mainly by the minor political parties. However, apart from a brief period when VE and AS was lawful in the Northern Territory, these attempts to reform the law have been unsuccessful. The position is different in a small but increasing number of jurisdictions overseas where such conduct is lawful. The most well known is the Netherlands but there are also statutory regimes that regulate VE and/or AS in Belgium and Luxembourg in Europe, and Oregon and Washington in the United States. A feature of these legislative models is that they incorporate review or oversight processes that enable the collection of data about how the law is being used. As a result, there is a significant body of evidence that is available for consideration to assess the operation of the law in these jurisdictions and some of this is considered briefly here. Assisting a suicide, if done for selfless motives, is also legal in Switzerland, and this has resulted in what has been referred to as ‘euthanasia tourism’. This model is also considered. The paper also identifies the major arguments in favour of, and against, legalisation of VE and AS. Arguments often advanced in favour of law reform include respect for autonomy, that public opinion favours reform, and that the current law is incoherent and discriminatory. Key arguments against legalising VE and AS point to the sanctity of life, concerns about the adequacy and effectiveness of safeguards, and a ‘slippery slope’ that will allow euthanasia to occur for minors or for adults where it is not voluntary. We have also attempted to step beyond these well trodden and often rehearsed cases ‘for and against’. To this end, we have identified some ethical values that might span both sides of the debate and perhaps be the subject of wider consensus. We then outline a framework for considering the issue of how Australia should regulate VE and AS. We begin by asking whether such conduct should be criminal acts (as they presently are). If VE and AS should continue to attract criminal responsibility, the next step is to enquire whether the law should punish such conduct more or less than is presently the case, or whether the law should stay the same. If a change is favoured as to how the criminal law punishes VE and AS, options considered include sentencing reform, creating context-specific offences or developing prosecutorial guidelines for how the criminal justice system deals with these issues. If VE and AS should not be criminal acts, then questions arise as to how and when they should be permitted and regulated. Possible elements of any reform model include: ensuring decision-making is competent and voluntary; ascertaining a person’s eligibility to utilise the regime, for example, whether it depends on him or her having a terminal illness or experiencing pain and suffering; and setting out processes for how any decision must be made and evidenced. Options to bring about decriminalisation include challenging the validity of laws that make VE and AS unlawful, recognising a defence to criminal prosecution, or creating a statutory framework to regulate the practice. We conclude the paper where we started: with a call for rational and informed consideration of a difficult and sensitive issue. How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

What makes juvenile offenders different from adult offenders?

Historically, children in criminal justice proceedings were treated much the same as adults and subject to the same criminal justice processes as adults. Until the early twentieth century, children in Australia were even subjected to the same penalties as adults, including hard labour and corporal and capital punishment (Carrington & Pereira 2009). Until the mid-nineteenth century, there was no separate category of ’juvenile offender’ in Western legal systems and children as young as six years of age were incarcerated in Australian prisons (Cunneen & White 2007). It is widely acknowledged today, however, both in Australia and internationally, that juveniles should be subject to a system of criminal justice that is separate from the adult system and that recognises their inexperience and immaturity. As such, juveniles are typically dealt with separately from adults and treated less harshly than their adult counterparts. The United Nations’ (1985: 2) Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the ‘Beijing Rules’) stress the importance of nations establishing a set of laws, rules and provisions specifically applicable to juvenile offenders and institutions and bodies entrusted with the functions of the administration of juvenile justice and designed to meet the varying needs of juvenile offenders, while protecting their basic rights. In each Australian jurisdiction, except Queensland, a juvenile is defined as a person aged between 10 and 17 years of age, inclusive. In Queensland, a juvenile is defined as a person aged between 10 and 16 years, inclusive. In all jurisdictions, the minimum age of criminal responsibility is 10 years. That is, children under 10 years of age cannot be held legally responsible for their actions.